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Rob Warden*
John Seasly**
INTRODUCTION
Nineteen years ago, a New Yorker cartoon depicted a judge proclaiming,
“Innocence is no excuse.”1 As humorous as it may have been, only a sadist could find
anything amusing about the extent to which the cartoon reflected, and continues to
reflect, the reality of U.S. criminal justice in general and capital punishment in particular.
For most of the nation’s history, innocence was barely a footnote in the dominant
narrative of criminal justice—exemplified by the distinguished liberal jurist Learned
Hand’s assertion in 1923 that:
Our procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man
convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is the archaic
formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the
prosecution of crime.2
Since the advent and advance of DNA forensic technology in the late twentieth
century,3 the “unreal dream” has given way to a nightmare of unintended consequences—
of which the most thoroughly documented is false convictions.4 As of June 2019, 161
prisoners sentenced to death under laws enacted after the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down all state death-penalty laws in 1972 5 had been exonerated based on substantial
claims of innocence.6

* Executive Director Emeritus, Center on Wrongful Convictions, Bluhm Legal Clinic, Northwestern
Pritzker School of Law; Co-founder, National Registry of Exonerations; Co-founder, Injustice Watch, a
Chicago-based investigative journalism project focusing on criminal justice reform.
** Reporter, Injustice Watch. Seasly received a BA in Journalism from Indiana University in 2011 and an
MS in Journalism from Northwestern University in 2014.
1
J.B. Handelsman, Innocence Is No Excuse, NEW YORKER, Aug. 21, 2000, at 142.
2
United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
3
See WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE
INNOCENT 2 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017) (“The first use of DNA technology to free an innocent defendant
in the United States occurred in 1989.”).
4
Since the advent of the DNA forensic age, more than 2,400 false convictions have been documented.
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last
visited May 23, 2019).
5
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam).
6
Innocence Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence (last visited
June 6, 2019). The list includes the names of 165 exonerated persons, but four were convicted under pre1972 laws. Id.
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A second—worse—unintended consequence of capital punishment is the execution
of the falsely accused and convicted, an inevitability that has been acknowledged
officially in only three cases, involving four defendants, whose executions long predate
the current laws, 7 while a greater number of likely mistaken executions has not been
acknowledged.8 A third unintended consequence is botched executions, of which history
is replete with examples.9 Scholarly research suggests that upwards of three percent of all
executions in the United States between 1890 and 2010 were botched.10
But there is a fourth unintended consequence: cases of unrequited innocence, in
which convicted men and women sentenced to death have not been exonerated despite
compelling evidence of innocence.11 Capital cases in the fourth category are the focus of
this Article, which does not purport to be a definitive study but rather a compilation of
anecdotal evidence of the lengths to which the criminal justice system sometimes goes to
avoid acknowledging the error of its ways. Although it is impossible to determine
innocence or guilt in any case beyond doubt, we believe that the twenty-four cases

7

William Jackson Marion was hanged in Nebraska in 1887 and received a full pardon in 1987. In the
Matter of a Posthumous Pardon for William Jackson Marion, Mar. 25, 1987 (granted by Neb. Gov. Robert
Kerrey on the 100th anniversary of Marion’s hanging) (on file with authors). Thomas and Meeks Griffin
were electrocuted in South Carolina in 1913 and received full pardons in 2009. Leonard Green, Race Prof
Clears 2 in ‘13 Slay, N.Y. POST, Oct. 15, 2009, at 8. Joe Arridy died in the Colorado gas chamber in 1939
and received a full pardon in 2011. Press Release, Office of Gov. Bill Ritter Jr., Gov. Ritter Grants
Posthumous Pardon in Case Dating Back to 1930s (Jan. 7, 2011),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/ArridyPardon.pdf.
8
See Rob Warden & Daniel Lennard, Death in America Under Color of Law: Our Long, Inglorious
Experience with Capital Punishment, 13 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 194, 249 (2018) (entry dated May 10,
1984) (James Adams, Fla.); id. at 249–50 (entry dated Sept. 10, 1984) (Timothy George Baldwin, La.); id.
at 254 (entry dated May 20, 1987) (Edward Earl Johnson, Miss.); id. at 255 (entry dated Mar. 15, 1988)
(Willie Jasper Darden, Fla.); id. at 256 (entry dated Dec. 7, 1989) (Carlos DeLuna, Tex.); id. at 257 (entry
dated May 4, 1990) (Jesse Joseph Tafero, Fla.); id. at 259 (entry dated May 12, 1993) (Lionel Torres
Herrera, Tex.); id. at 260–61 (entry dated Aug. 24, 1993) (Ruben M. Cantu, Tex.); id. at 263 (entry dated
May 17, 1995) (Girvies Davis, Ill.); id. at 264–65 (entry dated June 21, 1995) (Larry Griffin, Mo.); id. at
267 (entry dated July 23, 1997) (Joseph Roger O’Dell III, Va.); id. at 267–68 (entry dated Apr. 3, 1997)
(David Wayne Spence, Tex.); id. at 270–71 (entry dated Mar. 10, 1999) (Roy Michael Roberts, Mo.); id. at
273 (entry dated June 22, 2000) (Shaka Sankofa, Tex.); id. at 278 (entry dated Feb. 17, 2004) (Cameron
Todd Willingham, Tex.); id. at 288 (entry dated Sept. 21, 2011) (Troy Anthony Davis, Ga.).
9
Recent examples are the executions of Dennis McGuire in Ohio in 2014, Erica Goode, After a Prolonged
Execution, Questions over ‘Cruel and Unusual’, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2014, at A12, Clayton D. Lockett in
Oklahoma in 2014, Mark Berman, Inmate Dies Following Botched Oklahoma Execution, Second Execution
Delayed, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2014/04/29/oklahoma-execution-botched-inmate-still-dies-second-executiondelayed/?utm_term=.351f0c80f41b, and seventy-two-year-old Brandon Astor Jones in Georgia in 2016,
Georgia Executes Its Oldest Death Row Inmate at 72, TIMES & TRANSCRIPT (New Brunswick), Feb. 4,
2016, at B6.
10
Of 8,776 U.S. executions from 1890 through 2010, 276 were botched. AUSTIN SARAT, GRUESOME
SPECTACLES: BOTCHED EXECUTIONS AND AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY 179–210 (2014).
11
We have adopted the National Registry of Exoneration’s definition of “exoneration”—that a convicted
person has been “relieved of all legal consequences of [his or her] conviction through a decision by a
prosecutor, a governor or a court, after new evidence of his or her innocence was discovered.” SAMUEL R.
GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
1989–2012, at 6 (2012),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf.
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profiled in this Article, involving twenty-five condemned men and women, 12 are
sufficient to establish that unrequited innocence is a real and serious problem.
The criteria for inclusion among our profiles are simply that the prisoner was
sentenced to death more than fifteen years ago—a limit we set on the theory that the
records of more recent cases are unlikely to be sufficiently developed to enable
meaningful profiling—and that he or she has not been exonerated despite affirmative
evidence of innocence. Eleven of the defendants in the profiled cases remain on death
row.13 Three died while still under death sentences.14 Five received sentence reductions
but remained in prison.15 Six were released but not exonerated.16
The profiles are presented in chronological order by the date of the crime rather
than on the strength of the facts supporting the likelihood that the conviction was false.
Following the profiles, we discuss what might be done to address the problems posed by
the profiled cases.
PROFILES IN UNREQUITED INNOCENCE
1.

Sonia Jacobs—Florida

Phillip Black, a Florida state trooper, and Donald Irwin, a Canadian constable who
was visiting Black, were shot to death at an Interstate 95 rest stop in Broward County on
February 20, 1976. 17 Sonia “Sunny” Jacobs, a mother of two, was convicted of the
crime. 18 Her jury recommended a life sentence, but the judge—M. Daniel Futch, Jr.,
known as “Maximum Dan” 19 —sentenced her to death. 20 A month earlier, Futch had
12

One of the profiled cases involves two condemned men. See infra profile No. 7 (Thomas Jesse Ward &
Karl Allen Fontenot, Okla.).
13
Infra profile Nos. 2 (Jonathan Bruce Reed, Tex.), 6 (Kevin Cooper, Cal.), 8 (Jarvis Jay Masters, Cal.), 11
(Walter Ogrod, Pa.), 14 (Tyrone Lee Noling, Ohio), 16 (Eddie Lee Howard Jr., Miss.), 18 (Rodney Reed,
Tex.), 19 (Darlie Lynn Routier, Tex.), 21 (Marcellus S. Willams, Mo.), 22 (Larry Ray Swearingen, Tex.),
24 (Robert Leslie Roberson III, Tex.). The chance that Cooper and Masters will be executed decreased on
March 13, 2019, when California Governor Gavin Newsom declared a moratorium on executions. A Pause
for California’s Death Row (editorial), N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2019, at A24.
14
Infra profile Nos. 9 (Ralph International Thomas, Cal.), 12 (Anibal Garcia Rousseau, Tex.), 13 (Dennis
Harold Lawley, Cal.).
15
Infra profile Nos. 5 (John George Spirko Jr., Ohio), 7 (Karl Allen Fontenot & Thomas Jesse Ward), 15
(David Ronald Chandler, Ala. (federal)), 23 (Kimber Edwards, Mo.).
16
Infra profile Nos. 1 (Sonia Jacobs, Fla.), 4 (Edward Lee Elmore, S.C.), 10 (Ha’im Al Matin Sharif,
Nev.), 17 (Damien Wayne Echols, Ark.), 20 (Corey Dewayne Williams, La.). To avoid remaining behind
bars pending court-ordered retrials, four of these defendants—all except Williams—pleaded guilty while
professing innocence, as authorized under the Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 28 n.2 (1970) (affirming acceptance of a plea from Henry C. Alford, who had told the trial court
“I’m not guilty but I plead guilty”). While a petition for certiorari for Williams was pending before the U.S.
Supreme Court, the prosecution and defense filed a joint motion in the trial court to vacate his conviction,
with the understanding that he would plead guilty to lesser charges in exchange for immediate freedom.
The trial judge granted the motion and Williams was released. See infra notes 809–11 and accompanying
text.
17
Jacobs v. State, 396 So. 2d 713, 715 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam).
18
Id.
19
Mike Clary, Judge M.D. Futch, ‘Maximum Dan’, SUN SENTINEL (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.sunsentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-2009-04-14-0904130494-story.html.
20
Jacobs, 396 So. 2d at 715. In Florida, notwithstanding a jury recommendation of a life sentence, a trial
judge may impose a death sentence. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2017).
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sentenced Jesse Joseph Tafero, father of the younger of Jacobs’s children,21 to death for
the same crime.22
Jacobs, her children, Tafero, and Walter Norman Rhodes, Jr. had been asleep in a
Chevrolet Camero at the rest stop when Black and Irwin approached the car and, within
minutes, were shot to death.23 Rhodes would attribute the murders to Jacobs and Tafero.24
Jacobs claimed that she did not see what happened and denied firing any shots.25 Tafero
said that Rhodes killed the officers.26 Two truck drivers who saw the murders could not
discern who fired the shots, although they did see Rhodes standing in front of the car, and
one of the truckers thought the initial shots came from the back seat—which, if correct,
would indicate that Jacobs had fired them. 27 However, gunshot residue on Rhodes’s
hands indicated that he probably had fired all of the shots.28
Despite the conflicting evidence, the prosecution made a deal with Rhodes under
which he would plead guilty to second-degree murder and receive a life sentence in
exchange for testifying against Jacobs and Tafero.29 At both trials, Rhodes testified that
the officers ordered him out of the car and, while his back was to the car and his hands
were raised, he heard a shot, turned and saw Jacobs, in the rear seat, holding a ninemillimeter handgun,30 which Tafero took from her and with which he shot the officers.31
At the Jacobs trial, her former cellmate, Brenda Isham, testified that Jacobs had admitted
shooting the officers.32 The prosecution also introduced several ostensibly incriminating
statements police attributed to Jacobs—including allegedly answering, “We had to,”
when asked, “Do you like shooting troopers?”33
While Jacobs’s appeal was pending, her counsel discovered that the lead
prosecutor, Broward County Assistant State Attorney Michael J. Satz, had suppressed a
memo saying that Rhodes had told a polygraph examiner that “he could not be sure
21

Jacobs, 396 So. 2d at 715 n.2.
Tafero v. State, 403 So. 2d 355, 358–59 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam).
23
Jacobs, 396 So. 2d at 715.
24
Id. at 716.
25
Email message from Christie E. Webb, appellate attorney for Jacobs, to Rob Warden. (Jan. 2, 2018,
19:08 CST PM) (on file with authors).
26
Jacobs, 396 So. 2d at 716.
27
Jacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282, 1289 n.4 (11th Cir. 1992).
28
See FLA. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT, GUNPOWDER RESIDUE/NEUTRON ACTIVATION
ANALYSIS, REP. NO. 760250979, 1–2 (1976) (on file with authors) (reporting that residue on Rhodes’s
hands was “consistent with the subject having discharged a weapon,” while residue on Jacobs’s hands was
indicative only of her “having handled an unclean or recently discharged weapon” and that residue on
Tafero’s hands was indicative of him “having handled an unclean or recently discharged weapon, or
possibly discharging a weapon.”). These findings are consistent with Tafero’s claim that Rhodes handed
him the gun after firing it. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
29
Singletary, 952 F.2d at 1285–88; Tafero v. Wainwright, 796 F.2d 1314, 1315–16 (11th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam); Jacobs, 396 So. 2d at 715.
30
Jacobs, 396 So. 2d at 715.
31
Id.
32
Singletary, 952 F.2d at 1286. A 2005 study by the Center on Wrongful Convictions found that testimony
of witnesses with incentives to lie—“snitches,” in the vernacular—had been instrumental in fifty-one of
111 capital cases (45.9%) in which the defendants had been exonerated after capital punishment was
resumed in the 1970’s. NW. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, THE SNITCH SYSTEM:
HOW SNITCH TESTIMONY SENT RANDY STEIDL AND OTHER INNOCENT AMERICANS TO DEATH ROW 3
(2005), https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/SnitchSystemBooklet.pdf.
33
Jacobs, 396 So. 2d at 717.
22
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whether or not Jacobs had fired at all.”34 In light of the contradiction between the memo
and Rhodes’s trial testimony, the Florida Supreme Court put the appeal on hold, directing
Judge Futch to determine whether suppression of the memo had violated Jacobs’s
rights..35
Citing other prior inconsistent statements by Rhodes that the prosecution had
provided to the defense, Judge Futch held that, when Rhodes’s trial testimony “was
viewed in its entirety,” withholding the memo had not been prejudicial.36 In 1981, the
Florida Supreme Court agreed, affirming Jacobs’s conviction, but remanding her case for
resentencing—holding that Futch had lacked sufficient basis to override the jury’s
recommendation of a life sentence. 37 Futch thereupon resentenced Jacobs to life. 38
Rhodes, meanwhile, had signed an affidavit recanting his trial testimony “in the interest
of justice and to purge myself before my creator”39 and stating that moments after getting
out of the Camaro with a gun concealed under his shirt:
I fired a shot into the left side of his chest. The bullet went through him
and hit the chrome windshield molding of the patrol car. I fired four more
shots through his head and various parts of his body . . . As I swiveled to
the left, I observed Constable Irwin attempting to grap [sic] the service
revolver from Patrolman Black's grip. Thus I fired twice through his
head.40
The affidavit continued that Assistant State Attorney Satz had “coerced, threatened,
and cajoled” him to falsely attribute the murders to Tafero and Jacobs.41
In 1982, after Tafero had lost his appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, 42 Rhodes
stated in another affidavit that he had been “the triggerman” and that “neither Tafero nor
[Jacobs] participated in the shooting and had no prior knowledge that such would
occur.” 43 Rhodes mailed the second affidavit to Satz 44 and, days later, in a sworn
statement taken by an attorney for Tafero, again stated that he alone killed the officers. 45
Asked to explain why he had recanted his trial testimony, Rhodes replied:

34

Jacobs v. State, 357 So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam); see also Memorandum from Carl Lord,
polygraph examiner, to Assistant State Attorney Michael J. Satz (Apr. 6, 1976) (on file with authors).
35
Jacobs, 357 So. 2d at 171; see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that “the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment”).
36
Jacobs, 396 So. 2d at 716. Rhodes had not testified that he saw Jacobs fire a shot, but rather that he had
heard a shot and then saw Jacobs hand the gun to Tafero. Id.
37
Id. at 718.
38
Brief for Appellant at 3, Jacobs v. Dugger, No. 90-5293 (11th Cir. 1990) (on file with authors).
39
Affidavit of Walter Norman Rhodes at 1, (Nov. 9, 1979) (on file with authors).
40
Id. at 2.
41
Id. at 3.
42
Tafero v. State, 403 So. 2d 355, 358 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam).
43
Affidavit of Walter Norman Rhodes Jr., mailed to Broward County Assistant State Attorney Michael J.
Satz (Sept. 6, 1982) (on file with authors).
44
Id.
45
Sworn Statement of Walter Norman Rhodes at 9, 14 (taken by Elizabeth J. Du Fresne, Union Corr. Inst.,
Sept. 24, 1982) (on file with authors).
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It’s very simple. Ever since this thing happened, I felt extremely—I hate to
use the word, but I felt extremely guilty. . . . I felt guilty afterwards, after
coming to prison, and knowing that I put two people . . . on death row, for
something they didn’t do, and I did.46
Eventually, Rhodes recanted his recantations—claiming that they had been
motivated variously by pressure from fellow prisoners, by promises of sex, and by
substantial sums of money offered by a Tafero emissary 47 —but the Florida Supreme
Court denied an evidentiary hearing Tafero sought regarding the recantations.48 Tafero
sought a federal writ of habeas corpus, which also was denied, 49 and, on May 4, 1990, he
was executed—suffering a macabre death in “Old Sparky,” as the Florida electric chair
was known, convulsing as flames poured from his head.50
In Jacobs’s case, Brenda Isham, who had testified at Jacobs’s trial that she had
confessed to her, recanted, claiming—reminiscent of Rhodes’s recantations—that
prosecutors had pressured her into lying. 51 Isham initially had told the authorities—
contrary to her trial testimony—only that she had heard “jailhouse gossip” to the effect
that Jacobs had confessed—but the initial statement had not been disclosed to the
defense.52
As evidence of Jacobs’s innocence mounted, Micki Dickoff, a Los Angeles
filmmaker, initiated correspondence with her; the two had been inseparable friends in
their pre-teens living near each other on Long Island, New York, in the 1950s.53 After
46

Id. at 9. For a discussion of how courts and prosecutors often dismiss recantations as invalid, even though
they often eventually prove valid, see Rob Warden, Reflecting on Recantations, in WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 106 (Daniel
S. Medwed ed., 2017) (“One lesson of the DNA forensic age is that recantations of trial testimony by
prosecution witnesses deserve to be taken seriously, notwithstanding time-honored dicta to the contrary.
Unfortunately, the lesson seems to have been lost on some prosecutors and judges.”).
47
Lane Kelley, Threats, Bribes Changed Testimony, Inmate Says, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Oct. 3,
1992, at 3B (quoting Rhodes as saying that he had recanted in light of “subtle pressure” from prisoners,
leading him to fear for his life, and in light of a visit from a since-deceased female Tafero emissary who
“was willing to do anything to get me to change my testimony”).
48
See Tafero v. State, 440 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1983) (a 3–2 decision, in which the justices in the majority did
not explain their rationale, while dissenting Justices Ben F. Overton and Joseph A. Boyd Jr. contended
“that whenever the asserted recanted testimony was a critical feature of the trial there must be an
evidentiary hearing”). In 1984, at a post-conviction hearing in Tafero’s case, Rhodes recanted his
recantation. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 38, at 30 n.28. In 1992, Rhodes would testify that he had
falsely recanted his original testimony because he had been threatened by fellow prisoners and because a
woman attorney, since deceased, had offered him money and sexual favors. Kelley, supra note 47.
49
Tafero v. Wainwright, 796 F.2d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
50
Barry Bearak, Dispute over Fiery Death Idles Florida Electric Chair, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 1990, at 15;
Rene Stutzman, Convicted Cop-Killer Executed, UNITED PRESS INT’L, May 4, 1990,
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1990/05/04/Convicted-cop-killer-executed/2009641793600/. Botched
executions prompted Florida to abandon the electric chair in favor of lethal injection in 2000. Leslie Clark,
Lethal Injection Approved, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 17, 2000, at B1. For background on the Florida electric
chair, see Sydney P. Freedberg, The Story of Old Sparky, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 25, 1999, at 6A.
51
Brief of Appellant, supra note 38, at 2–3.
52
Id. at 17–19.
53
Peter Marks, Inseparable Sunny Jacobs and Micki Dickoff Were Decades and Worlds Apart When
Murder, a Death Sentence and the Essence of Friendship Brought Them Back Together, NEWSDAY (Long
Island), Sept. 8, 1992, at 44.
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meeting with Jacobs and looking into the evidence, Dickoff became persuaded of her
childhood friend’s innocence—and of Tafero’s as well.54 Dickoff, with the help of her
lawyer, Christie E. Webb, provided an analysis for a U.S. Court of Appeals brief
attacking the last vestige of seemingly credible evidence against Jacobs—the truck
drivers’ testimony, which the prosecution had construed as corroboration of Rhodes’s
trial testimony.55 Dickoff and Webb demonstrated that, when the shots were fired, the
view of one of the truckers had been obstructed as the other trucker’s rig passed between
him and the murder scene, while the latter’s view shifted from his right window to his
rearview mirror.56 Consequently, the truckers’ trial testimony, contrary to the contention
of the prosecution, had been consistent with the defense theory that Rhodes alone had
shot the officers.57
In February 1992, the Court of Appeals reversed Jacobs’s conviction and remanded
her case for retrial, holding that the trial court had erred in admitting her alleged
statements to police into evidence, and that the prosecution had improperly suppressed
the polygraph examiner’s exculpatory memo and Isham’s initial statement that she
merely had heard gossip to the effect that Jacobs had confessed.58
Jacobs sought release on bond, which was denied.59 In October 1992, eight months
after prevailing in the Court of Appeals, Jacobs—facing at least several months behind
bars pending retrial, and perhaps reconviction, albeit unlikely—agreed to enter a plea
without admitting guilt to two counts of second-degree murder under a procedure
authorized by a U.S. Supreme Court decision in North Carolina v. Alford.60 Upon her
guilty-but-not-guilty plea, she was sentenced to time served and released.61
In 2011, at age sixty-four, Jacobs married seventy-three-year-old Peter Pringle,
who had been sentenced to death in Ireland for the murder of two police officers in
County Roscommon—a crime for which he had been exonerated in 1995 after fifteen
years in prison. 62 They launched the Sunny Center, a not-for-profit organization that
operates a sanctuary in Ireland for the wrongfully convicted. 63 But she remains legally

54

Id.
Reply Brief of Appellant at 6–17, Jacobs v. Dugger, No. 90-5293 (11th Cir. 1990) (on file with authors).
56
Id. at 5, 14–17.
57
Id.
58
Jacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282, 1286, 1287–89, 1296 (11th Cir. 1992).
59
Kelley Lane, Convicted Killer Fights for Release, SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), July 20, 1992, at 1B.
60
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 29–39 (1970); Peter Marks, I’m Free, I’m Free, I’m Free! Serving
Life in Murders, She’s Released—with Friend’s Aid, NEWSDAY (Long Island), Oct. 13, 1992, at 5; see also
IN THE BLINK OF AN EYE (ABC 1996), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VlpNI7cDEMk, a dramatization
based on the Jacobs–Dickoff relationship that aired as an ABC “Movie of the Week” in 1996. For concise
information on the advent of Alford pleas, see John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated:
Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 171–73 (2014); see also
Megan Rose & ProPublica, The Deal Prosecutors Offer When They Have No Cards Left to Play, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/09/what-does-an-innocent-man-have-todo-to-go-free-plead-guilty/539001/.
61
Marks, supra note 60.
62
Vincent M. Mallozzi, Sunny Jacobs and Peter Pringle, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at ST15; Frances
Mulraney, ‘Death Row’ Couple Helps Others, IRISH VOICE (N.Y.), Jan. 4, 2017, at 7.
63
Vincent M. Mallozzi, Both Were Once on Death Row, Now They Share a Life Helping Others, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2019, at ST11; see also THE SUNNY CTR., http://www.thesunnycenter.com/.
55

381

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2019

guilty as a result of the plea that she entered in a context that amounts to a modern form
of torture.64
2.

Jonathan Bruce Reed—Texas

Wanda Jean Wadle, a twenty-six-year-old Braniff Airlines flight attendant, was
fatally assaulted in her Dallas, Texas, apartment in the early afternoon of November 1,
1978.65 Her roommate and fellow flight attendant, Kimberly Pursley, arrived during the
attack and heard a man call out from the bedroom, “Don’t come in here. Stay out
there”—to which Pursley replied, “Don’t worry, I won’t come in.”66
When the man emerged from the bedroom, he said he was from maintenance and
was there to check the air-conditioning filter, but he then bound and gagged Pursley until
she feigned unconsciousness, whereupon he left, robbing her of twenty dollars.67 After
freeing herself, Pursley ran outside, encountering a neighbor a nurse, who with her
roommate nurse, went into the apartment and found Wadle on her bedroom floor, nude
from the waist down, blood oozing from her mouth, a plastic bag and belt around her
neck, and her hands bound with a telephone cord. 68 Pursley summoned emergency
personnel, who found Wadle still breathing and rushed her to a hospital, where she died
nine days later.69
Pursley described the attacker as white, twenty-five to twenty-eight years old, with
medium-length, curly, thinning blond hair, a little more than six feet tall, and weighing
about 180 pounds.70 After reading a newspaper account of the attack, Micki Green, a
legal secretary who lived in the same apartment complex, reported that a man with wavy
blond hair had knocked on her door the afternoon of the attack, identified himself as a
maintenance man, and asked if anyone had been by to check her air filter.71 Green told
the man that she did not know if anyone had been there because she had not been home,
whereupon the man left, telling her that he would return to check the filter.72
From the descriptions provided by Green and Pursley, an artist prepared a
composite sketch, which was pinned to the visor of a squad car into which twenty-fouryear-old Jonathan Bruce Reed happened to be placed a few weeks later when he was

64

See Toni Schlesinger, Plea Bargaining Is Torture, CHI. LAW., Dec. 1978, at 1 (quoting University of
Chicago Law Professor John H. Langbein on “the parallels in function between torture and plea
bargaining”).
65
Reed v. Dretke, No. 3:99-CV-0207-N, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15019, at *3, *6 (N.D. Tex. July 27,
2005), rev’d sub nom Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 2009); SW. INST. OF FORENSIC SCI.,
AUTOPSY REPORT, CASE NO. 2663-78-1241 (1978) (on file with authors). Wadle was born September 17,
1952. Wanda Jean Wadle, FIND A GRAVE (Oct. 11, 2008),
https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/30504443/wanda-jean-wadle (last visited May 23, 2019).
66
Quarterman, 555 F.3d at 365; Dretke, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15019, at *3.
67
Dretke, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15019, at *4–5.
68
Id. at *5; see also State’s Brief at 6–7, Reed v. Texas, No. 05-11-01495-CR (Tex. App. 2013).
69
State’s Brief, supra note 68, at 9.
70
Appellant’s Opening Brief at *18, Reed v. Texas, No. F81-01988-K (Tex. App. 2012).
71
Id. at *8–9.
72
Id. at *8.
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arrested in connection with an unrelated sexual assault.73 Noticing that Reed resembled
the man depicted in the sketch, the arresting officer exclaimed, “Hey, that’s you.” 74
Within hours, Reed was identified in police lineups by Green, Pursley, and Green’s
neighbor Phil Hardin, who had seen a man with a clipboard in the area around the time of
the crime.75 Based on the identifications, Reed was arrested for Wadle’s murder.76
No physical evidence linked him to the crime.77 In fact, he was excluded as the
source of fingerprints on items that Pursley believed the killer had touched—two drinking
glasses, a cold-water tap, a telephone, and the front door knob. 78 Reed also had what
seemed to be a well-corroborated alibi: His father would testify that at midday on the day
of the attack, he called Reed at his part-time job at Diamond Motors—an eighteen-minute
drive from the crime scene—and arranged for him to drive a family friend to Fort Worth.
Reed agreed and left promptly for his parents’ home, where he arrived shortly after 1:00
P.M., having stopped to buy gasoline, for which he had a credit card receipt. 79 A young
woman visiting next door fixed the time of his arrival by the airing of a television show.80
Later, from Fort Worth, Reed made two long-distance telephone calls, documented by
receipts, to Diamond Motors, his part-time place of employment.81
Despite the fingerprint exclusion and alibi, the jury convicted Reed solely on the
testimony of Pursley, Green, and Hardin. 82 The trial judge ordered a new trial for an
unspecified reason,83 but Reed again was convicted and sentenced to death in 1983 after
his second jury trial at which, in addition to the eyewitnesses, the prosecution called
William S. McLean, Jr., Reed’s former cellmate, who testified that Reed had confessed to
the crime.84 The prosecution told the jury that Reed confided details of the crime that
only the killer would know—including that Wadle had a tampon in place during the
Id. at *10, *34–36; see also State’s Brief, supra note 68, at *11. Reed was born on October 19, 1951.
Death Row Information: Offenders on Death Row, TEX. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST.,
https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/death_row/dr_offenders_on_dr.html (last updated Mar. 1, 2019). The National
Registry of Exonerations summarizes seven murder cases in which false convictions occurred after the
advent of DNA technology in 1989. The cases are those of Kirk Bloodsworth (Md.), Jeffrey Cox (Va.),
Cory Epps (N.Y.), Andre Haygood (Tex.) Anthony Hinton (Ala.), Frank Lee Smith (Fla.), and Paul Terry
(Ill.) NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 4.
74
State’s Brief, supra note 68, at *11.
75
Id. at *10, *12
76
Id. at *12.
77
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 70, at *39, *75, *77.
78
Id. at 75; see also FORENSIC SCIENCE ASSOCIATES REPORT 3 (2011) (on file with authors). The source of
the prints might have been identified years later when the national Automated Fingerprint Identification
System became available, but the state had lost the original fingerprint cards. Appellant’s Opening Brief,
supra note 70, at *7 n.8.
79
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 70, at *3.
80
Id. at *5–6.
81
Id. at *4.
82
Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364, 366–67 (5th Cir. 2009). Micki Flanagan Green is referred to in some
documents as “Green” and in others as “Flanagan.”
83
State ex rel. Watkins v. Creuzot, 352 S.W.3d 493, 495 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Although the reason for
granting the new trial was not stated, it appeared that jury selection had violated Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S.
38 (1980), in which the Supreme Court addressed the application of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
(1968), to Texas’s death-penalty statute. Email message from Robert C. Owen, appellate attorney for Reed,
to Rob Warden. (Feb. 23, 2018, 18:16 CST) [hereinafter Owen E-mail] (on file with authors).
84
Petitioner-Appellant’s Supplemental Brief at 12, 27–28, Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364 (5th Cir.
2009) (No. 05-70046).
73
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attack.85 In fact, the tampon had been inserted days later when Wadle began menstruating
at the hospital.86 Although prosecutors denied that McLean had been promised anything
in exchange for his testimony, McLean would complain to them in writing that “you have
brockin [sic] your ple [sic] bargin [sic] with me.”87
In 2009, after protracted federal habeas corpus proceedings, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit awarded Reed a third trial, holding that there had been racial
discrimination in selection of the jury for his second trial.88 The Fifth Circuit, however,
did not reach other issues, such as McLean’s false testimony, who fed McLean the false
information about the tampon, and whether McLean had been promised anything in
return for helping send Reed back to death row.89
At the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented testimony of the victim of the sexual
assault for which Reed had been arrested the month after the Wadle attack and of a selfprofessed accomplice in a burglary in which Reed allegedly pretended to be checking an
air filter.90 Reed was convicted for the third time in 201191—by which time DNA testing
had excluded him as the source of trace amounts of seminal material recovered from her
pubic area. 92 This time, the prosecution did not seek the death penalty and Reed was
sentenced to life in prison.93
After the third conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, 94 post-conviction
proceedings were held in abeyance pending possible further DNA testing 95 —which,
thanks to a recent advance in amplification technology, could make it possible to identify
someone other than Reed as Wadle’s killer. 96 Failing that, Reed in all likelihood will
remain in prison for life, despite his exclusion as the source both of fingerprints on the

85

Id. at 28.
Id. at 28–29.
87
Id. at 9, 24–27.
88
Quarterman, 555 F.3d at 365. Of more than 2,200 documented state and federal false convictions since
1989, approximately 7% involved jailhouse-informant testimony. See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
supra note 4.
89
State ex rel. Watkins v. Creuzot, 352 S.W.3d 493, 495 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Not reaching these
additional issues was in accord with the so-called “narrowest grounds” rule. See Ryan C. Williams,
Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions & Precedential Constraint, 69 STAN. L. REV. 795, 804 (2017).
90
Reed v. State, No. 05-11-01495-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10489, at *2–3 (Tex. App. Aug. 20, 2013);
Owen E-mail, supra note 83.
91
Reed, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10489, at *1.
92
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 70, at *6, 7 n.9. The seminal material apparently resulted not from
ejaculation but rather had been transferred from the attacker’s groin. While the sample was sufficient to
exclude Reed, it was insufficient to submit to the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) to identify its
possible source. E-mail from Edward T. Blake, forensic analyst for Reed, to author (Apr. 19, 2018, 15:44
CDT) [hereinafter Blake E-mail] (on file with authors).
93
Reed, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10489, at *1.
94
Id. at *14; see also Ex parte Reed, No. WR-38,174-03, 2016 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub LEXIS 694, at *1
(July 27, 2016); In re Reed, No. PD-1663-13, 2014 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 222, at *1 (Feb. 12, 2014).
95
Reed, 2016 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub LEXIS 694, at *1.
96
Blake E-mail, supra note 92. For an overview of the amplification technology, known as MiniFiler, see
AmpFLSTR MiniFiler PCR Amplification Kit, THERMOFISHER,
https://www.thermofisher.com/us/en/home/industrial/human-identification/ampflstr-minifiler-pcramplification-kit.html (last visited May 23, 2019).
86
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items recovered at the crime scene and seminal material recovered from the victim, and
his corroborated alibi for the time of the crime.97
3.

Robert M. Kubat—Illinois

On the morning of November 2, 1979, sixty-three-year-old Lydia C. Hyde was
abducted from a tavern where she worked near Kenosha, Wisconsin, brought across the
state line into Lake County, Illinois, and shot to death on the shoulder of U.S. Route 41
about a mile south of the Wisconsin state line.98 On June 19, 1980, Robert M. Kubat, a
forty-five-year-old truck driver from Lyons, Illinois, was sentenced to death for the
crime.99
The principal witness against Kubat was his former wife, Carolyn Sue Quick,
who surrendered to law enforcement officials in South Bend, Indiana, three weeks after
the crime and portrayed herself as Kubat’s unwilling accomplice.100 Quick, then fortyone, was charged with aggravated kidnapping, but the charge was dropped in exchange
for her testimony against her ex-husband.101
The defense portrayed Quick as a jealous and vindictive woman—she admitted on
the witness stand that she once had threatened to kill Kubat102—and contended that Kubat
had spent the night of November 1 and all of November 2, 1979, in the Chicago area with
his girlfriend, Francine Bejda.103 Kubat and Bejda had picked up a rent-assistance check
on November 2 and cashed it that afternoon at a Chicago tavern, according to the
defense. 104 The check, dated November 2, was entered into evidence, but the defense
failed to rule out the possibility raised by the prosecution that it could have been cashed
later.105
Three witnesses from one of the Kenosha area bars that Quick testified she and
Kubat had visited before abducting Hyde identified him in court as the man who had
been with her, although the identifications were tainted because they initially were made
from a photographic spread in which Kubat’s photograph was distinctive. 106 Two
witnesses from the bar where the abduction occurred, but who had not seen the abduction
itself, described the getaway vehicle not as the white Chevrolet station wagon that Quick
claimed had been used in the crime, but as a gray Chevrolet Monte Carlo.107
The only physical evidence purporting to link Kubat to the crime was hair
recovered from the front seat of his station wagon that a state forensic scientist testified
Appellant’s Reply Brief at 6, Reed v. State, No. 05-11-01495-CR (Tex. App. Mar. 11, 2013) (on file with
authors).
98
Lynn Emmerman, Waitress Seized, Slain in Robbery, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 1979, at 7.
99
Lyons Man Is Sentenced to Die in Waitress’ Slaying, CHI. TRIB., June 20, 1980, at D6 [hereinafter Lyons
Man].
100
People v. Kubat, 447 N.E.2d 247, 256–57 (Ill. 1983).
101
Id. at 250.
102
Id. at 252–53.
103
Id. at 257.
104
Id. at 258.
105
Id. at 258–59.
106
Id. at 253–54 (describing testimony of Jesse Lopez, Sandra Lawson, and Nora Lopez). The photographic
spread consisted of five photographs, four of which were close-ups of individuals against a wall, while the
fifth—the one of Kubat—was a full-frontal view with a television set, a painting, and furniture in the
background. Id. at 279.
107
Id. at 254; see also People v. Kubat, 501 N.E.2d 111, 116 (Ill. 1986).
97
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was “consistent” with Hyde’s hair.108 Tires on Kubat’s station wagon at the time of his
arrest did not match a tire print found near Hyde’s body, but the prosecution presented
evidence that Kubat had purchased five new tires eight days after the crime, ostensibly to
avoid detection.109
After convicting Kubat of murder and aggravated kidnapping, the jury found no
mitigating evidence sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty 110 —not
surprising, given that Kubat’s lawyer, Lake County Public Defender George Pease, had
presented no mitigating evidence. 111 Lake County Circuit Court Judge Robert K.
McQueen sentenced Kubat to death, plus thirty years for the kidnapping.112
On direct appeal, Kubat’s leading contention was that he had not been proved
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because Quick’s testimony lacked the “absolute
conviction of truth” because it had been conditioned on the dismissal of the kidnapping
charge against her.113 He also contended that Pease had failed to investigate exculpatory
evidence and that the identification procedures had been “impermissibly suggestive and
conductive to misidentification.”114
After the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence in
January 1983—holding that the evidence “overwhelmingly” supported the jury’s
verdict115—Chicago Lawyer116 published an extensive article undermining the moorings
of the prosecution case, beginning with the claim that Kubat had gotten rid of the tires on
his station wagon so that they could not be matched to the track at the crime scene.117
In a telephone interview from death row, Kubat said that he had replaced his old
tires because they had been slashed and that he had taken the damaged ones to an Allstate
Insurance Company claim center in Westchester, Illinois. 118 Chicago Lawyer obtained
Allstate records—which George Pease had failed to obtain—establishing that the slashed
tires were Uniroyals—standard equipment on a 1977 Chevrolet station wagon. 119 A
108

Kubat, 447 N.E.2d at 258. The forensic scientist was Michael Podlecki, who had testified in an earlier
capital case that he had been unable “to find any dissimilarities” between a rape-murder victim’s hair and
hairs recovered from a car allegedly used by the defendants in her abduction. See People v. Rainge, 445
N.E.2d 535, 540 (Ill. 1983). Podlecki’s testimony in that case proved to have been falsely incriminating
when the defendants in the case were exonerated by DNA. Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, Convicted by a
Hair, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 18, 1999, at 1.
109
Kubat, 447 N.E.2d at 252; see also Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351, 363 (7th Cir. 1989).
110
Kubat, 447 N.E.2d at 250.
111
Id. at 269.
112
Lyons Man, supra note 99.
113
Kubat, 447 N.E.2d at 259–60.
114
Id. at 261–64.
115
Id. at 259, 278.
116
A monthly investigative journal founded in 1978 by the Chicago Council of Lawyers—a small, liberal
bar association founded eleven years earlier “in reaction to the failures of the established Chicago bar to
speak out” regarding, among other issues, police violence surrounding the 1968 Democratic Convention
and the ensuing “Conspiracy 7” trial. See, e.g., John R. Schmidt, Personal Appreciation of the Council,
CHI. LAW., May 1984, at B3. In 1988, ownership of Chicago Lawyer was transferred to Rob Warden, its
longtime editor, who continued as editor until selling the publication to the Law Bulletin Publishing
Company in 1989. Neil Tesser, Chicago Lawyer: New Management, Less Muck, CHI. READER, Sept. 15,
1989, at 4.
117
Rob Warden, Quick and the Dead: New Evidence Raises Doubt About the Guilt of the Man Carolyn Sue
Quick Sent to Death Row, CHI. LAW., Dec. 1983, at 1.
118
Id. at 6.
119
Id. at 6–7.
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forensic analysis by Peter McDonald, manager of tire design for Firestone Tire & Rubber
Company in Akron, Ohio, determined with “absolute certainty” that the tire print had not
been left by a Uniroyal tire.120
Chicago Lawyer also reported that Pease had failed to interview or present
potential witnesses who could have corroborated Kubat’s alibi and, although it would not
become an issue, that Pease had failed to investigate the possibility that—according to
two Kenosha County Sheriff’s Department reports—Hyde’s body had been dumped
beside Route 41 after she was killed elsewhere.121 The new evidence regarding the tires—
including a prosecution stipulation that the print could not have been left by a Uniroyal—
and Pease’s failure to corroborate Kubat’s alibi were raised in a petition for postconviction relief, but was rejected by Lake County Circuit Court Judge Fred A. Geiger.122
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Geiger, but Justice Seymour Simon strongly
dissented, writing:
Counsel’s performance was patently deficient, and there is a reasonable
probability that the defendant would have been acquitted had his alibi
defense been properly developed and Quick impeached with all the
evidence at hand. . . . Justice does not permit the execution of a defendant
who was effectively rendered no legal assistance at all, and I must
emphatically dissent.123
Kubat next turned to the federal courts, seeking a writ of habeas corpus, focusing
on ineffective assistance of counsel. 124 U.S. District Court Judge Nicholas J. Bua—
although stating that “the seeds of ineffectiveness had been sown before the trial even
commenced”125—affirmed Kubat’s conviction,126 but vacated his death sentence, holding
that Pease had failed during the sentencing phase of the trial to call witnesses whose
“testimony would have made an impressive case for sparing Kubat’s life.”127 After the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed Bua’s decision, 128 Kubat
remained in prison another two decades, until finally being paroled in 2009.129 He died
four years later.130 The Illinois death penalty was abolished in 2011.131
4.

Edward Lee Elmore—South Carolina

On January 18, 1982, Jimmy Holloway, a member of the Greenwood, South
Carolina, County Council, reported finding the body of his neighbor, Dorothy Edwards, a
120

Id. at 7.
Id.
122
People v. Kubat, 501 N.E.2d 111, 118 (Ill. 1986).
123
Id. at 122–23 (Simon, J., dissenting).
124
U.S. ex rel. Kubat, 679 F. Supp. 788, 810 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
125
Id. at 809.
126
Id. at 810.
127
Id.
128
Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351, 374 (7th Cir. 1989).
129
E-mail from Dolores Kennedy, who investigated the Kubat case, to Rob Warden (Dec. 21, 2017, 14:15
CST) (on file with authors).
130
LaSalle Cty. Clerk, Medical Certificate of Death for Robert Kubat (2013) (on file with authors).
131
John Schwartz & Emma Fitzsimmons, Illinois Governor Signs Capital Punishment Ban, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 2011, at A18.
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seventy-five-year-old widow, in her bedroom closet.132 Holloway told police that, when
he had seen Edwards two days earlier, she had mentioned that she planned to go out of
town.133 Thus, after noticing her car parked near her home on January 18, he knocked on
her backdoor—which came open, revealing signs of a disturbance and prompting him to
go inside.134 She had been “savagely attacked and brutally raped.”135
Although Holloway was a logical suspect, 136 rather than investigating him, the
authorities focused on a suspect he brought to their attention—Edward Lee Elmore, a
twenty-three-year-old African American handyman with an IQ of about seventy. 137
Edwards, who was white, had employed Elmore sporadically to wash the windows and
clean the gutters of her home.138 Her checkbook showed that she had paid him by check,
most recently on December 30, 1981. 139 The day after Holloway reported the crime,
police found Elmore’s thumbprint on the outside frame of Edwards’s backdoor and
arrested him the next morning.140
Elmore’s trial began on April 12, 1982, before Judge E.C. Burnett III and a jury
with ten white and two African American members.141 The prosecutor was William T.
Jones III, who for thirty years had been Greenwood County’s elected solicitor, the
official title of South Carolina prosecutors.142 Elmore’s lead defense lawyer was a harddrinking local public defender, Geddes D. Anderson, who would deny an investigator’s
allegation that he had been “drunk through the whole trial,” but would acknowledge that
he believed “the son-of-a-bitch [Elmore] did it.”143 Anderson was assisted by a courtappointed Greenwood lawyer, John Beasley, who once allegedly referred to Elmore as a
“redheaded nigger.”144
Jones’s case relied heavily on Dr. Sandra Conradi, a forensic pathologist who
performed the Edwards autopsy. 145 Conradi testified that Edwards’s death could have
occurred as late as Monday, January 18, but more likely had occurred on Saturday night,
January 16—a time for which Elmore had no alibi. 146 Edwards had been stabbed
repeatedly in the head, neck, and chest, suffering more than seventy separate injuries,
including defensive wounds to her arms and hands, fractured ribs, and vaginal abrasions
that, according to Conradi, were indicative of sexual assault.147
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Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783, 785–87, 807 (4th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 791–92.
134
Id.
135
State v. Elmore, 332 S.E.2d 762, 765 (S.C. 1985), vacated by Elmore v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1101
(1986).
136
Ozmint, 661 F.3d at 803 (Holloway’s “illogical statements and bizarre conduct . . . rendered him the
probable murderer.”); see also CONNIE FLETCHER, WHAT COPS KNOW 70 (1990) (quoting a Chicago
detective as saying, “Many times the person who discovers the body is the killer.”).
137
Ozmint, 661 F.3d 803 at 785–87, 807.
138
Id. at 787, 807.
139
Id. at 787.
140
Id.
141
RAYMOND BONNER, ANATOMY OF INJUSTICE: A MURDER CASE GONE WRONG 43–44, 54 (2013).
142
Id. at 41.
143
Id. at 46–47.
144
Id. at 48; see also Ozmint, 661 F.3d 803 at 826 n.23.
145
BONNER, supra note 141, at 59.
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Id. at 61–62.
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Id. at 59–61.
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The theory that Edwards had been raped was supported by state forensic chemist
Earl Wells, who testified that he had determined to “a very high degree of probability”
that Elmore was the source of pubic hairs that police claimed to have recovered from
Edwards’s bed.148 John C. Barron, a state forensic serologist, testified that spots of Type
A blood—Edwards’s type, shared by forty to forty-five percent of the population—had
been found on a pair of blue jeans found in Elmore’s room.149 Sergeant Alvin Johnson
and Lieutenant Thomas W. Henderson, Jr., of the state police, testified that Elmore told
them that if he had killed Edwards he could not remember it. 150 James Gilliam, a
jailhouse informant, testified that Elmore had spontaneously confessed that he went to
Edwards’s house to rob her, but killed her because “she wouldn’t quit screaming.”151
Gilliam added that Elmore said he knew that “the police couldn’t have no fingerprints of
his because he had wiped everything down when he left.”152 Elmore took the stand to
deny the statements attributed to him by the state police officers and Gilliam.153
After deliberating two and a half hours, the jury found Elmore guilty of murder,
criminal sexual conduct, house-breaking, and burglary.154 Two days later, while the jury
was deliberating Elmore’s punishment, Judge Burnett, unaccompanied by counsel, went
into the jury room and asked the status of the deliberations. 155 Shortly thereafter, the jury
recommended a death sentence.156 When Burnett asked if Elmore wished to say anything,
he responded, “I’d like to say I did not commit that crime Your Honor said I did.”157
Burnett followed the jury’s recommendation—sentencing Elmore to death in the electric
chair.158
In 1983, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded
the case for a new trial, holding that Burnett’s visit with the jury had been “highly
improper” and in violation of Elmore’s right to be present at all stages of his trial.159
Elmore was tried again in 1984, this time before a jury of eight white jurors, four African
American jurors, and a different judge, James E. Moore, but with the same prosecutor
and defense counsel, although Elmore requested different lawyers.160 The evidence was
virtually the same as at the first trial, and, as at the first trial, the jury deliberated for two
and a half hours before finding Elmore guilty. 161 The second jury, like the first,
recommended a death sentence, and Judge Moore obliged.162
148

Id. at 67–69.
Id. at 56–57; see also Ozmint, 661 F.3d at 786.
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BONNER, supra note 141, at 77–78.
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154
BONNER, supra note 141, at 82–83.
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S.E.2d 315 (S.C. 1991).
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Elmore, 308 S.E.2d at 784–85.
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BONNER, supra note 141, at 98–100.
161
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In 1985, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and
sentence,163 but the following year the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case in light of
its recent decision in another South Carolina capital case in which it held that a trial
court’s exclusion of certain mitigating evidence had deprived a jury of information
relevant to sentencing.164 On remand, Elmore received death sentence,165 his third, which
the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed in 1989.166
Six years later, Diana Holt, who had been a lawyer for less than a hundred days and
was working at the South Carolina Death Penalty Resource Center, entered the case,
joining J. Christopher Jensen, a New York litigator who had taken the case pro bono.167
In ensuing state post-conviction and federal habeas-corpus proceedings, Holt and Jensen
raised issues that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit would conclude raised
“grave questions about whether it really was Elmore who murdered Mrs. Edwards.”168
Holt and Jensen contended that the pubic hairs and blood purportedly linking
Elmore to the crime had been planted by police—inferences they drew from the facts that
investigators had not photographed the hairs after supposedly discovering them, and that
copious amounts of blood, not tiny spots, would have been on clothing worn by the killer
during the crime.169
New evidence developed by Holt and Jensen established that the prosecution had
falsely represented that a fingerprint found on Edwards’s toilet had been unidentifiable,
when in fact both she and Elmore had been eliminated as its source, and that the
prosecution had suppressed the fact that a Caucasian hair from someone other than
Edwards had been found on her body, indicating that the killer had been white—not
African American.170
The previously secret evidence pointing to someone other than Elmore as the killer
led Holt to suspect that the crime had been committed by Holloway, Edwards’s nowdeceased neighbor with whom it was rumored that Edwards had had an affair. 171 From an
interview with Edwards’s daughter, Carolyn Lee, who confided that her mother’s planned
trip probably had been to visit a man whom she planned to marry in North Carolina, Holt
deduced that Holloway had a motive—jealousy.172 Not long before his death in 1994,
Holloway had told Holt that the police initially had questioned him because “neighbors
probably told them [the police] me [sic] and Dorothy [Edwards] were [sic] having an
affair.”173
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State v. Elmore, 332 S.E.2d 762, 765 (S.C. 1985), vacated by Elmore v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1101
(1986).
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Resurfaces, Unsettling ‘82 Murder Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at A18.
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BONNER, supra note 141, at 139–41.
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Holt’s suspicion of Holloway was strengthened by a new forensic analysis by Dr.
Jonathan Arden, New York City’s acting first deputy medical examiner, indicating that
the crime most likely had occurred on January 17 or 18, when Elmore had a corroborated
alibi.174 It was, in Arden’s words, “extraordinarily unlikely and improbable really in the
extreme” that it had occurred on January 16, when Elmore lacked a credible alibi.175
Further discrediting the veracity of Elmore’s convictions, James Gilliam, the jailhouse
informant, recanted his trial testimony—saying at an evidentiary hearing that he had lied
because a jail administrator had promised him, “You help me out on the Elmore thing,
we’ll look after you.”176
Although state post-conviction relief was denied despite the new evidence,
Elmore’s death sentence was reduced to life in prison in 2010 on the ground that his
limited mental capacity prohibited his execution.177 U.S. District Court Judge David C.
Norton proceeded to deny habeas relief, but the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the
case for another retrial in 2011, holding that Elmore had been denied effective assistance
of counsel.178
After the Fourth Circuit decision, the prosecution offered to release Elmore
immediately if he would enter an Alford plea.179 Rather than spending more time behind
bars and facing a fourth jury, Elmore entered the plea on March 2, 2012, attaining
freedom—but, in the eyes of the law, rendering himself forever guilty. 180 He died
December 3, 2018.181
5.

John George Spirko, Jr.—Ohio

Betty Jane Mottinger, the postmistress of Elgin, a town of ninety-six residents
located twenty-two miles west of Lima, disappeared on August 9, 1982182—thirteen days
after John George Spirko, Jr., a thirty-six-year-old career criminal, had been paroled from
a life sentence for strangling a seventy-two-year-old woman to death in Kentucky.183
Shortly after Mottinger’s skeletal remains were found wrapped in a paint-splattered
tarpaulin in a field fifty miles from Elgin in October 1982, Spirko was charged with

174

Id. at 808–09.
Id. at 820–21.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 786; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that executing “mentally
retarded” persons violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment).
178
Ozmint, 661 F.3d at 786; BONNER, supra note 141, at 272.
179
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 29–39 (1970).
180
Raymond Bonner, When Innocence Isn’t Enough, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2012, at SR8. For an analysis of
why Elmore chose to enter the plea, see Rob Warden, ‘Injustice’ Serves Dramatic Story, Historic Truths,
CHI. TRIB. PRINTERS ROW J., Mar. 18, 2012, at 17.
181
Aleks Gilbert, ‘He’s Really Freed Now’: Friends Mourn Passing of Elmore, AP (Dec. 15, 2018),
https://www.apnews.com/ef3fc79ae25f4e539616a186db733801.
182
State v. Spirko, No. 15-84-22, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 710, at *1–2 (Mar. 6, 1989); Bob Paynter, A
Cold-Blooded Liar, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 23, 2005, at A1. Spirko was born on June 13, 1946.
Offender Details: John Spirko, OHIO DEP’T OF REHAB. & CORR.,
https://appgateway.drc.ohio.gov/OffenderSearch/Search/Details/A171433 (last visited May 23, 2019).
183
Paynter, supra note 182. For details of Spirko’s Kentucky conviction, see Special Meeting Minutes,
Ohio Parole Auth. (Aug. 23, 2005) (on file with authors), and Spirko v. Commonwealth, 480 S.W.2d 169,
170–71 (Ky. 1972).
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feloniously assaulting a woman in a bar near Toledo.184 In what he would contend was an
ill-conceived ploy to avoid returning to prison in Kentucky for life—a serious possibility
for felonious assault in light of his parole status—Spirko claimed to know what had
happened to Mottinger and promised to tell all in exchange for leniency.185
Investigators initially discounted Spirko’s story because they had a strong
suspect— Marion “Sonny” Baumgardner, who was on parole for robbing a postmistress
seven years earlier in Dupont, thirty miles from Elgin.186 But when Baumgardner was
arrested in Texas and proved to have an unassailable alibi for the day Mottinger
disappeared,187 investigators began taking Spirko seriously—ultimately agreeing to a deal
under which, in exchange for his cooperation, he would face no more than five years in
prison for the assault near Toledo.188 In addition, his girlfriend, also allegedly involved in
the Toledo area incident, would not be prosecuted.189
In interviews with postal inspectors in late 1982 and early 1983, 190 Spirko provided
shifting accounts of what he claimed to know of Mottinger’s fate, ranging from merely
attending a party where he learned details of the crime to being present when she was
raped, beaten, and stabbed to death by a man he knew only as “Rooster.”191 Some of
Spirko’s claims flew in the face of known evidence—e.g., he described the victim as a
“fat bitch,” although she weighed only 104 pounds; he said that she wore a gold necklace
and gold watch, although her family maintained that she wore neither; he claimed that
she had been stabbed in the back, although she had been stabbed only in the chest.192
Postal inspectors may not have been aware of it when they questioned Spirko, but years
earlier, in a scheme to get out of jail in Michigan, he had embarrassed authorities with a
false claim that he had first-hand knowledge of a series of rape-murders.193
There were no known witnesses to the Mottinger abduction, but two witnesses
reported seeing a man and a brown two-tone sedan outside the Elgin Post Office around
the time that she disappeared.194 One of the witnesses, Opal Seibert, described the man as
clean-shaven, with dark hair, wearing a long-sleeved blue shirt. 195 The other witness,
Mark Lewis, said the man was slightly pot-bellied, weighing about 240 pounds, with
sandy-brown or reddish hair, maybe having a light mustache, and wearing a green shortsleeved shirt with orange stripes.196 Neither description fit Spirko, who was blond and
184

Paynter, supra note 182.
Paynter, supra note 182; see also Bob Paynter, A Mysterious Murder Suspect Emerges, Then
Disappears, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 24, 2005, at A1.
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Paynter, supra note 182; see also Body of Missing Postmistress Found, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Sept. 20,
1982), https://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/09/20/Body-of-missing-postmistress-found/8636401342400/
(mentioning search for Baumgardner).
187
Paynter, supra note 182 (quoting Toledo Blade story from Oct. 29, 1982, reporting that Baumgardner
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Id.
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weighed about 180 pounds.197 But in a scrapbook Spirko had maintained, Paul Hartman,
the lead postal inspector assigned to the case, noticed a photograph of Delaney Gibson,
Jr., a former Spirko cellmate, who appeared to match the description Seibert had
provided.198 Soon thereafter in a final interview, Spirko told Hartman that Gibson had
robbed, kidnapped, raped, and murdered Mottinger.199
In September 1983, Spirko and Gibson were indicted for aggravated murder and
kidnapping, 200 but Gibson was a fugitive and would remain so until after Spirko was
tried, convicted, and sentenced to death.201 The prosecution’s theory at the August 1984
trial was that Spirko and Gibson committed the crime together—a theory resting largely
on testimony by Seibert that she was “one hundred percent sure” that Gibson was the
cleanly shaven man she had seen outside the Elgin post office two years earlier202 and
testimony by Hartman, the postal inspector, that Spirko had admitted committing the
crime with Gibson.203
The evidence against Spirko otherwise had been underwhelming—testimony by
two informants, Andre Ruffin and Leon Connors, that Spirko, who had been a cellmate of
each, had admitted the abduction and murder,204 and testimony by Mark Lewis that he
was “seventy percent certain” Spirko was the man he had seen outside the post
office205—a dubious claim because Lewis initially had identified Marion Baumgardner as
the man in question.206
The defense contended that the crime might have been committed by an eighteenyear-old local drug dealer, John Willier, who had worked in the summer of 1982 as a
house-painter—a capacity in which he had access to tarpaulins like the paint-splattered
one in which Mottinger’s remains had been found.207 Five witnesses had reported seeing
Willier around the time of the crime driving a brown sedan like the one described by
Seibert and Lewis.208
After Spirko’s conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal,209 his
pro bono attorneys from the Washington, D.C., law firm of Shaw Pittman LLP 210
discovered evidence—known to the prosecution and allegedly improperly withheld prior
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Id.
Id. Gibson and two co-defendants had been convicted of rape and, like Spirko, sentenced to life in
prison in Kentucky. Gibson v. Commonwealth, 417 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967).
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200
State v. Spirko, No. 15-84-22, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 710, at *2 (Mar. 6, 1989); see also Spirko v.
Mitchell, 368 F.3d 603, 604 (6th Cir. 2004).
201
Spirko, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 710, at *2; Mitchell, 368 F.3d at 604–05.
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Mitchell, 368 F.3d at 616.
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State v. Spirko, 570 N.E.2d 229, 242, opinion recalled by 579 N.E.2d 715 (Ohio 1991).
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Id. at 241, 246–47.
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Id. at 256.
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Ohio v. Spirko, 1998 WL 34277220 (Ohio 1998) (No. 98-1202). Called as a defense witness, Willier
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State v. Spirko, No. 15-84-22, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 710, at *1–2 (Mar. 6, 1989).
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to trial211—indicating that Delaney Gibson could not have been in Ohio at the time of
Mottinger’s abduction and, thus, could not have been the man Opal Seibert had seen in
Elgin on August 9, 1982.212
The newly discovered evidence indicated that from June through October 1982,
Gibson and his wife, Margie, had been working on a crew of tomato-pickers in North
Carolina—an alibi corroborated by the leader of the crew, by friends who had visited the
Gibsons only hours before the Mottinger abduction, by the friends’ motel receipt, and,
most dramatically, by photographs of Gibson, showing that at the time of the crime he
was not clean-shaven, but had a full beard. 213 In addition, Spirko’s former cellmates,
Ruffin and Connors, recanted their trial testimony that Spirko had confessed, 214 and
Hartman acknowledged that he had been aware before Spirko’s trial that Gibson could
not have been involved in the crime.215
In spite of the new evidence, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied
Spirko’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 216 Spirko’s lawyers petitioned for
certiorari,217 and a former director of the FBI, two retired federal court of appeals judges,
and a former U.S. attorney for the Northern District of Illinois filed an amicus brief
asserting that Spirko had been wrongly convicted because the prosecution had suppressed
exculpatory evidence, 218 but the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case. 219
Questions about Spirko’s guilt nonetheless were sufficiently troubling that he received
seven gubernatorial stays of execution prior to 2008, when his sentence was commuted to
life in prison without parole by Governor Ted Strickland, who said:
I have concluded that the lack of physical evidence linking him to the
murder, as well as the slim residual doubt about his responsibility for the
murder that arises from careful scrutiny of the case record and revelations

See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86–88 (1963) (holding that the prosecution’s suppression of
evidence favorable to an accused person who has requested such evidence violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment).
212
Paynter, supra note 192.
213
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Spirko v. Bradshaw, 404 F. Supp. 2d 984 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (No. 3:95CV7209), 2005 WL 6063085, at *12.
216
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of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and Hon. Thomas P. Sullivan, former U.S. Attorney for
the Northern District of Illinois).
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about the case over the past twenty years, makes the imposition of the
death penalty inappropriate in this case.220
Spirko’s lawyers vowed to continue to pursue his exoneration, 221 but there was
nowhere to turn and he continues to languish behind bars more than eleven years after
Strickland spared his life.222
6.

Kevin Cooper—California

Kevin Cooper was sentenced to death on May 14, 1985, for a murder that occurred
in Chino Hills on June 4, 1984— two days after he escaped from the minimum-security
section of the nearby California Institution for Men. 223 The bodies of the victims—
Douglas and Peggy Ryen, forty-one-year-old chiropractors and Arabian horse-breeders,
their ten-year-old daughter Jessica, and an eleven-year-old houseguest, Christopher
Hughes—were found in the Ryen home on the morning of June 5. 224 The Ryens’ eightyear-old son Joshua suffered near-fatal injuries. 225 The family station wagon was
missing.226
Analyses of the stomach contents of the deceased indicated that they had been
killed the previous night, one to three hours after they had eaten. 227 In all, they had
suffered some 140 wounds inflicted variously with what appeared to have been a knife,
an ice pick, and an axe or a hatchet.228 Two blood-stained T-shirts—one blue, one tan—
and a hatchet covered with dried blood were found near the home.229 Numerous hairs that
could have been ripped from someone’s head during a struggle were found clutched in
Jessica Ryen’s right hand.230
Joshua Ryen attributed the crime to three Mexican men, one of whom wore a “blue
short-sleeved shirt.”231 Two witnesses who had been driving in the area the night of the
crime reported seeing three white men in a station wagon resembling the missing one.232
Other witnesses reported seeing three white strangers drinking at a bar near the Ryen
home that night.233 On June 7, the Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Department issued a
bulletin identifying the suspected perpetrators as three “white or Mexican males.”234
220
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Two days later, however, Sheriff Floyd Tidwell announced that there was just one
suspect—who was neither white nor Mexican, but African American: twenty-five-yearold Kevin Cooper, for whom a warrant had been issued on charges of murder, attempted
murder, and prison escape.235 It seemed unlikely that the massacre had been the work of
one man, much less that of the 155-pound Cooper, given that Douglas Ryen, an exMarine, stood six-two and kept a loaded rifle near his bed; Peggy Ryen also kept a loaded
pistol in her bedside drawer.236 Cooper, moreover, could not have been the source of the
hairs found in Jessica Ryen’s hand.237 Nor did the discovery of two blood-stained T-shirts
square with the lone-perpetrator theory. 238 After his June 2 escape, however, Cooper,
whose criminal record began at age seven,239 had broken into and spent two nights in an
unoccupied home 126 yards from the Ryen home.240 It would be alleged that the hatchet
found shortly after discovery of the massacre had been come from the unoccupied
home.241
The day that the sheriff announced that Cooper had been charged and was sought
for committing the murders, a woman named Diana Roper contacted the sheriff’s office
to report her suspicion that the crime had been committed by her boyfriend—Eugene
Leland Furrow, who was white and who until recently had been in prison for murder. 242
Roper said that early on the morning of June 5 Furrow had appeared at her home driving
a station wagon and wearing blood-splattered coveralls, which she turned over to the
sheriff’s office.243 She added that on June 4 she had laid out clothes for Furrow, including
a tan T-shirt, which was gone.244 After learning that a hatchet linked to the Ryen crime
had been found, Roper again contacted the sheriff’s office to report that she had checked
Furrow’s tool chest and discovered a hatchet missing. 245 Despite Roper’s claims,
however, Furrow would not be seriously pursued as a suspect and the bloody coveralls
would be destroyed without being tested.246
Cooper remained the prime suspect even though, after seeing a photograph of him
on television on June 14, Joshua Ryen spontaneously told his grandmother that Cooper
had not committed the crime.247 On July 30, Cooper was arrested near the Santa Barbara
coast, where he had been working as a deckhand. 248 When he arrived at the San
235
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Bernardino County Jail in shackles the next night, he was taunted by an angry crowd,
some members of which chanted, “Gas chamber, gas chamber.” 249 After a change of
venue to San Diego County, Cooper pleaded guilty to the prison escape count and his
trial for murder and attempted-murder opened before Judge Richard Garner and a jury on
October 23, 1984.250
In addition to the hatchet supposedly taken from the home that Cooper had broken
into, the evidence presented by San Bernardino County District Attorney Dennis
Kottmeier and Assistant District Attorney John Kochis included a drop of blood of
Cooper’s type allegedly recovered from the Ryen home, blood of types matching those of
Cooper and Douglas Ryen purportedly found on one of the recovered T-shirts, shoeprints
purportedly from Pro-Keds Dude tennis shoes Cooper supposedly had obtained from a
fellow prisoner who testified for the prosecution, and saliva consistent with Cooper’s
blood type on cigarette butts purportedly recovered from the Ryen home and from the
stolen station wagon, which had been found at Long Beach.251
Cooper’s defense, as outlined by Santa Barbara County Public Defender David
Negus in his opening statement, was that the sheriff’s office botched the investigation and
that the prosecution evidence would prove less than definitive, leaving reasonable doubt
about Cooper’s guilt.252 “I’m not going to be able to prove to you that [Cooper] . . . is
innocent,” said Negus, who cited the failure to investigate Diana Roper’s claims
regarding Furrow as an example of how the investigation had been botched.253 In a vein
seemingly more befitting the prosecution than the defense, Negus added that the
destruction of the bloody coveralls was “a piece of evidence that could well have no
significance whatsoever in this case.”254
Joshua Ryen did not testify, but Negus agreed to the admission into evidence of
electronic recordings of two interviews, conducted in December 1994, in which Joshua
said that he had seen only one man, or one man’s shadow, during the crime—flatly
contradicting his repeated statements six months earlier attributing the crime to three
men.255 The defense contended that the supposed change in Joshua’s recollection was the
result of manipulation by authorities whose theory was that Cooper alone had committed
the crime.256
On January 2, 1985, after a twelve-day holiday break in the trial, the prosecutors
informed Negus that the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department had interviewed
two state prisoners who corroborated both Joshua’s initial contention that three men had
carried out the attack and Diana Roper’s contention that Furrow likely was involved.257 In
the first interview, on December 17, 1984, a prisoner named Anthony Wisely claimed
O’CONNOR, supra note 227, at 81 (quoting contemporaneous accounts from the San Bernardino Sun and
United Press International).
250
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that his cellmate, Kenneth Koon, had implicated himself and two other men in the
crime.258 In the second interview, conducted two days later, Koon—who had been out of
prison from October 11, 1982, to November 7, 1983, and moved in with Diana Roper
after Furrow moved out—denied any role in the crime, although he said he was aware
that “Lee Farrel [sic] had left bloody coveralls at Roper’s home.259
Judge Garner recognized the tardy disclosure of the interviews deprived Negus of
an adequate opportunity to explore Koon’s possible involvement in the crime with
Furrow, but the only remedy Gardner advanced was to give Negus an hour to review the
prisoners’ statements. 260 After availing himself of that opportunity, Negus told Garner
and opposing counsel that he would not request “any further delay at this point in time,”
although “there might be a time later on when I might need a day or two’s delay to get it
all together.”261 Ten days later, a defense investigator interviewed Wisely, who said that,
in light of his conversation with Koon, he had no doubt of Cooper’s innocence, but
Negus pursued the matter no further and the jury did not hear of Wisely and Koon’s
statements.262
In their summations, Kochis, the assistant district attorney, told the jury that the
evidence proved Cooper’s guilt “beyond any doubt,” 263 while Negus contended that it
proved nothing of the sort.264 Negas argued that if a detective recorded an interview that
he conducted with Joshua Ryen nine days after the crime the recording would have
established a “rational interpretation of the evidence” consistent with Cooper’s
innocence. 265 In rebuttal, Kottmeier, the district attorney, asserted falsely that Joshua
consistently maintained that there had been only one attacker—“Kevin Cooper with a
hatchet in one hand and a knife at the other.”266
After both sides rested, Judge Garner instructed jurors on the law and admonished
them not to be influenced by demonstrators who had appeared outside the courthouse
carrying signs saying “Kill Cooper” and “Hang the Nigger.” 267 Having heard 141
witnesses and received 788 exhibits, the jury deliberated for six days before finding
Cooper guilty on February 19, 1985. 268 Ten days later, the jury unanimously
recommended a death sentence, which Garner imposed on May 15. 269 It took the
California Supreme Court nearly six years—until May 1991—to decide Cooper’s
automatic appeal, in which it affirmed his conviction and death sentence, rejecting his
claims of police and prosecutorial misconduct, judicial error, ineffective assistance of
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counsel, and accumulated error.270 Three years later, with a petition for a state writ of
habeas corpus pending, Cooper filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus.271
Two years after that the California Supreme Court denied his state habeas and
Cooper filed a supplemental federal habeas petition, which was denied by U.S. District
Court Judge Marilyn L. Huff in August 1997.272 In 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed Huff, pronouncing the evidence of Cooper’s guilt
“overwhelming.” 273 In the wake of the Ninth Circuit decision, Cooper and the
prosecution agreed to the DNA testing of certain forensic evidence 274 —testing that
resulted in what the prosecution contended was proof positive of guilt—Cooper’s blood
on the recovered tan T-shirt.275
In an application for the Ninth Circuit’s permission to file a successor habeas
petition, however, Cooper alleged that the blood had been planted.276 In requesting the
permission—required by the 1996 federal Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act277 and case law278—Cooper claimed actual innocence and sought testing of the blood
on the T-shirt for the presence of a preservative that, if found, would indicate that the
blood had been planted.279 He also sought mitochondrial DNA testing of the hairs found
in Jessica Ryen’s hand—testing that would either identify or eliminate Cooper as the
source of the hairs and, if he were eliminated, perhaps lead to the identity of their
source.280 In support of his claim of actual innocence, Cooper attached a hand-written
sworn declaration from a prisoner named James Taylor recanting his trial testimony that
he had provided tennis shoes to Cooper of the type that supposedly left the shoeprints
linking him to the crime.281
On February 8, 2004, two days before Cooper’s scheduled execution, a three-judge
panel of the Ninth Circuit denied permission for filing the successor petition, but the next
day an eight-to-three majority of the full Ninth Circuit reversed the panel, not only
270

People v. Cooper, 809 P.2d 865, 885–91, 893–901, 904–05, 912 (Cal. 1991).
Cooper v. Calderon, 255 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2001).
272
Id.
273
Id. at 1110. The decision was two-to-one, but the dissent pertained solely to whether Cooper’s death
sentence was appropriate. See id. at 1115–18 (Browning, J., dissenting).
274
At the time of Cooper’s trial, forensic applications of DNA testing were years in the future. In 1984, Dr.
Alec J. Jeffreys, a University of Leicester geneticist, discovered the potential of DNA to identify criminals.
Nick Zagorski, Profile of Alec J. Jeffreys, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8918, 8919 (2006). The technique
led to the 1988 conviction of the killer of two girls in England. JOSEPH WAMBAUGH, THE BLOODING
(1989). In 1989, advancing DNA technology exonerated Gary Dotson in Illinois. Brandon L. Garrett &
Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 4
(2009).
275
Cooper v. Calderon, No. 98-99023, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27035, at *2 (9th Cir. 2002).
276
Cooper v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
277
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) (2012).
278
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 299 (1995) (holding that to bring a second habeas petition “a petitioner
must show that, in light of all the evidence, including new evidence, it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”).
279
Woodford, 358 F.3d at 1119.
280
Id. at 1122. Disclosure of exculpatory evidence is required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963). In 1996, the FBI began testing mitochondrial DNA, the principal type of forensic evidence
extracted from hair shafts. See Frederika A. Kaestle et al., Database Limitations on the Evidentiary Value
of Forensic Mitochondrial DNA Evidence, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 54, 62 (2006).
281
See Woodford, 358 F.3d at 1122; Blake, supra note 251 and accompanying text.
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staying Cooper’s execution and allowing him to file his successor habeas petition, but
also sending the case back to Judge Huff with directions to allow the DNA testing
Cooper requested. 282 Two Ninth Circuit judges would have gone further, directly
ordering the DNA testing.283
After protracted, albeit limited, testing that she characterized as failing to
undermine the previous DNA results “confirming” Cooper’s guilt, Huff denied the
successor federal habeas, as she had the first.284 A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit
affirmed Huff, 285 whereupon Cooper sought a rehearing before the full Ninth Circuit,
which denied it in 2009 with an order from which Judge William A. Fletcher dissented,
pointedly rebutting both Huff’s conclusions and the majority’s rationale for allowing her
decision to stand.286 “There is no way to say this politely,” Fletcher wrote, “The district
court failed to provide Cooper a fair hearing and flouted our direction to perform the two
tests.”287
The most telling indication of tampering was a tube of what was supposed to be
Cooper’s blood that had been in the possession of the sheriff’s office since shortly after
his arrest. 288 Testing conducted while the successor petition was pending before Huff
showed that the tube contained the blood of two persons—Cooper and someone else—
indicating that some of Cooper’s blood had been removed and replaced with the other
person’s blood so that none would appear missing.289
Fletcher’s dissent laid out troubling questions about the case, including: Why did
Joshua Ryen not recognize Cooper, if he was the lone killer? Why did no fingerprints link
Cooper to the crime? Why, with so much blood, was only one drop of what supposedly
was Cooper’s blood found in the Ryen home? Why was the jury not informed of the
bloody coveralls that were turned over to the sheriff’s office and destroyed? 290 Four of
Fletcher’s fellow Ninth Circuit judges joined in his dissent, and two other judges filed
separate dissents in which six additional judges joined.291 Four years later, in a lecture at
New York University School of Law, Fletcher offered a possible answer to all of his

282

See Woodford, 358 F.3d at 1118, 1124.
Id. at 1124–25 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (contending that, “Since Cooper’s guilt can be quickly and
definitively determined by means of a simple test, there is no reason not to have it performed prior to his
execution. . . .The public cannot afford a mistake. Neither can Cooper.”).
284
Cooper v. Brown, No. 04-CV-656H, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46232, at *1, *3, *79–91, *94–116, *149
(S.D. Cal. May 27, 2005).
285
Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 2007).
286
Cooper v. Brown, 565 F.3d 581, 583–608 (9th Cir. 2009) (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
287
Id. at 583.
288
Id. at 607–08.
289
Id.
290
Id. at 581, 632–33.
291
Eleven Ninth Circuit judges dissented from the majority holding. In addition to Fletcher, in alphabetical
order, they were Marsha S. Berzon, Raymond C. Fisher, Susan P. Graber, Alex Kozinski, Richard A. Paez,
Harry Pregerson, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Stephen Roy Reinhardt, Sidney R. Thomas, and Kim McLane
Wardlaw. Joining Fletcher’s dissent were Paez, Pregerson, Rawlinson, and Reinhardt. Separate dissenting
opinions were filed by Fisher, Reinhardt, and Wardlaw. Fisher’s dissent stood alone and comprised a single
sentence: “I generally agree with Judge Fletcher that we should have taken this case en banc to require the
factual inquiry the previous en banc court expected to occur.” Id. at 635 (Fisher, J., dissenting). Joining in
the Reinhardt dissent were Berzon, Garber, Kozinski, and Pregerson. Joining in the Wardlaw dissent were
Berzon, Pregerson, Reinhardt, and Thomas.
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questions, succinctly summing up his view of Cooper’s situation: “'He is on death row
because the San Bernardino Sheriff's Department framed him.”292
His appeals exhausted, 293 Cooper sought clemency from Governor Edmund G.
“Jerry” Brown, Jr.,294 before whom a petition requesting a reprieve of the death sentence
and other relief had been pending since February 17, 2016. 295 Brown finally ordered
DNA testing in the case on December 24, 2018, two weeks before Brown was succeeded
by his lieutenant governor, Gavin Newsom.296
The petition Newsom inherited alleges that Cooper was falsely convicted as a result
of judicial bias, ineffective assistance of counsel, planting of evidence by the sheriff’s
office, perjured testimony for the prosecution, withholding of exculpatory evidence,
falsified forensic results, and racial discrimination. 297 In addition to the reprieve, the
petition asks the governor’s office to “undertake a complete investigation” of the case
under its auspices, order all additional forensic testing that Cooper’s legal team
determines should be done, grant the team access to all exculpatory materials in the
possession of the sheriff’s office, district attorney’s office, and state crime laboratory,
and, if his innocence is established, grant him freedom.298
7.

Thomas Jesse Ward and Karl Allen Fontenot—Oklahoma

At around 8:40 P.M. on April 28, 1984, Donna Denice Haraway, a twenty-fouryear-old recently married college student, was abducted from an Ada convenience store
known as McAnally’s where she worked. 299 The following November 7, although
Haraway’s body had not been found, Thomas Jesse Ward and Karl Allen Fontenot, both
in their early twenties, were charged with robbing, abducting, raping, and killing her.300
The sine qua non of the prosecution case—and the only evidence that Haraway had
been raped, or slain, for that matter—were video-taped statements in which Ward and
Fontenot described dreams they reported having about the crime. 301 The purported
dreams differed in material respects,302 but in both the victim had died of multiple stab
292

William A. Fletcher, U.S. Circuit Judge, Ninth Circuit, Our Broken Death Penalty (Oct. 13, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f9NfqB6y7L4.
293
The U.S. Supreme Court denied Cooper’s petition for a writ of certiorari on November 30, 2009.
Cooper v. Ayers, 558 U.S. 1049 (2009).
294
Brown had opposed the death penalty, but nonetheless had committed himself to carrying out the state
law. See Jerry Gillam, Brown Vows to Enforce Death Penalty Law, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1977, at 1. In
1960, to no avail, Brown, a former Jesuit seminarian, had urged his father and namesake, then-Governor
Edmund G. “Pat” Brown, to ask the state legislature for a moratorium on executions. EDMUND “PAT”
BROWN, PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCY: A GOVERNOR’S EDUCATION ON DEATH ROW 20–21, 39–40
(1989).
295
Petition for Executive Clemency, supra note 229.
296
Alene Tchekmedyian, Gov. Jerry Brown Orders New Tests in Quadruple-Murder Case of Death Row
Inmate Kevin Cooper, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2018, at 1; John Wildermuth & Joe Garofoli, Gov. Gavin
Newsom Promises a ‘Progressive, Principled’ California, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 7, 2019, at 1.
297
Petition for Clemency, supra note 229, at 27, 75, 95, 131, 151–52.
298
Id. at 161.
299
ROBERT MAYER, THE DREAMS OF ADA 2–3, 8–9, 13–14 (1985).
300
Id. at 36, 79–82, 161.
301
Id. at 261–304.
302
For example, Ward dreamed that he tried to rape Haraway, but could not get an erection. Id. at 269, 275.
Fontenot, in contrast, dreamed that Ward raped Haraway. Id. at 289–91.
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wounds, her body either had been burned and left in a concrete bunker on the outskirts of
Ada or in a nearby abandoned house that was set afire the next day, and the ringleader of
the crime had been a third man—an ex-convict named Odell Titsworth.303
The authorities promptly eliminated Titsworth as a suspect because he had suffered
a broken arm in a scuffle with police two days before Haraway disappeared and had been
physically incapable of the acts attributed to him in the Ward and Fontenot dreams.304
Once Titsworth was cleared, a reassessment of the prosecution’s case against Ward and
Fontenot surely was warranted; the false implication of Titsworth, as Ward and
Fontenot’s lawyers would contend, most likely resulted from “pressure tactics” employed
by their interrogators305—especially Ada Detective Dennis Smith and Oklahoma Bureau
of Investigation Agent Gary Rogers, who obtained a false dream confession from former
minor league baseball star Ronald Keith Williamson in 1987.306
Despite the false implication of Titsworth, District Attorney William N. Peterson
and Assistant District Attorney Chris Ross pressed on with the prosecution of Ward and
Fontenot.307 In addition to playing the defendants’ dream videos at the 1985 trial,308 the
prosecutors called three eyewitnesses—two of whom placed Ward and another man at a
convenience store known as J.P.’s Pack-To-Go, which was near McAnally’s. 309
According to the prosecution theory of the case, Ward and the second man—presumably
Fontenot—left J.P.’s in a “mixed red primer and gray primer” pickup truck that they used
shortly thereafter in the Haraway abduction; the third eyewitness placed Ward and a
second man, as well as a pickup similar to the one seen at J.P’s, at McAnally’s before
Haraway disappeared.310
The only other evidence purporting to link Ward and Fontenot to the crime was the
testimony of a jailhouse informant, Terri Holland, who claimed that Fontenot confessed
to her in the Pontotoc County Jail, implicating Ward.311 Although the jury was unaware
of it, Holland also had testified at Ronald Williamson’s trial that Williamson confessed to
her in jail.312 Despite no physical evidence linking them to the Haraway crime, 313 Ward
303

Id. at 47–48, 80, 271–82; see also id. at 283–304.
Id. at 264–68; see also Fontenot v. State, 742 P.2d 31, 31–32 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987).
305
MAYER, supra note 299, at 330.
306
JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN 125–27, 193–94 (2006). Williamson was sentenced to death in
1988 for the murder of Debbie Sue Carter in Ada and exonerated in 1999. Jim Dwyer, Ronald Williamson,
Freed from Death Row, Dies at 51, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at C11.
307
MAYER, supra note 299, at 218–20.
308
Id. at 246–47, 261, 284.
309
Id. at 236–37.
310
Id. at 237. Eyewitness identifications of strangers, as all were in this case, often are unreliable. See
Nancy Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Sequential and Simultaneous Lineup Presentations: A
Meta-Analytic Comparison, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 459 (2001). Two of the eyewitnesses who identified
Ward, including the one who placed him at McAnally’s, were tainted because they had seen a composite
sketch of a suspect resembling Ward prior to identifying him in lineups. Additionally, the witness who
placed Ward at McAnally’s had been hypnotized in an effort to enhance his recollection. While the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that hypnosis, as a technique of memory retrieval, does
not meet the evidentiary standard of general scientific acceptance, testimony based on a witness’s prehypnotic memory is permitted. Robison v. State, 677 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984).
311
Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69, 78 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
312
GRISHAM, supra note 306, at 152–54. False testimony of informants—“snitches,” in the vernacular—has
been a factor in most wrongful convictions in U.S. capital cases since the 1970’s. See THE SNITCH SYSTEM,
supra note 32.
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and Fontenot were convicted on September 25, 1985, following a thirteen-day jury trial
and sentenced to death thirty days later by Judge Donald E. Powers.314
As dubious as the convictions may have been, they became all the more so on
January 6, 1986, when—while Ward and Fontenot’s appeals were pending—Haraway’s
body was found.315 It was not at the location described in the dreams but rather in a field
twenty-seven miles away.316 An autopsy determined that she died not of stabbing but of a
single bullet wound to the head and that her body had not been burned. 317 Without
considering the exculpatory new evidence,318 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
proceeded to reverse the convictions and remand the cases for separate retrials—holding
that the admission into evidence of the dream statements at the joint trial deprived each
defendant of his right to confront the other.319
Although the dreams were incontrovertibly at odds with virtually every significant
detail of the crime, the prosecution plowed ahead with retrials, relying primarily on the
dream statements and the eyewitnesses who testified at the 1995 trial. 320 Ward and
Fontenot’s juries returned guilty verdicts, recommending a life sentence for Ward and
death for Fontenot.321 Judge Powers, who presided over both trials as well as the original
joint trial, sentenced Ward and Fontenot accordingly.322 Both convictions were affirmed
on direct appeal, but Fontenot’s case was remanded for resentencing because the judge
had failed to instruct the jury that life without parole was a sentencing option. 323 On
remand, the parties negotiated life without parole.324
As unjust as convictions relying on fiction-filled “confessions” may seem in
retrospect, at the time of the Ward-Fontenot trials the false-confession phenomenon was
counterintuitive and in the early days of exploration by social scientists. 325 Gradually,
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Brief in Support of Post-Conviction Relief at 2, Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994)
(CR-88-43) [hereinafter Fontenot PC] (on file with authors); Brief in Support of Post-Conviction Relief at
1, 17, Ward v. State, 755 P.2d 123 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (CRF-1984-183) [hereinafter Ward PC] (on
file with authors).
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Direct appeal is limited to the factual record as established in the trial court. See DANIEL J. MEADOR &
JORDANA S. BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1994).
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Fontenot PC, supra note 313, at 32; see also Ward v. State, 755 P.2d 123, 124 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
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Ward PC, supra note 313, at 3; see also Fontenot PC, supra note 313, at 2.
321
Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69, 71 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); Ward v. State, No. F-90-0017 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1994), at 1 (on file with authors).
322
Fontenot PC, supra note 313, at 87.
323
Id.
324
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 10, Fontenot v. Rios, 6:16-cv-00069-JHP-KEW (E.D. Okla. 2016)
(on file with authors).
325
See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of
Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998). In 122 capital cases in which exonerations have occurred since the dawning of
the DNA forensic age in 1989, false confessions occurred in twenty-three cases, or 18.9 percent. NAT’L
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx?View={FAF6EDDB-5A68-4F8F8A52-
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over ensuing decades, it would be recognized that mentally challenged suspects—as
Ward and Fontenot were 326 —“are especially vulnerable to the types of psychological
pressure and intimidating interrogation techniques that lead to false confessions.”327
As it was, however, Ward and Fontenot’s cases lay dormant for nearly the next
two decades, when the Oklahoma Innocence Project brought a petition for postconviction relief on Fontenot’s behalf.328 The petition cited Oklahoma State Bureau of
Investigation records allegedly withheld from Fontenot’s trial and appellate counsel.329
The records established that Fontenot had a strong multi-witness alibi, corroborated by
police dispatch records and police reports, for his whereabouts at the time of the crime.330
Although the Oklahoma post-conviction statute sets no time limit for seeking postconviction relief, 331 Fontenot’s petition was denied by Judge Thomas S. Landrith without
a hearing in December 2014 based on a legal principle known as laches, which bars
claims not brought in a timely fashion. 332 In 2015, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed Landrith’s decision, and the matter, as of this writing, is the subject of a
petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus.333
Meanwhile, in 2017, volunteer lawyers from the Chicago-based firm of Sidley
Austin LLP and the Center on Wrongful Convictions joined Oklahoma attorney Mark
Barrett, who had been instrumental in the Williamson exoneration,334 in filing a petition
for post-conviction relief on Ward’s behalf. 335 The petition alleged that the withheld
Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation files show that authorities knew of but failed to
inform Ward’s trial counsel of alternative suspects336 and stymied a proper defense by
failing to disclose other exculpatory evidence, intimidating witnesses, and knowingly
allowing and failing to correct false testimony.337
In light of the ongoing proceedings, exoneration remains possible more than three
decades after the evidence emanating from the discovery of Haraway’s body left no
doubt that the dream statements—without which, the petition asserts, there is a

2C61F5BF9EA7}&FilterField1=Sentence&FilterValue1=Death&FilterField2=FC&FilterValue2=8_FC
(last visited May 23, 2019).
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MAYER, supra note 299, at 280, 301.
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OKLA. JUSTICE COMM’N, REPORT TO THE OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION 1, 9 (2013),
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/ok_justice_comm_report_convictions_feb_2013.pdf
(last visited May 23, 2019).
328
Fontenot PC, supra note 313, at 9.
329
Id. (allegedly in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
330
Fontenot PC, supra note 313, at 9.
331
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1080 (1970). Even if there were a time limit, it would not bar claims of actual
innocence in view of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding that “actual innocence, if proved, serves as a
gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar . . . or . . .
expiration of the statute of limitations.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013).
332
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 10, Fontenot v. Rios, 6:16-cv-00069-JHP-KEW (E.D. Okla. Feb.
24, 2016) (citing state application for post-conviction relief filed on July 24, 2013, and denied by Judge
Thomas S. Landrith on September 17, 2014, without a hearing, based on the state’s assertion of laches).
333
Id.
334
GRISHAM, supra note 306, at 298–301.
335
Ward PC, supra note 313.
336
Id. at 6.
337
Id. at 58.
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“reasonable probability” that Ward and Fontenot would not have been convicted—were
fiction.338
8.

Jarvis Jay Masters—California

Jarvis Jay Masters was sentenced to death in 1990 for his purported role in the
murder of Sergeant Dean Burchfield, a corrections officer at San Quentin Prison, on June
8, 1985.339 At the time of the crime, Masters was serving a twenty-three-year sentence for
a series of 1980 armed robberies.340 The prosecution alleged that another prisoner, Andre
Johnson, stabbed Burchfield to death in culmination of a conspiracy with Masters and a
third prisoner, Lawrence Woodard.341 Johnson and Woodard received life sentences.342
All three prisoners were alleged members of a prison gang known as the Black Guerilla
Family.343
Burchfield died of a single stab wound that severed his pulmonary artery. 344
Johnson was linked to the crime by Rick Lipton, a corrections officer, who testified that
he had seen Burchfield collapse in front of Johnson’s cell.345 A “homemade spear shaft”
was discovered nearby. 346 The star witness against Masters and Woodard was Rufus
Willis, also a member of the Black Guerilla Family, who testified under a grant of
immunity from prosecution at the 1990 trial for which two juries were empaneled—one
for Johnson, one for Masters and Woodard—before Marin County Superior Court Judge
Beverly B. Savitt.347
Willis told the Masters/Woodard jury that he had been in the prison exercise yard
with the defendants and other members of the Black Guerilla Family when they plotted to
kill corrections officers. 348 Burchfield was chosen as the first—and it would turn out
only—victim.349 It was agreed that Johnson would carry out the “hit” and Masters would
provide the murder weapon.350
The prosecution introduced notes—“kites,” in prison vernacular—that Willis
claimed had been written by Masters describing his role in the murder, and a handwriting
expert confirmed that the notes were in Masters’s handwriting. 351 In addition, Bobby
Evans, a Black Guerilla Family member, testified before both juries that Masters,
Woodard, and Johnson had confessed their roles in the killing about a month after it

338

Id. at 6. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82, 289 (1999) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley 514 U.S.
419, 433 (1995)).
339
People v. Masters, 365 P.3d 861, 871–73 (Cal. 2016).
340
People v. Masters, 134 Cal. App. 3d 509, 514 (1982), superseded by statute as stated in People v. Perez,
207 Cal. App. 3d 431 (1989).
341
People v. Johnson, 19 Cal. App. 4th 778, 794 (1993) (affirming convictions of Johnson and Woodard).
342
Id. at 780.
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Id. at 782.
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Id. at 783.
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Id.
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occurred.352 Regardless of the merits of the cases against Johnson and Woodard, there
was a serious problem with the Masters case: At a preliminary hearing, Willis had
described Masters as standing five-seven, bespectacled, clean shaven, and free of tattoos,
when in fact Masters stood six-one, did not wear glasses, had a mustache and goatee, and
had a tattoo on his left cheek.353
In addition, before trial, Harold Richardson, a San Quentin prisoner who fit the
description Willis had provided of the conspirator alleged to be Masters, confessed to
playing the role in the crime Willis attributed to Masters. 354 At the trial, outside the
presence of the juries, Masters’s counsel called Richardson to the stand, but he refused to
testify, citing his right against self-incrimination.355 The defense asked Judge Savitt to
grant Richardson immunity from prosecution and compel him to testify, but she
refused.356 Savitt also denied a defense request to present expert testimony regarding the
unreliability of jailhouse informants.357
Although upon conviction Johnson and Woodard were sentenced to life in prison
without parole,358 Masters was sentenced to death after a penalty-phase hearing at which
a prisoner named Johnny Hoze, a member of the Black Guerilla Family, testified that
Masters had bragged about murdering a San Quentin prisoner in 1984. 359 Masters,
according to Hoze, called murdering the prisoner “better than sex.”360
The Johnson and Woodard convictions were affirmed in 1993,361 but appeals in the
Masters case would drag on for another quarter of a century with no end in sight, 362 even
though the witnesses whose testimony had led to his conviction and death sentence—
Rufus Willis, Bobby Evans, and Johnny Hoze—had recanted with sworn statements
saying that they had lied at the trial in the hope of obtaining favorable treatment for
themselves.363 The Willis statement also said that he had coerced Masters, out of fear for
his safety, to write the incriminating “kites,” which Masters copied from writings of
Willis and Woodard.364 In addition, Andre Johnson, the Masters co-defendant convicted
of actually stabbing Burchfield to death, provided a sworn statement saying that Masters
had no role in the murder.365
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Id. at 877. Accusers with incentives to lie were instrumental in a majority of false convictions in U.S.
capital cases from the 1970’s through the mid-2000’s. See THE SNITCH SYSTEM, supra note 32, at 14.
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See Brief for Death Penalty Focus as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner-Appellee at 12, Jones v.
Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-56373) (citing Appellant’s Opening Brief at 50-51, People v.
Masters, No. S016883 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2001)).
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359
Report of Referee Lynn Duryee at 18-21, In re Masters (Marin Cty. Super. Ct., Apr. 11, 2011) (No.
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(Willis declaration) (on file with authors); id. Ex. 7 (declaration of Joseph Baxter, attorney for Masters,
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Id. Ex. 1, at 4–7.
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In 2004, while Masters’s direct appeal was pending before the California Supreme
Court, his court-appointed appellate attorneys, Joseph Baxter and Richard I. Targow,
filed a petition for a state writ of habeas corpus, citing the recantations and alleging that
Masters’s conviction and death sentence rested on evidence that the prosecution had
known or should have known “was inflammatory, unreliable, untrue, and/or
misleading.”366
Under a 2008 order of the California Supreme Court, Marin County Superior Court
Judge Lynn Duyree was appointed as a referee to review questions raised in the habeas
petition, but she did not conduct a hearing until 2011.367 At the hearing, which lasted
thirteen days, Duyree heard extensive testimony from Willis and Evans, expert testimony
of a forensic linguist who said that the kites used against Masters had been authored by
someone other than Masters, and evidence pertaining to the statements of Hoze, who did
not testify.368At the conclusion of the hearing, Duyree concluded that the evidence she
heard did not support issuance of the writ—because she had “scant ability to discern”
whether Willis and Evans had lied at the trial or before her, 369 because the unrebutted
forensic linguistic testimony, while convincing, did not exonerate Masters, 370 and
because Hoze’s disavowal of his trial testimony was “not believable.” 371 In 2012,
Masters’s lawyers filed a response in the Supreme Court contending that most of
Duyree’s findings were not supported by the record or were contrary to law, or both, and
arguing that Masters was entitled to habeas relief because “[e]very single piece of posttrial evidence casts fundamental doubt upon [his] conviction and points unerringly to his
innocence.”372
In 2015, Masters’s plight was cited in an amicus brief filed by Death Penalty Focus
of California in the case of Ernest Dewayne Jones as an example of the state’s
“exorbitant delays in processing capital cases.”373 A year earlier, a federal judge had held
in the Jones case that “the dysfunctional administration of California’s death penalty
system” rendered it cruel and unusual and therefore unconstitutional.374 The Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court decision, holding that federal courts cannot consider novel
constitutional theories on habeas review—but not disagreeing that the state’s death

366

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1–2, 11, 48–58, 117, In re Masters, No. 10467 (Cal. Dec. 28,
2004) (on file with authors). A California petition for habeas corpus generally must be filed while the direct
appeal is pending. See OFFICE OF VICTIMS’ SERVS., CAL. ATTORNEY GEN.’S OFFICE, A VICTIM’S GUIDE TO
THE CAPITAL CASE PROCESS 6, https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/publications/deathpen.pdf.
367
Duryee, supra note 359, at 1.
368
Id. at 8–13 (discussion of Willis and Evans testimony and recantations); id. 14–15 (discussion of
forensic linguist Robert Leonard’s testimony); id. at 18–26 (discussion of Hoze testimony and recantation).
369
Id. at 6.
370
Id. at 15.
371
Id. at 25. For a discussion of how judges often fail to take recantations seriously, see Rob Warden,
Reacting to Recantations, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS
OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 106–16 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017).
372
Petitioner’s Exceptions to Referee’s Report at 2–3, 227, In re Masters, No. S130495 (Cal. Jan. 2, 2012)
(on file with authors).
373
Brief for Death Penalty Focus as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 353, at 2,
11–14.
374
Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1051 (C.D. Cal. 2014), reversed by Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d
538 (9th Cir. 2015).
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penalty system is dysfunctional and that the delay between sentencing and execution is
extraordinary.375
In 2016—twenty-six years after Masters had been sentenced to death and without
reference to evidence adduced in his still-unresolved habeas proceedings—the California
Supreme Court finally ruled on his direct appeal, affirming his conviction and
sentence. 376 As a result, in early 2019, despite the substantial evidence of innocence,
Masters remained on death row—where he became a Buddhist and wrote two books377—
barred from pursuing relief in the federal courts until his state remedies have been
exhausted.378
One factor in the delay of the adjudication of the Masters case—the proverbial
elephant in the room—may be its political touchiness, in light of the facts that the victim
was a corrections officer, that the corrections officers’ union is a powerful political force
in California,379 and that members of the California judiciary must stand for election.380
In November 1986, just short of a year and a half after the Burchfield murder, the perils
of appearing soft on crime became apparent in California, when voters ousted three
liberal justices of the California Supreme Court, including Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth
Bird, whom the Los Angeles Times reported “fell victim to a multimillion-dollar
campaign that focused on her long record of voting to overturn death sentences.”381
The Masters case is perhaps just the sort of travesty that Harvard Law School Dean
Roscoe Pound had in mind eighty years before the Bird defeat when he opined that
“putting courts into politics and compelling judges to become politicians, in many
jurisdictions has almost destroyed the traditional respect for the bench.”382
9.

Ralph International Thomas—California

The bodies of two Grateful Dead fans—Mary Regina Gioia, twenty-two, of
Schenectady, New York, and Gregory Allen Kniffin, eighteen, of Wilton, Connecticut—
were found in San Francisco Bay the morning of August 16, 1985. 383 They had been
beaten and shot at point-blank range near a Berkeley transient encampment known as
375

Jones, 806 F.3d at 541, 553.
People v. Masters, 365 P.3d 861, 871 (Cal. 2016).
377
JARVIS JAY MASTERS, FINDING FREEDOM: WRITINGS FROM DEATH ROW (1997); JARVIS JAY MASTERS,
THAT BIRD HAS MY WINGS: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN INNOCENT MAN ON DEATH ROW (2009).
378
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). Although Masters remains on death row, the chance that he will be
executed was diminished when Governor Gavin Newsom declared a moratorium on executions on March
13, 2019. See A Pause for California’s Death Row, supra note 13.
379
See Ed Salzman, Politicians Protect and Serve the Police, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1989, at 3 (describing the
California Correctional Peace Officers Association as “the most potent of the [state’s] law-enforcement
unions”).
380
See Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Judicial Selection in the States: California, JUD. SELECTION IN THE
STATES, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=CA (last visited May 23,
2019).
381
Frank Clifford, Voters Repudiate Three of Court’s Liberal Justices: Bird Becomes First Chief Justice to
Be Ousted in Modern Era, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1986, at B1.
382
Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L.
REV. 729, 748 (1906).
383
People v. Thomas, 828 P.2d 101, 106–07 (Cal. 1992); Charles Burress, Ex-Convict Arrested in Berkeley
Slaying, S.F. CHRONICLE, Aug. 27, 1985, at 3. (The article spells the male victim’s name “Kniffen,” but
reported decisions spell it “Kniffin.”)
376
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Rainbow Village, where they and other followers of the Grateful Dead had been
staying.384
Ralph International Thomas, a thirty-one-year-old ex-convict, was arrested ten days
after the murders.385 Following a 1986 jury trial, he was convicted and sentenced to death
based solely on circumstantial evidence: that he had been with the victims not long before
they were slain, that he had owned what might have been the murder weapon, a
Remington .44 Magnum rifle that he claimed had been stolen before the murders and had
never been recovered, and that statements attributed to him after his arrest were indicative
of guilt.386
The defense postulated that the murders had been committed not by Thomas, an
African American, but by a white, blond-haired man who had been implicated in the
crime by a witness named Vivian Cercy.387 At a preliminary hearing, Cercy testified that
she had seen the victims walking toward the waterfront with the man who was carrying
what Cercy thought at the time was a stick, but that could have been a rifle, heard three
firecracker-like sounds, and saw the man return from the waterfront and wipe his hands
on vegetation.388 Cercy was unavailable at Thomas’s trial, but her preliminary-hearing
testimony was read to the jury.389
After his conviction and death sentence were affirmed,390 Thomas sought a state
writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his trial counsel, Alameda County Public
Defender James Chaffee, had failed to investigate the alternative suspect whom Cercy
had described.391 In 2002, the California Supreme Court ordered an evidentiary hearing at
which several witnesses identified the blond man as James Bowen, a Grateful Dead fan
known as “Bo.”392 The Supreme Court concluded that Thomas indeed had been deprived
of effective assistance of counsel, but nonetheless denied relief because he had failed to
show prejudice and because it was “difficult to know” what a competent investigation
might have demonstrated two decades earlier.393
Thomas next sought a federal writ of habeas corpus, which U.S. District Court
Judge Marilyn Hall Patel granted in September 2009, ordering a new trial. 394 Judge Patel
was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 395 but Thomas had
suffered a series of strokes and seizures and his mental health had deteriorated to a point

384

Thomas, 828 P.2d at 106 n.2.
Id. at 107, 111, 125–26. Thomas’s prior convictions were for rape, armed robbery, and sodomy. He was
born on June 14, 1954. Ralph International Thomas, ARRESTFACTS.COM, https://arrestfacts.com/RalphThomas-0i6C13 (last visited May 23, 2019).
386
Thomas, 828 P.2d at 106–09, 113, 122 n.13.
387
Id. at 110, 125.
388
Id. at 111.
389
Id.
390
Id. at 105.
391
In re Thomas, 129 P.3d 49, 50–52 (Cal. 2006).
392
Id. at 51; see also id. at 69–70 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
393
Id. at 55, 61–62.
394
See Thomas v. Wong, No. C 93-0616 MHP, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131945, at *16–17, *57–58 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 9, 2009) (holding that Chaffee failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into evidence
supporting the theory that someone other than Thomas committed the murders).
395
Thomas v. Chappell, 678 F.3d 1086, 1106 (9th Cir. 2012).
385
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that rendered him incompetent to stand trial.396 As a result, nearly three decades after he
was sentenced to death, Thomas was committed to a state mental health facility, where,
his opportunity to establish his innocence foreclosed, he died in January 2014.397
10.

Ha’im Al Matin Sharif—Nevada

Charles Lamont Robins, later known as Ha’im Al Matin Sharif,398 was sentenced to
death in December 1988 for what a medical examiner deemed the murder of his
girlfriend’s infant daughter the previous April in Las Vegas.399 The child, Brittany Smith,
suffered extensive injuries—a broken back, broken leg, and internal hemorrhaging400—
but medical evidence would emerge a quarter of a century later indicating that her
injuries were the result of infantile scurvy. 401 In addition, Brittany’s mother, Lovell
McDowell, who testified in 1988 that Robins had abused Brittany, recanted that
testimony and accused police and prosecutors of coercing her to lie by threatening to send
her to prison and take away her other three children.402
In September 2016, the Nevada Supreme Court, citing “the compelling nature of
the new medical evidence” and McDowell’s recantation, ordered the trial court to hold an
evidentiary hearing on Sharif’s innocence claim.403 Although the Supreme Court found it
“more likely than not” that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the
new evidence, assuming that it withstood scrutiny at trial, 404 Sharif entered into an
agreement with the prosecution under which his conviction and death sentence were
vacated in exchange for pleading guilty to second-degree murder—foreclosing the
possibility of his exoneration, but effecting his immediate release in 2017.405 Had he not
accepted the deal, Sharif would have remained on death row while pursuing his actualinnocence claim.406
At the trial, McDowell testified that she was awakened shortly after 12:30 A.M. on
April 19, 1988, by sounds of Brittany gagging or choking and arose to find Robins
holding the eleven-month-old and hollering, “Brittany, come on. Brittany, wake up.
Wake up Brittany.”407 McDowell called 911 and ran outside, screaming that her baby had
396

David Crawford, A Crumbling Death Penalty System Does Not Benefit Inmates, Especially the Innocent,
CASETEXT (Sept. 1, 2015), https://casetext.com/posts/a-crumbling-death-penalty-system-does-not-benefitinmates-especially-the-innocent.
397
Id.
398
Order Changing Name, In the Matter of the Application of Charles Robins (Nev. 7th Dist. Jud. Ct. Mar.
13, 1995) (on file with authors).
399
Amended Judgment of Conviction, Nevada v. Robins, No. C84005 (Clark Cty. Dist. Ct. Feb. 1, 1989)
(on file with authors); see also Robins v. State, 798 P.2d 558, 561 (Nev. 1990) (per curiam).
400
Robins, 798 P.2d at 615–16.
401
Robins v. State, No. 65063, 2016 Nev. Unpub LEXIS 764, at *6–9 (Nev. Sept. 22, 2016).
402
Declaration of Lovell McDowell (May 5, 2013) (on file with authors).
403
Robins, 2016 Nev. Unpub LEXIS 764, at *13–15.
404
Id. at *14.
405
Memorandum of Agreement, Nevada v. Robins, No. 88C084005 (Clark Cty. Dist. Ct. May 16, 2017)
(on file with authors).
406
The plea agreement specified that his conviction and death sentence would be reinstated if he attempted
further litigation regarding any issues arising from the case. Id. at 2–3. For a discussion of why defendants
sometimes plead guilty to crimes they did not commit, see Toni Schlesinger, Plea Bargaining Is Torture,
CHI. LAW., Dec. 1, 1978, at 1 (interview with University of Chicago Law Professor John H. Langbein).
407
Robins v. State, 798 P.2d 558, 614–15 (Nev. 1990) (per curiam).
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stopped breathing.408 An Air Force sergeant who heard McDowell’s screams performed
cardiopulmonary resuscitation before paramedics arrived and rushed Brittany to a
hospital, where she was pronounced dead.409
Dr. Nina Hollander, the state medical examiner, concluded from an autopsy that
Brittany died from blunt-force trauma, which could not have resulted from the attempted
resuscitation. 410 Robins, then nineteen, 411 was charged with first-degree murder and
felony child abuse.412 Based on Hollander’s findings and testimony by McDowell and
other prosecution witnesses who claimed to have seen Robins physically abuse
Brittany—contrary to findings of medical professionals and child-abuse investigators
who examined her on four occasions during the relevant time period and found no
abuse413—the jury convicted Robins and concluded that Brittany’s death involved torture
and depravity of mind, thus warranting a death sentence.414
Affirming the conviction and sentence, the Nevada Supreme Court held that
“abusive treatment by Robins ultimately resulted in the infant’s untimely and brutally
violent death.”415 Robins would languish on Nevada death row for more than another two
decades, losing appeal after appeal,416 until Cary Sandman, an attorney with the Federal
Defender for the District of Arizona, was appointed to the case in 2012.417
Sandman lined up two distinguished experts—Dr. Patrick D. Barnes, chief of
pediatric neuroradiology at Stanford University Medical Center, and Dr. John Plunkett, a
board-certified physician in anatomical, clinical, and forensic pathology who had
performed more than 200 autopsies on children under age two—to review Brittany’s
medical records—from which both concluded to a reasonable degree of medical certainty
that Brittany died of undiagnosed and untreated infantile scurvy.418
Sandman also tracked down Brittany’s mother, who, in addition to recanting her
trial testimony, claimed that the other prosecution witnesses who accused Robins of
abusing Brittany had lied under oath and that one of those witnesses had admitted to her
that he had falsely accused Robins in the hope of receiving leniency in a pending drug
case.419 After agreeing to the plea deal—rendering himself legally, if not in fact, guilty—
Sharif walked off of Nevada death row, his home for nearly three decades, and went to
live with relatives in Washington State.420
408

Id.
Id.
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Id. at 561–62.
411
Robins was born on August 31, 1968. Certificate of Live Birth for Charles Lamont Robins, Los
Angeles, Cal. (1968) (on file with authors).
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Robins v. State, No. 65063, 2016 Nev. Unpub LEXIS 764, at *4 (Nev. Sept. 22, 2016).
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Id. at *9.
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Robins, 798 P.2d at 569 n.4.
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Id. at 560.
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See Robins v. Baker, No. 2:99-cv-0412-LRH-PAL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158402, at *12–17 (D. Nev.
Nov. 4, 2013).
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Id. at *16.
418
Brief for Innocence Network as Amicus Curiae Supporting Charles Robins, aka Ha’im Al Matin Sharif,
Robins v. Baker at *7, No. 65063 (Clark Cty. Dist. Ct., Sept. 8, 2014); Michael Kiefer, The Long Journey
from Death Row to Freedom, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (June 15, 2017),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-investigations/2017/06/15/nevada-death-row-inmateset-free-arizona-lawyer/394809001/.
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Declaration of Lovell McDowell, supra note 402, at ¶ ¶ 21–23.
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Walter Ogrod—Pennsylvania

After his first trial ended with a jury hung eleven-one in favor of acquittal in
1993, 421 Walter Ogrod was convicted and sentenced to death in 1996 following his
second trial for the murder of four-year-old Barbara Jean Horn, whose naked, battered
body had been found in a plastic trash bag inside a cardboard box near her Northeast
Philadelphia home late the afternoon of July 12, 1988.422 She died of five blows to her
head inflicted with what the medical examiner thought might have been a two-by-four.423
There was nothing to indicate that she had been sexually assaulted.424
Minutes before the grisly discovery, which occurred about two and a half hours
after the child had been playing in her front yard, four witnesses saw a man carrying the
box in which the body would be found—a man the witnesses described as in his midtwenties or early thirties, standing five-six to five-nine, weighing 165 to 175 pounds, and
having either dark or sandy hair.425 Shortly before the man was seen by those witnesses,
another witness who knew the child had seen her walking with a man of similar
description. 426 From descriptions provided by two of the witnesses, a police artist
prepared a sketch of the suspect, and a third witness deemed the sketch accurate,
especially the hair.427
The initial suspect was Barbara Jean’s step-father, John Fahy,428 who was in his
late twenties, stood five-seven, weighed about 160 pounds, and had short brown hair.429
But police soon focused on other suspects, including Wesley Ward, who had purchased a
television set in the box in which the body was found,430 and Ross Felice, whom two of
the witnesses identified as the man they saw carrying the box, but grand juries declined to
indict either man. 431 Police collected organic evidence from the homes of Ward and
Felice, as well as from the plastic bag and box in which the body had been found, but the
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Commonwealth v. Ogrod, 839 A.2d 294, 305–06 (Pa. 2002); Dianna Marder, Mistrial, Melee End
Ogrod Trial, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 5, 1993, at A1; see also THOMAS LOWENSTEIN, THE TRIALS OF
WALTER OGROD 8–9, 288–89 (2017).
422
Ogrod, 839 A.2d at 306–07, 309; LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 5, 8, 10, 302–03; Jack McGuire &
Gloria Campisi, Child’s Slaying Has NE in Panic, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, July 13, 1988, at 1; Jury Chooses
Execution for Walter Ogrod, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 1, 1996, at B1; Kimberly J. McLarin & Edward
Colimore, Man Held in Child's '88 Killing: Ex-Neighbor of N.E. Phila. Girl, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 7,
1992, at B1.
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Ogrod, 839 A.2d at 306–07; LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 10.
424
Postmortem Report at 6, Paul J. Hoyer, M.D. July 12, 1988) (“Oral, rectal, and vaginal smears do not
show sperm.”) (on file with authors).
425
LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 4–6, 19, 22, 325 n.5 (quoting a police interview on July 12, 1988 with
Margaret Kruce, mother of a friend of the murdered child).
426
Id. at 5, 8 (fixing timeframe between the child’s disappearance and discovery of her body); id. at 21–22,
325 n.4 (quoting July 12, 1988 police interview with Peter Vargas, who had been installing an air
conditioner in the area); see also Ogrod, 839 A.2d at 308–09 (summarizing trial testimony of witnesses
Michael Massi and David Schectman).
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LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 22.
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See id. at 10 (quoting Fahy as saying that one officer told him, “We found her, she’s dead, and you did
it.”).
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See id. at 11 (reporting that Fahy was 22 when he met the victim’s mother in 1983); see also id. at 17
(describing Fahy).
430
Id. at 27–28.
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Ogrod, 839 A.2d at 309; LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 28–30.

412

Vol. 14:3]

Rob Warden and John Seasly

evidence was not subjected to DNA testing.432 One of the witnesses who had identified
Felice also identified yet another suspect, Raymond Sheehan, from a photo.433
The case had grown cold by February 1992, when it was reassigned to veteran
Philadelphia Detectives Martin Devlin and Paul Worrell.434 Four months earlier, Devlin
had obtained a confession that would prove false after resulting in the conviction of an
innocent man for the murder and rape of a seventy-seven-year-old woman.435 Devlin and
Worrell also threatened and physically coerced witness statements and false confessions
that had culminated in the conviction of another innocent man for the murder of the
seventy-eight-year-old operator of a payday-loan business.436
Once assigned to the Horn investigation, Delvin and Worrell began re-interviewing
persons who had been interviewed four years earlier—among them Ogrod, who at the
time of the crime shared a home in the neighborhood with a couple whose young son,
known as “Charliebird,” was a friend and playmate of Barbara Jean Horn.437 In 1990,
Ogrod had moved into an apartment above a chandelier shop in suburban Glenside,
where Worrell went on April 4, 1992.438 Ogrod was not at home, but Worrell left his
business card at the chandelier shop, asking the owner to ask Ogrod to call the next
day.439 As requested, Ogrod, now twenty-seven, called and, at Worrell’s request, drove to
the Philadelphia Police Administration Building, known as the “Roundhouse,” to be
interviewed—not as a suspect, according to the detectives, but as an “informational
witness.”440
Ogrod, who had no criminal record and did not fit the description of the man seen
carrying the box,441 had attended a school for youths with learning disabilities, graduating
two years late.442 “Crazy Walter,” as he was known,443 had served briefly in the Army,
from which he received a medical discharge based on a diagnosis of “mixed personality
disorder characterized by extreme dependency.” 444 One acquaintance said that Ogrod
“seemed mentally retarded,” 445 and other acquaintances described him as “easily

432

Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief at 6, Commonwealth v. Ogrod, CP-51-CR-0532781-1992
(Pa. 1st Dist. Ct. of Common Pleas, June 24, 2011).
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Id. at 4 n.2.
434
LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 37.
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PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 24, 2016, at A1.
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Thomas v. City of Philadelphia, 290 F. Supp. 3d 371, 373–75 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
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LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 14, 63. Walter’s adoptive father, who died in 1984, bequeathed the
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Id. at 66–67; see also Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, supra note 432, at 8.
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LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421.
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Id. at 17, 66, 109; see also Commonwealth v. Ogrod, 839 A.2d 294, 311 (Pa. 2002). Ogrod was born on
February 3, 1965. Inmate Search Results, PA. DEP’T OF CORR., http://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov/#/Result
(search for “Walter Ogrod”) (last visited May 23, 2019).
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LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 24; see also Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, supra note
432, at 6.
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LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 52.
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Id. at 44.
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Id. at 51.
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Affidavit/Declaration of Steven King dated June 14, 2011, at ¶ 5, Ex. No. 36, Appx. Vol. I, Amended
Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, Commonwealth v. Ogrod, CP-51-CR-0532718-1992 (Pa. 1st Dist. Court
of Common Pleas, 2011) (on file with authors).
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manipulated,” 446 “definitely slow,” 447 and “an easy person to bully.” 448 When Ogrod
arrived at the Roundhouse, he had been awake for roughly thirty hours, having worked an
eighteen-hour shift as a driver for a commercial bakery.449
After hours of interrogation, which was not electronically recorded, Ogrod signed
each page of a sixteen-page statement—purportedly in his own words, but in Devlin’s
handwriting— confessing to the murder and attempted sexual assault of Barbara Jean
Horn.450 According to the statement, which Ogrod recanted almost immediately, the fouryear-old had come to his house looking for Charliebird,451 whereupon he lured her into
the basement to “play doctor” and tried to force her to perform oral sex.452 She screamed,
prompting him to strike her head at least four times with “what felt like a pipe,” but
perhaps was a “pull-down bar” from his weight set.453 He said he then washed her body,
put it into a plastic bag, and disposed of it in the box in which it would be found. 454
Ogrod was charged with murder and related sex crimes.455
At the 1993 trial, the prosecution relied principally upon the signed confession,
which Judge Juanita Kidd Stout held admissible despite a psychiatrist’s testimony that it
was not in Ogrod’s style of speaking.456 Ogrod took the stand, denying the murder and
asserting that, during the hours of interrogation, the detectives had persuaded him—
briefly—that he must be guilty. 457 There was no physical evidence linking him to the
crime.458 The murder weapon was not, and would not be, recovered.459
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of Common Pleas, 2011) (on file with authors).
447
Affidavit/Declaration of Kim Ward dated Feb. 18, 2011, Ex. No. 22, Appx. Vol. I, Amended Petition for
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After nine hours of deliberation at the end of the eight-and-a-half-day trial, the jury
foreman sent a note to Judge Stout stating that the jury was deadlocked eleven to one.460
Stout summoned the parties to the courtroom, but before court reconvened the foreman
informed her that the jury had reached a verdict after all.461 The acquittal was announced
in open court, but when jurors were polled, one said, “I do not agree with the verdict.”462
Stout declared a mistrial.463
Charles T. Graham, the jury foreman, who favored acquittal, would explain, “I did
not believe that Mr. Ogrod was the source of the confession because when he took the
stand it was clear to me that he could not have authored something as sophisticated as the
confession. I came to this conclusion because on the stand Mr. Ogrod was not very
articulate and had difficulty expressing himself.”464 Graham quoted Alfred Szewczak, the
juror who changed his mind after initially agreeing to the acquittal, as telling the other
jurors, “Ogrod signed the confession—I have no doubt he’s guilty. No amount of duress
would make me sign or agree to anything I didn’t believe.”465
Less than two month before Ogrod’s 1996 retrial,466 the prosecution disclosed to
his court-appointed lawyer, Mark Greenberg, that two repeat felons, Jay Wolchansky and
John Hall, had come forward some eighteen months earlier to claim that Ogrod had
confessed to them when the three were in jail together.467 Wolchansky was an acolyte of
Hall, a serial informant known as “the Monsignor” for his success in obtaining
confessions, or rather claiming to obtain them.468 Because the Monsignor “had a lot of
baggage,” he would not be called to testify against Ogrod, but the acolyte became a
principal witness for the prosecution at the retrial. 469 Under the alias Jason
Banachowski,470 Wolchansky testified that Ogrod had admitted luring the victim into his
house and trying to force her to perform oral sex, but when “she became hysterical . . . he
grabbed a weight bar and smacked her in the head with it.”471 Wolchansky, who claimed
that he expected nothing in exchange for his testimony, added that Ogrod had mentioned
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been manifestly necessary. Ogrod, 839 A.2d at 316–17 (citing Commonwealth v. Diehl, 615 A.2d 690 (Pa.
1992)).
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to Elicit Jail Confessions, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 27, 1997, at 1.
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470
The alias was allowed ostensibly to protect Wolchansky and his family. Ogrod, 839 A.2d 294, at 327.
471
Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, supra note 432, at 42.
461

415

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2019

that his mother—by this time deceased—had accused him of the killing, to which he had
replied, “Damn right I did, and if you know what’s best for you, you’ll keep quiet.”472
On Greenberg’s advice, Ogrod did not testify at the retrial.473 Greenberg, moreover,
presented nothing to rebut the confession testimony, not even challenging the
questionable claim that the murder weapon had been a weight bar, focusing instead on
the possibility that one of the initial suspects, Ross Felice, had committed the crime. 474 In
closing, the prosecutor, Assistant Philadelphia District Attorney Judith Rubino, suggested
that Ogrod’s silence was indicative of guilt, telling the jury that the “defendant admitted
to his mother that he killed Barbara Jean and threatened his own mother; there had been
no denial of that.” 475 Judge Stout sustained an objection from Greenberg, who would
state in chambers that he did not ask for a mistrial because he knew that Stout would tell
the jury that defendants were not required to testify.476
After instructions, the jury retired and took an initial vote, which was ten-to-two
in favor of conviction, according to a journal kept by juror Thomas James, who made the
journal available to journalist Thomas Lowenstein.477 An hour and twenty minutes after
deliberations began, court adjourned for the day, but the jury, after deliberating another
hour and a half the next day, found Ogrod guilty of murder and attempted involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse. 478 The day after that, jurors deliberated less than ninety
minutes before unanimously agreeing that Ogrod deserved to die.479 Judge Stout imposed
the death sentence on November 8, 1996.480
It was not until more than seven years later that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
affirmed Ogrod’s conviction and death sentence,481 rebuffing his claims that Rubino had
impermissibly commented on his silence and that Greenberg had been ineffective in
failing to object to the 1993 mistrial.482 Five months before Ogrod’s conviction and death
sentence were affirmed, Raymond Sheehan pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life in
prison for the murder and rape of a ten-year-old girl the year before the Horn murder in
the same neighborhood.483
After the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Ogrod case, 484 a team of
federal community defenders and pro bono attorneys from the Philadelphia firm of
Bingham McCutchen LLP485 brought a petition for a state habeas corpus, proffering new
472

Id. at 73 (quoting trial transcript).
Ogrod, 839 A.2d 294, at 315.
474
Id. at 279, 315.
475
Id. at 324.
476
Id. at 324–25.
477
LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 241, 287; email message from Thomas Lowenstein, author of THE
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evidence that “affirmatively demonstrates” Ogrod’s innocence and “undermines and
refutes” the prosecution case. 486 The new evidence included a series of affidavits,
including one from John Hall, now deceased, stating that Jay Wolchansky, also
deceased, 487 had never talked to Ogrod “in any detail” and had obtained all of the
information he purported to know about the Horn crime from Hall,488 one from Hall’s
widow stating that Hall had told her that Ogrod had not confessed in jail,489 one from a
man who had been in Ogrod’s basement shortly after the Horn child’s body was found
and who saw neither blood nor signs of a clean-up,490 one from a pathologist with whom
the medical examiner who performed the Horn autopsy concurred in the opinion that the
murder weapon could not have been the weight bar,491 one from a witness stating that the
man carrying the box had lit a cigarette,492 and ones from associates of Ogrod attesting
that he did not smoke.493
The petition alleged that Mark Greenberg had rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel at the second trial—principally by failing to pursue evidence of Ogrod’s
innocence, failing to retain and proffer the testimony of an expert witness regarding the
counter-intuitive phenomena of false confessions, and failing to explain why Ogrod, in
light of his sleep deprivation and limited intellect, had been especially vulnerable to
psychologically coercive interrogation techniques employed by police. 494 The petition
also accused the prosecution of withholding evidence, in violation of the U.S. Supreme
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Court’s Brady decision,495 that Hall and Wolchansky had received leniency in exchange
for their cooperation in the Ogrod case.496
Judge Shelley Robins New, 497 a former Philadelphia assistant district attorney
who had worked as a homicide prosecutor alongside Judith Rubino until 1995, was
assigned to the case.498 In April 2013, a little more than twenty-one months after Ogrod’s
petition was filed, the commonwealth responded with a motion to dismiss the petition
without an evidentiary hearing. 499 Despite an ensuing lapse of nearly six years, Judge
New had not ruled as of late January 2019.500
Ogrod may have reason for optimism, however, in light of what a Philadelphia
columnist termed a “seismic shift in the city’s criminal-justice climate”501—the result of
the election of a progressive district attorney, Larry Krasner, who was sworn in on
January 1, 2018, to replace R. Seth Williams, who had been district attorney during the
pendency of Ogrod’s state habeas until he went to federal prison for taking bribes in
2017. 502 On March 16, 2018, Krasner’s office informed Judge New that the office’s
Conviction Review Unit, headed by Patricia Cummings, who had been aggressive in
correcting wrongful convictions as head of a comparable unit in Dallas County, Texas,
was reviewing the case. 503 The office’s communications director, Ben Waxman,
confirmed that the office had agreed to extensive state-of-the-art DNA testing,504 which
Williams’s administration had opposed.505 If the DNA testing were to lead to Ogrod’s
exoneration, he will have served longer after having been sentenced to death than all but
three prisoners who have been exonerated by DNA in capital cases.506
12.

Anibal Garcia Rousseau—Texas

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency investigators David Delitta and James
Sullivan were about to join friends for dinner at a Houston restaurant on October 27,
495
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1988, when a man armed with what Sullivan described as a silver, chrome, or nickel
revolver “popped up” from between parked cars in the parking lot and robbed them.507
Delitta drew a gun from an ankle holster and exchanged fire with the robber, who fled on
foot.508 Delitta died the next day of a .38- or .357-caliber bullet wound.509
From a description provided by Sullivan, police prepared a composite sketch
depicting the killer as a dark-complexioned white or Hispanic man, forty-five to fifty-five
years old, weighing about 160 pounds, standing five-eight or five-nine, and having
medium-length dark hair, a thin mustache, and wrinkled forehead. 510 After a robbery
detective noted that the man depicted in the sketch resembled Anibal Garcia Rousseau, a
forty-seven-year-old drug addict who supported his addiction by committing armed
robberies, Sullivan identified Rousseau from a photo array as the killer. 511 On November
7, ten days after Delitta died, police announced that Rousseau was being sought as a
suspect.512 He remained at large until December 9, when a television reporter arranged
his surrender.513
On March 9, 1989, three months to the day after Rousseau gave himself up, the
bullet-riddled body of Leo Williams was found in a ditch in southeast Houston.514 Five
days later, when a thirty-eight-year-old drunk driver, Juan Alfredo Guerrero, was
involved in a traffic accident, a witness saw him throw a weapon into a field, where
police recovered it.515 On April 13, a ballistics test determined that the bullets that killed
Williams and Delitta had been fired from the recovered weapon—a black .38-caliber
Rohm revolver.516
Rousseau’s capital murder trial opened on May 8, 1989, with the lead prosecutor,
Lorraine Parker, by her account, unaware of the ballistics report. 517 At the trial, Sullivan
identified Rousseau as the killer,518 although, standing just five-six and weighing only
125 pounds, he was considerably smaller than the man Sullivan initially described. 519
Sullivan expressed certainty that the weapon wielded by the killer had been silver,
507
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chrome, or nickel.520 Three eyewitnesses testified that Rousseau was not the killer,521 but
Parker argued that Sullivan’s testimony was more credible because, owing to his
Environmental Protection Agency experience, he had “practically a photographic
memory.”522 Rousseau’s lawyer wanted to call a forensic psychologist who would have
cast doubt on the veracity of Sullivan’s identification of Rousseau, but the judge did not
allow it.523 Despite the lack of physical evidence linking Rousseau to the crime, the jury
found him guilty and he was sentenced to death on May 17, 1989.524
A little more than a month later, police issued a second ballistics report reaffirming
that the black Rohm revolver recovered after Guerrero’s traffic accident was the weapon
used in the slayings of both David Delitta and Leo Williams.525 Eight months after that,
on February 9, 1990, Guerrero was charged with the Williams murder, to which he
pleaded guilty a little more than two years later on March 14, 1992, and was sentenced to
twelve years in prison.526 Some nine years after that, in early 2001, Rousseau’s appellate
lawyers discovered the ballistics reports in a file at the district attorney’s office. 527 In a
prison interview in June 2001, Guerrero admitted to the Delitta murder to Richard Reyna,
an investigator for Rousseau, but then denied it after learning that Delitta had been a
federal agent. 528 The following January 28, Guerrero was paroled and deported to the
Dominican Republic.529
On February 15, 2002, Lorraine Parker, the lead prosecutor at Rousseau’s 1989
trial, acknowledged that withholding the ballistics reports violated the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Brady decision530 and stated that she would not have prosecuted Rousseau if she
had known that the same weapon had been used in both the Williams and Delitta
killings.531 The following September 11, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded
the Rousseau case to the trial court to supplement the record for the state habeas
proceedings. 532 While the proceedings were pending, Rousseau died in prison at age
sixty-five on March 5, 2006, and his quest for exoneration died with him. 533 Parker’s
experience in the case turned her into an opponent of capital punishment.534
13.

Dennis Harold Lawley—California

After waiving his right to counsel and representing himself—arguing that he was
being framed as a result of his avowed aspiration “to go into history as a Beast in
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Revelations”—Dennis Harold Lawley, a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic, was
convicted and sentenced to death in 1990 on charges that he had hired two men to kill
Kenneth Lawton Stewart.535
On January 22, 1989, Stewart, who had been released from prison four days earlier,
was found dead on the side of a road in Modesto near Butler’s Camp, where Lawley lived
in a cabin that was said to be “the scene of much drug dealing.” 536 The prosecution
contended that Stewart, who had been shot twice in the head, had robbed Lawley, who in
turn had hired Brian Seabourn and Steven Mendonca to exact deadly revenge.537
Lawley was deemed competent to represent himself after a court-appointed
psychologist, Philip Trompetter, concluded that, despite two involuntary psychiatric
hospitalizations and weird machinations about emulating a Biblical beast, Lawley had “a
very sophisticated awareness” of the charges he faced and that his decision to waive
counsel, although perhaps imprudent, was “not motivated by a psychotic delusion.”538
During the voir dire, Lawley told prospective jurors that he would introduce testimony to
show “that I have for a number of years attempted to go down in history as a Beast in
Revelations” and that, as a result, he was being framed.539 Once the jury was sworn, in its
presence, Lawley reiterated the fantasy.540
The prosecutor, James C. Brazelton, called four witnesses with purported
knowledge of the crime. Ricky Black, a heroin addict who had been charged with helping
Seabourn kidnap Stewart, but who had been granted immunity from prosecution in
exchange for testifying against Lawley.541 David Anderson, a paid informant and former
heroin addict who claimed to have overheard Lawley arrange the murder. 542 Treva
Coonce, Mendonca’s heroin-addicted girlfriend whose testimony was damaging to
Lawley even though she recanted testimony that she had given at his preliminary hearing
implicating him and Seabourn in the murder.543 Sharon Tripp, another heroin user who
testified that before the murder Lawley had told her that he had wanted to kill Stewart for
robbing him.544 William Jerry Chisum, a criminologist from the California Department of
Justice, testified—in what Stanislaus County Superior Court Judge Eugene M. Azevedo,
the trial judge, described as “probably the most damaging testimony of all”545—that a
Ruger .357 Magnum pistol recovered in a search of Lawley’s cabin had been the murder
weapon.546
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When Lawley called his first witness, a convict named Monty Ray Mullins, the
prosecution objected.547 Judge Azevedo excused the jury, allowing Lawley to make an
offer of proof that Mullins and a second proffered defense witness, David Hager, would
testify that Seabourn had told them that he had killed someone in Modesto at the
direction of the Aryan Brotherhood—and that an innocent man was in jail for the
murder.548 Azevedo held that the allegation that the Aryan Brotherhood had directed the
hit was inadmissible hearsay and the claim that an innocent man had been jailed for the
crime was inadmissible opinion.549 As a result, neither Mullins nor Hager testified before
the jury.550
After Lawley rested his case, Brazelton told the jury that Lawley had been “ripped
off” by Stewart and asked, rhetorically, “Did you hear anything in this case at all about
anybody [other than Lawley] being mad at Kenneth Stewart for any reason and wanting
to kill him? Did you hear that Brian Seabourn was mad at him? Did you hear that Steve
Mendonca was mad at him?”551 On October 10, 1989, the jury, having heard no evidence
to that effect, owing to the fact that Judge Azevedo had excluded testimony about the
Aryan Brotherhood, found Lawley guilty. 552 On February 26, 1990, after the jury
concluded that death was appropriate for Lawley, Azevedo sentenced him accordingly.553
In separate proceedings, Brian Seabourn was tried and convicted of, and Steven
Mendonca pleaded guilty to, second-degree murder.554
Lawley’s case descended into the California appellate process, which typically
takes three decades or more for a condemned defendant to exhaust.555 In 1993, Scott F.
Kauffman was appointed as Lawley’s appellate counsel.556 It took another six years, until
November 1999, to complete briefing in Lawley’s automatic appeal, 557 in which the
principal issue was Lawley’s competency to represent himself. 558 The month that the
briefing was completed, Seabourn signed a sworn declaration stating that he had slain
Stewart at the behest of the Aryan Brotherhood with assistance from immunized
prosecution witness Ricky Black,559 that Lawley was innocent,560 that “the gun found in
Lawley’s cabin was not the gun used to kill Stewart,561 that he, Seabourn, had buried the
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murder weapon, a Smith & Wesson .357 Magnum, in a field near the murder scene,562
and that he had told Monty Ray Mullins and David Hager about the murder 563 —as
Lawley had attempted, to no avail, to establish at his trial.564
“Blood in, blood out”—“you have to kill to get in, and be killed to get out”—was a
guiding principle of the Aryan Brotherhood.565 In December 1988, the month Seabourn
was released from prison and moved in with his family in Modesto, Stewart was in “the
hat”— meaning that the Brotherhood wanted him dead.566 Seabourn was in “the tip”—
meaning that he aspired to Brotherhood membership. 567 Upon learning that Stewart
would be coming to Butler’s Camp when he was released from prison on January 18,
1989, Seabourn decided to kill him—but waited four days so that Stewart “could have
some fun before he died.”568
In June 2000, with Lawley’s automatic appeal pending, his appellate lawyer, Scott
Kauffman, filed a petition for a state writ of habeas corpus alleging that Lawley was
innocent and that the prosecution had withheld extensive exculpatory evidence pertaining
to Seabourn and the Aryan Brotherhood, in violation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Brady
decision.569 Nineteen months after that, in January 2002, the California Supreme Court at
long last decided Lawley’s automatic appeal, affirming his conviction and death
sentence, citing the discovery of the alleged murder weapon in Lawley’s cabin as
evidence of his guilt and holding that judicial discretion had not been abused in finding
Lawley competent to represent himself or in excluding testimony about the Aryan
Brotherhood.570
Shortly after affirming the conviction and sentence, the California Supreme Court
ordered the Attorney General, who represented the state in the proceedings, to show
cause why the alleged new evidence would not establish Lawley’s innocence and
appointed a referee to hear evidence and make factual findings regarding Lawley’s claim
of innocence related claim that the prosecution had failed to disclose exculpatory
evidence.571 More than a dozen years had passed since Lawley had been sentenced to
death, but another two years and ten months would lapse before the referee, Stanislaus
County Superior Court Judge John E. Griffin, Jr issued findings on the issues raised in
Lawley’s habeas petition.572
During an extended evidentiary hearing before Griffin, former Aryan Brotherhood
members James Brun and Wayne “Smiley” Richardson had testified that the Brotherhood
ordered Stewart’s murder. 573 Richardson added that he had told Seabourn before his
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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 556, at 24–25 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
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People v. Lawley, 38 P.3d 461, 478–87, 495 (Cal. 2002).
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In re Lawley, 179 P.3d 891, 894, 898, 902 (Cal. 2008).
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Referee Report at 4–15, In re Lawley, No. 1037325 (Stanislaus Cty. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2004) (on file
with authors).
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Petitioner’s Proposed Summary of Evidence and Findings of Fact at 75-90, In re Lawley, No. S089463,
(Super Ct. of Stanislaus Cty., Aug. 18, 2004) (on file with authors).
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release from prison in December 1988, “If you get the opportunity when you are out
there, take care of business”—meaning kill Stewart. 574 Seabourn also testified at the
hearing and, when asked by Kauffman’s co-counsel, Bicka Barlow, how he knew
Stewart, he memorably replied, “I killed him.”575
While there was “plenty of evidence” that the Brotherhood was involved in
Stewart’s murder, Griffin opined that it also was clear from the trial testimony of William
Jerry Chisum, the state criminalist, corroborated by expert testimony at the evidentiary
hearing, that the Ruger .357 Magnum found in Lawley’s cabin was the murder weapon,
thus linking him to the murder.576 “I’m sure,” Griffin wrote, “that the possession of the
gun by Dennis Lawley [was] a very important factor in his conviction.”577
In December 2007, three years after Griffin returned his findings, Kauffman,
Lawley’s lawyer, unearthed a Smith & Wesson revolver in the field where Seabourn
repeatedly had sworn that he had buried the murder weapon. 578 Kauffman promptly filed
a motion to expand the record to include the discovery of the weapon, 579 but the
California Supreme Court denied the motion 580 and dismissed Lawley’s state habeas
petition the following March, adopting Griffin’s findings.581
Kauffman filed a new state habeas petition,582 which was pending in June 2009
when court-appointed federal counsel Wesley A. Van Winkle and Lissa J. Gardner filed a
petition in U.S. District Court seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus. 583 The petition
noted that the only physical evidence purporting to link Lawley to the murder was the
Ruger .357 Magnum that evidently had not been the murder weapon, reiterated Lawley’s
Brady claims, and challenged the finding that Lawley had been competent to defend
himself in light of his “ludicrous, preposterous, and absurd” ambition to emulate the
Beast in Revelations. 584 The strength of the claims would come to naught, however,
because on March 11, 2012, before further substantive action in either the state or federal
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2008).
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proceedings, Lawley died of natural causes on California death row—his home for the
previous twenty-two years and two months.585
14.

Tyrone Lee Noling—Ohio

The bullet-riddled bodies of Bearnhardt and Cora Hartig, both eighty-one, were
found along with ten .25-caliber shell casings on the kitchen floor of their home in
Atwater Township, Portage County, on April 7, 1990.586 Shortly before the bodies were
discovered, eighteen-year-old Tyrone Lee Noling had stolen a .25-caliber pistol during a
robbery in the nearby town of Alliance and fired it during a second robbery there. 587
Noling was questioned about the Atwater crime, but ballistics tests showed that the pistol
he had stolen in Alliance was not the weapon used in the Hartig killings and Noling was
not charged.588
In 1992, the Portage County prosecutor’s office launched a reinvestigation of the
case and, in a series of interrogations conducted by investigator Ron Craig, three
associates of Noling’s implicated him and themselves in the murders—for which Noling
then was indicted.589 The charges were dropped in June 1993,590 but Noling again was
indicted for the crime in August 1995. 591 In the interim, David William Norris, the
Portage County prosecutor who had dismissed the charges against Noling, resigned after
pleading guilty to possession of cocaine.592
Noling volunteered to take a polygraph test, which he passed. 593 In addition to the
shell casings on the Hartigs’ kitchen floor, police found some open jewelry boxes in a
bedroom drawer that apparently had been rifled through, but Noling and his alleged coconspirators were excluded as sources of fingerprints lifted from the house, the shell
casings, and the jewelry boxes.594 All four also were excluded as the sources of biological
material recovered from a cigarette butt found in the driveway of the Hartigs, who were
non-smokers.595 The murder weapon was not recovered.596
At Noling’s trial, in January 1996, 597 the prosecution relied primarily on the
testimony of his associates—Gary St. Clair, Joseph Dalesandro, and Butch Wolcott—
with whom Noling had been living and committing crimes in Alliance in 1990. 598 In
585

Order Dismissing Action, Lawley v. Chappell, No. 1:08-CV-01425 LJO (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2009) (on
file with authors).
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State v. Noling, 781 N.E.2d 88, 98 (Ohio 2002). Autopsies determined that Cora Hartig had been shot
five times and died of “gunshot wounds to her chest [and] internal injuries” and that Bearnhardt Hartig had
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at 97.
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593
Merit Brief of Tyrone Noling, supra note 588, at 9.
594
Id. at 4.
595
Id. at 9–10.
596
Id. at 5.
597
Id.
598
Id. at 1.

425

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2019

exchange for their cooperation, St. Clair and Dalesandro received plea deals and Wolcott
was granted immunity from prosecution. 599 Dalesandro and Wolcott told the jury that
after they, Noling, and St. Clair had committed the second Alliance robbery they went in
Dalesandro’s car to Atwater, where Noling and St. Clair entered the Hartig home. 600
Dalesandro testified that he had smelled gun smoke when Noling returned to the car and
Wolcott testified that he had seen the smoking weapon.601
Before the trial, St. Clair recanted his incriminating statement, but he was called as
a hostile witness for the prosecution, which rebutted his recantation by reading his prior
statement into the record.602 The prosecution also called two jailhouse informants who
testified that Noling had admitted the murders to them after his arrest for Alliance crimes;
one of the informants, Paul Garner, quoted Noling as saying that he did not mean to kill
the Hartigs—that it “just happened”—and the other, Ronnie Gantz, claimed that Noling
admitted the murders after initially attributing them to St. Clair.603
On January 23, 1996, Noling’s jury found him guilty and he was sentenced to death
twenty-eight days later. 604 On appeal, Noling argued, among other things, that his
conviction was “against the manifest weight of the evidence,” that he had been denied
effective assistance of counsel by his lawyer’s failure to adequately investigate the case,
and that the prosecution had engaged in misconduct by commenting on potential defense
witnesses who had not testified. 605 The Portage County Appellate Court affirmed the
conviction and death sentence in 1999 and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the
appellate court in 2002.606
A Cleveland Plain Dealer examination of the case in 2006, and a records request
by the Ohio Innocence Project and the Ohio Public Defender in 2009, identified two
previously undisclosed suspects—Daniel Wilson, whose foster brother claimed that
Wilson had admitted the Hartig murders and who had been executed for abducting and
burning a young woman alive, and Raymond VanSteenberg, an insurance agent from
whom Bearnhardt Hartig had been attempting to collect a $10,000 debt and who had
owned a .25-caliber pistol that VanSteenberg claimed he had sold to an unknown person
years earlier. 607 In addition, the key witnesses for the prosecution, Dalesandro and
Wolcott, recanted their trial testimony, claiming that they had been coerced by the
prosecution to falsely implicate themselves in the murders and identify Noling as the
killer.608
In June 2010, after losing a bid for a federal writ of habeas corpus, 609 Noling’s
lawyers, in moves that would be rejected by the Court of Common Pleas, sought
599
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advanced DNA testing, the goal being to link the cigarette butt to one of the alternative
suspects, and to get a new trial based on the failure to disclose the existence of the
alternative suspects before the 1996 trial.610 In 2014, the Portage County Appellate Court
remanded the case for further development of evidence allegedly withheld in violation of
Brady v. Maryland, 611 but in 2018 the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the denial of
advanced DNA testing.612 In January 2019, as Noling passed the twenty-third anniversary
of his death sentence, his best hope for freedom, at least in the near term, rested on
winning a new trial based on Brady violations and subsequent dismissal of the charges.613
15.

David Ronald Chandler—Alabama (federal)

For a murder that he was convicted of soliciting, David Ronald Chandler, a largescale marijuana grower and distributor in northern Alabama, became the first person to be
sentenced to death under the 1988 federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act.614
On May 8, 1990, Charles Ray Jarrell, Sr., who worked for Chandler, admittedly—
and indisputably—shot and killed Marlin Shuler, the abusive former husband of Jarrell’s
half-sister, who also was Chandler’s sister-in-law and one of Chandler’s marijuana
dealers.615 About two months before Shuler was murdered, based on information he had
provided about his ex-wife’s drug dealing, police obtained a warrant and searched her
home, where they found roughly a kilogram of marijuana and arrested her.616
On January 9, 1991, a federal grand jury returned a nine-count indictment charging
Jarrell, Chandler, and fourteen others with conspiracy to possess more than a thousand
marijuana plants and distribute more than a thousand kilograms of marijuana; with
murdering Shuler in furtherance of a criminal enterprise; and with money laundering and
firearms violations.617 Eight days later, in exchange for immunity from prosecution for
the murder, Jarrell agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy and testify against Chandler,
whose trial was severed from those of the other defendants.618
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At the trial before U.S. District Court Judge James H. Hancock and a jury in March
and April 1991, some forty witnesses testified, but only Jarrell’s testimony linked
Chandler to the murder.619 Jarrell testified that Chandler offered him $500 to kill Shuler,
but that he thought Chandler was joking until May 8, 1990, when Jarrell and Shuler were
at Chandler’s home and Chandler told Jarrell that “you better go on and get rid of him”
and “I still got that five hundred dollars.”620 After drinking beer for about an hour, Jarrell
told the jury that he and Shuler went to a lake, ostensibly for target practice with pistols,
and Jarrell shot Shuler to death, but Jarrell did not collect the $500 he claimed Chandler
had promised.621
Countering Jarrell’s testimony, Chandler’s lawyer, Drew Redden, introduced
evidence of a history of animosity between Jarrell and Shuler, who had abused his exwife and mother-in-law—Jarrell’s half-sister and mother, respectively—and that Jarrell’s
account of the murder shifted over time—first, he had not done it, then had done it
accidentally, then he had done it out of personal animosity over the abuse, and, lastly, he
had done it at Chandler’s behest.622 In 1989, during an argument, Jarrell allegedly had
pointed a loaded pistol at Shuler’s head and pulled the trigger, but the weapon failed to
fire.623The jury, accepting Jarrell’s final version of the murder, convicted Chandler of all
nine counts in the indictment.624
After a sentencing hearing at which Redden called only Chandler’s wife and
mother as character witnesses—not calling a substantial number of other witnesses who
would have testified about Chandler’s good deeds in life—the jury recommended the
death penalty, and Judge Hancock followed that recommendation followed that
recommendation.625 In 1993, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated
Chandler’s conspiracy conviction, but affirmed his death sentence for the murder, as well
as his conviction and prison sentences on the other counts.626
In October 1995, under a provision similar to habeas corpus available to prisoners
in federal custody,627 Chandler’s lawyers filed a motion, which was amended repeatedly
through early 1997, asking Judge Hancock to set aside Chandler’s conviction based on
ineffective assistance of counsel and other grounds 628 —the most dramatic being a
recantation by Jarrell of his trial testimony.629
619
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At a hearing before Hancock in February 1997, Jarrell, who was suffering from
throat cancer and serving a twenty-five-year prison sentence under his plea deal, testified
that he committed the murder solely out of animosity over the abuse of his half-sister and
mother, and that prosecutors and investigators threatened him and his son with the
electric chair unless he falsely implicated Chandler in the crime.630 In corroboration of
Jarrell’s recantation, Chandler’s attorneys called seven witnesses—three of Jarrell’s
relatives and four men who were in jail with him before the trial—who testified that
Jarrell told them that he was being subjected to, as Hancock put it, “Gestapo-style
midnight interrogations and harassment” to force him to testify falsely
against Chandler.631
Hancock denied relief, speculating, variously, that Jarrell’s recantation might have
been motivated by his “long relationship and friendship” with Chandler, that Jarrell’s
memory of events in 1990 was suspect because he “was a very heavy drinker” at that
time, and that he perhaps feared that Chandler would retaliate for his betrayal.632 In 1999,
a three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit voted two-to-one to vacate the death sentence
on the ground that Chandler was denied effective assistance of counsel by his lawyer’s
failure to call character witnesses during the sentencing phase of the 1991 trial,633 but the
full Eleventh Circuit granted a rehearing en banc and on July 21, 2000, again affirmed
Chandler’s conviction and death sentence by a six-to-five vote.634
In January 2001, while Chandler’s appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was
pending, 635 Chandler’s attorneys petitioned President Bill Clinton for clemency,
contending that, “Our judicial system, like the human beings who administer it, is
fallible. Mr. Chandler’s sentence of death should be commuted primarily because there is
now substantial doubt as to his guilt.”636 One of the attorneys, Jack Martin, summed up
the situation to an Atlanta Journal-Constitution reporter, “We claim the entire murder
case was concocted by law enforcement.”637
Clemency, in Martin’s view, was a long shot, but on January 20, just two hours
before Clinton left office, he commuted Chandler’s sentence to life without parole.638 As
Chandler passed his twenty-eighth year behind federal bars in early 2019, 639 at least
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thirty-three states and the District of Columbia had moved toward legalizing recreational
marijuana—the criminal enterprise that cost Chandler his freedom.640
16.

Eddie Lee Howard, Jr.—Mississippi

On February 2, 1992, firefighters responded to a report of smoke coming from a
Columbus home, where they extinguished a smoldering fire in the living room and found
eighty-two-year-old Georgia Kemp dead on her bedroom floor, with a bloody butcher
knife on her bed.641 Dr. Steven Hayne performed an autopsy the next day and reported
that Kemp died of two stab wounds to her chest and suffered vaginal injuries
“consistent with forced sexual intercourse.”642
Thirty-eight-year-old Eddie Lee Howard, Jr. perhaps was a logical suspect because
he lived just two blocks from the crime scene643 and twice had been in prison for sex
offenses.644 On February 6, three days after Kemp’s burial, Dr. Hayne arranged for her
body to be exhumed for examination by a forensic dentist because, as Hayne would put
it, there “was some question”—which he had not mentioned in the autopsy report—that
she had been bitten. 645 Also on February 6—before the body was exhumed—police
detained Howard and took him to a dental office where, with his consent, impressions
were made of his teeth.646 Two days later, based on a comparison of the impressions with
bite marks purportedly detected by Dr. Michael West, the dentist who re-examined
Kemp’s body, police arrested Howard, an African American, for the rape and murder of
Kemp, who was white.647
Howard had been in custody more than two years when, as a result of a dispute
with his court-appointed counsel over delays, he wound up representing himself at his
trial, which opened on May 9, 1994, before a Lowndes County jury and a judge named,
coincidentally, Lee Howard. 648 The prosecution relied almost exclusively on the
testimony of Dr. West, whose forensic qualifications were not challenged by Howard and
who proceeded to tell the jury that one of several bite marks he had found on Kemp’s
body was a “positive match” to Howard’s teeth. 649 The only evidence that Kemp had
suffered bites was the word of Dr. West; photographs taken by Dr. Hayne during the
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autopsy showed no bite marks.650 David Turner, a Columbus police officer, testified that
Howard had told him, “I had a temper and that’s why this happened,”—a statement that
Turner said he considered a confession, although he had not contemporaneously
memorialized it. 651 Because forensic testing had found neither seminal nor blood
evidence, the prosecution left it to the jury to infer, from the autopsy report of vaginal
injuries and the bite-mark testimony, that Kemp had been raped.652
After three days of testimony and a rambling closing statement by Howard, who
went so far as to suggest that one of the jurors might have committed the crime, the jury
found him guilty of murder and rape.653 The same day, after a brief sentencing hearing
during which Howard offered nothing in mitigation, the jury sentenced him to death. 654
On June 26, 1997, a little more than three years after the conviction and sentence, the
Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a retrial,
holding that, because Howard had “frequently exhibited behavior which reasonably
should have raised a question as to his ability to represent himself,” the judge had erred
by not holding a competency hearing to determine whether Howard was capable of
knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to counsel.655
Just short of another three years had passed when Howard’s retrial began in May
2000 before another Lowndes County jury and his namesake judge. 656 Howard was
represented by two lawyers, Thomas Kesler and Armstrong Walters.657 During the guiltinnocence phase of the re-trial, Dr. West reiterated his bite-mark testimony from the first
trial 658 and Officer Turner again claimed that Howard had made an incriminating
statement.659 This time, the prosecution also called a witness who had not appeared at the
first trial: Kayfen Fulgham, a former girlfriend of Howard’s, who told the jury that
Howard sometimes had bitten her breasts and neck during sex and that, when she had
seen him the day after Kemp’s body was found, he smelled “like burnt clothes or
something, you know, wood, like smoke.”660 Fulgham’s testimony was dubious because
she had been interviewed three months before Howard’s first trial and provided a twopage statement that mentioned neither Howard biting her nor smelling like smoke.661
After two days of testimony, Howard again was convicted. After a brief sentencing
hearing, at which Howard’s attorneys offered no mitigating evidence, the jury returned a
death sentence, but when the jury was polled one juror disavowed the verdict. 662
650
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the charges against Howard. Id. at 278.
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Id. at 282, 284, 288.
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Howard v. State, 853 So. 2d 781, 783, 785–86 (Miss. 2003).
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Id. at 786.
658
Id. at 795–96.
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Motion to Vacate Conviction, supra note 645, at 24–25.
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Id. at 28–29.
661
Id. at 29 n.121. On November 3, 2003, according to the director of the Mississippi Office of Capital
Post-Conviction Counsel, which represented Howard, Fulgham’s daughter stated that her mother had
admitted testifying falsely at the trial because Lowndes County DA Forrest Allgood had threatened her
with arrest if she refused. Affidavit of Robert M. Ryan at 1–2 (Miss. Aug. 13, 2004) (on file with authors).
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Howard, 853 So. 2d at 786, 798–99, 807.
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Howard’s lawyers thereupon asked Judge Howard to impose a life sentence, but he
instead told the jurors that a death sentence required unanimity and ordered them to
resume deliberating—which they did, returning a unanimous death verdict and affirming
it when polled. 663 On appeal, which took another three years-plus, the Mississippi
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence on July 24, 2003.664 Howard
then brought post-conviction proceedings that dragged on more than four more years
before coming to naught when the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the matter on
October 1, 2007.665
Howard—represented by the Mississippi Office of Capital Post-Conviction
Counsel, the Innocence Project in New York, and the Mississippi Innocence Project—
petitioned for a federal writ of habeas corpus and, separately in state court, for DNA
testing of biological evidence recovered at the crime scene. 666 In 2008, two African
American men who had been falsely convicted of the separate murders of two three-yearold girls in Mississippi based on false reports and testimony by Drs. Hayne and West
were exonerated by DNA.667 Even so, in Howard’s case, it was not until December 2,
2010, that the Mississippi Supreme Court ordered the requested testing of, among other
items, the butcher knife and the nightgown in which Kemp’s body had been found.668 The
tests found no DNA on the nightgown where there would have been saliva, if Kemp had
been bitten,669 and excluded Howard as the source of male DNA on the handle of the
butcher knife.670 In 2012, in an unrelated Mississippi murder case, Dr. West stated in a
deposition, “I no longer believe in bite-mark analysis. I don’t think it should be used in
court. I think you should use DNA, throw bite marks out.”671
On September 15, 2015, Howard’s appellate team filed a motion to vacate his
conviction, citing the exculpatory DNA and West’s stunning disavowal of bite-mark
analysis.672 Nineteen days later, the Mississippi Supreme Court directed Judge Howard to
663

Id. at 791.
Id. at 784.
665
Howard v. Mississippi, 552 U.S. 829 (2007); Howard v. State, 945 So. 2d 326, 371 (Miss. 2006)
(rehearing denied Jan. 18, 2007).
666
Howard v. Epps, No. 28:2254 (N.D. Miss. 2007); Motion to Vacate Conviction, supra note 645, at 19.
667
Kennedy Brewer was sentenced to death and spent thirteen years behind bars for the 1992 murder of his
girlfriend’s three-year-old daughter. Levon Brooks was sentenced to life in prison and spent sixteen years
behind bars for the 1990 murder of his former girlfriend’s daughter. In both cases, Hayne performed
autopsies, purporting to find bite marks, and called in West, who testified at the respective trials of Brewer
and Brooks that there was no doubt that the bite marks came from them. DNA tests identified the killer as
Justin Albert Johnson, who admitted committing the murders but asserted that he had not bitten either
victim. Brewer v. Hayne, 860 F.3d 819, 820–21 (5th Cir. 2017); Brooks v. State, 748 So. 2d 736, 750
(Miss. 1999); Brewer v. State, 725 So. 2d 106, 116 (Miss. 1998); see also Kennedy Brewer, INNOCENCE
PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/kennedy-brewer/ (last visited May 23, 2019); Levon
Brooks, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/levon-brooks/ (last visited May 23,
2019).
668
Howard v. State, 49 So. 3d 79, 80 (Miss. 2010).
669
CELLMARK FORENSICS, INITIAL REPORT OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION at 3 (2014) (on file with
authors).
670
CELLMARK FORENSICS, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION at 3 (2014) (on file
with authors).
671
Motion to Vacate Conviction, supra note 645, at 30 (citing West deposition in Vance v. State, No. 2011288-LS-LT (Lincoln Cty. Circuit Ct. Feb. 11, 2012)).
672
Motion to Vacate Conviction, supra note 645, at 30, 32.
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hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Howard was entitled to relief. 673 In
2016, at the mandated evidentiary hearing, West backed down on his 2016 epiphany
regarding bite marks, testifying, “I remember having my highest opinion as to the
perpetrator who left the bite marks [on Kemp’s body]. It was Eddie Lee Howard.” 674 On
October 10, 2018, Judge Howard denied the motion, asserting that the DNA results did
not point to a perpetrator other than Howard—although the male DNA on the knife
handle did just that—and holding that West’s competence had been litigated at earlier
stages and, therefore, was procedurally barred from consideration as a ground for
relief.675
Although Howard had unexhausted state and federal remedies, his
probable innocence remained unrequited in early 2019 as, at age sixty-five, he began his
twenty-eighth year behind bars for the Kemp murder.676 The heyday of Drs. Hayne and
West had passed—Hayne was barred from performing autopsies and West stopped bitemark analysis—but there was no official effort to assess the magnitude of their
malfeasance before they fell from what the authors of a book about them termed “the
powerful institutions that once embraced them.”677
17.

Damien Wayne Echols—Arkansas

The nude, bound, and mutilated bodies of three eight-year-old Cub Scouts—
Michael Moore, Christopher Byers, and Steve Branch—were found in a water-filled ditch
in an area known as Robin Hood woods near their West Memphis homes on May 6,
1993, a day after they disappeared.678
Suspicion arose that the murders had been the work of a satanic cult.679 Damien
Wayne Echols, an eighteen-year-old high school dropout who lived in a trailer park in
nearby Marion,680 seemed a logical suspect because he, as he would acknowledge, had
delved into the occult and was familiar with its practices.681 Echols and a friend, sixteenyear-old Charles Jason Baldwin,682 were questioned in the early days of the investigation,
but there was no basis to arrest them until June 3 when a third youth, seventeen-year-old
Jessie Lloyd Misskelley, Jr., whose IQ had been measured at seventy-two, implicated
them and himself in the crime.683
673

Howard v. State, 171 So. 3d 495, 495 (Miss. 2015).
Post-Conviction Hearing for Eddie Lee Howard, GEORGE C. COCHRAN INNOCENCE PROJECT (Oct. 5,
2017), http://innocenceproject.olemiss.edu/post-conviction-hearing-for-eddie-lee-howard/.
675
Order Denying Motion to Vacate at 12, Howard v. State, No. 2000-0115-CV1H 7-11 (Lowndes Cty.
Circuit Ct. Oct. 9, 2018) (on file with authors).
676
MISS. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 643.
677
RADLEY BALKO & TUCKER CARRINGTON, THE CADAVER KING AND THE COUNTRY DENTIST: A TRUE
STORY OF INJUSTICE IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH xxii, 296, 309, 317 (2018).
678
Echols v. State, 936 S.W.2d 509, 516–17 (Ark. 1996); Misskelley v. State, 915 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Ark.
1996).
679
MARA LEVERITT, DEVIL’S KNOT: THE TRUE STORY OF THE WEST MEMPHIS THREE 14–15, 58–59 (2002).
680
Id. at 41.
681
Echols, 936 S.W.2d at 519. Echols had been born Michael Wayne Hutchison but changed his name in
1990 when he was adopted by his stepfather—choosing “Damien,” according to some of his classmates,
because it was the name of the Antichrist in the horror film The Omen, although his family denied that.
Marc Perrusquia, Damien Echols May Be Troubled but He’s Not Killer, Some Say, COM. APPEAL
(Memphis), Feb. 27, 1994, at 1.
682
Echols, 936 S.W.2d at 524; LEVERITT, supra note 679, at 53.
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Misskelley, 915 S.W.2d at 706, 712.
674

433

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2019

On June 7—four days after the arrest of “The West Memphis Three,” as the
defendants would become known, 684 the Commercial Appeal in Memphis, Tennessee,
published an account of Misskelley’s confession attributing the murders to a cult ritual
and stating that he had watched as Echols and Baldwin choked the boys until they lost
consciousness and then raped one boy and sexually mutilated another. 685 On its face,
Misskelley’s confession was dubious because the details he related were at odds with
facts of the crime: He asserted that the murders had occurred during the morning of May
5, when in fact they had occurred that evening; that the victims had skipped school that
day, when in fact they had not; and that the victims’ hands had been bound with brown
rope, when in fact their hands and feet had been hogtied with their black and white
shoelaces. 686 In addition, there was no indication that any of the victims had been
raped.687
In 1993, however, the phenomenon of false confessions absent physical coercion
was not much appreciated, 688 even though it long had been recognized that youthful
suspects, especially those of limited intellect, were vulnerable to psychological
manipulation and thus prone to confess to crimes they did not commit. 689 Police are
allowed to deceive suspects 690 as they had done during Misskelley’s interrogation—
telling him that he had failed a polygraph test that he apparently had passed, rendering
him, and innumerable youths of limited mental capacity, vulnerable to false selfincrimination.691
“Free the West Memphis Three” became the mantra of a website launched by supporters of the
defendants after their convictions were affirmed in 1996. LEVERITT, supra note 679, at 291–93.
685
Bartholomew Sullivan, Teen Describes ‘Cult’ Torture of Boys; Defendant Misskelley Tells Police of Sex
Mutilation, COM. APPEAL (Memphis), June 7, 1993, at 1.
686
Brief of Amici Curiae Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions of Youth & Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers
as Amici Curiae Supporting Echols at 20–22, Echols v. State, No. CR 83-450a (Craighead Cty. Cir. Ct.
Sept. 7, 2009) (on file with authors).
687
Id. at 22.
688
Several empirical examinations of the phenomenon appeared after the convictions of the “West
Memphis Three.” See Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost
Confessions—and from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497 (1998); Richard J. Ofshe & Richard
A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. L. REV. 979
(1997).
689
See Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 n.75, 52 (1967) (stating that “authoritative opinion has cast
formidable doubt upon the reliability and trustworthiness of ‘confessions’ by children” and citing JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940), for the assertion that “under certain stresses a person,
especially one of defective mentality or peculiar temperament, may falsely acknowledge guilt”).
690
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam) (condoning falsely telling a suspect that his
fingerprints had been found at a crime scene); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737, 739 (1969) (condoning
falsely telling a suspect that a co-suspect had confessed).
691
Misskelley v. State, 915 S.W.2d 702, 711 (Ark. 1996); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Ctr. on Wrongful
Convictions of Youth & Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers as Amici Curiae Supporting Echols, supra
note 686, at 15–16; Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 17 (2010) (stating that “basic research has revealed that
misinformation renders people vulnerable to manipulation”). Other youths known to have confessed to
murders they did not commit after being told falsely that they had failed polygraphs include eighteen-yearold Peter Reilly in Connecticut, DONALD S. CONNERY, GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT 15, 63, 346–47
(1977), fourteen-year-old Michael Crowe in California, Mark Sauer & John Wilkens, He Considered It a
Blessing that He Didn’t Remember Killing His Sister, in TRUE STORIES OF FALSE CONFESSIONS 5, 6 (Rob
Warden & Steven A. Drizin eds., 2009), and sixteen-year-old Jeffrey Deskovic in New York, Fernanda
Santos, DNA Testing Frees Man Imprisoned for Half His Life, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2006, at B1.
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Whatever the shortcomings of the confession, Misskelley’s jury found it
sufficiently persuasive to convict him of the first-degree murder of Michael Moore and
the second-degree murder of Christopher Byers and Steve Branch. 692 The prosecutors,
John Fogelman and Brent Davis, sought a death sentence, but the jury sentenced
Misskelley to life in prison without parole—whereupon Fogelman and Davis told
reporters that the sentence might be reduced if Misskelley would testify against Echols
and Baldwin, whose joint trial would open eighteen days later.693
Misskelley did not take the bait—crediting his father and stepmother with helping
him understand that lying to help the prosecutors convict his friends was “something I
would have to live with the rest of my life.”694 Ironically, if Misskelley had testified it
might have been better for Echols and Baldwin, who would have had an accuser to
confront on the witness stand.695 As it was, the Echols-Baldwin jury would be fully aware
of Misskelley’s confession—which the jury foreman, Kent Arnold, would term the
“primary deciding factor” in his concurrence in the guilty finding in the face of “scanty”
and “extremely circumstantial” evidence.696
The prosecution evidence at the joint trial included the testimony of two girls who
claimed to have overhead Echols say he had killed the boys, of the state medical
examiner who told the jury that a knife found in a lake behind Baldwin’s parents’ home
could have been the murder weapon. of a witness who claimed to have seen Echols with
a knife similar to the one that had been found, of two witnesses who claimed to have seen
Echols near the crime scene the night of the murders, of a state criminalist who claimed
that fibers found on the victims’ clothing were microscopically similar to fibers recovered
from Echols’s home, and of a witness who alleged that Echols and Baldwin were
members of a cult. 697 In addition, a self-styled expert on occult killings named Dale
Griffis, who held what the defense characterized as a mail-order Ph.D. degree from an
unaccredited university, 698 testified for the prosecution that the crime had borne the
“trappings of occultism,” including that it had occurred under a full moon near a pagan
holiday and that the number of victims and their ages—three and eight, respectively—
were significant in occultism and witchcraft.699

See Misskelley, 915 S.W.2d at 707 (The statements “were virtually the only evidence, all other
testimony and exhibits serving primarily as corroboration.”).
693
LEVERITT, supra note 679, at 190, 192–93.
694
Id. at 212–13.
695
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing the right of the accused “to be confronted with the witnesses
against him”); Brief of Amici Curiae Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions of Youth & Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal
Def. Lawyers as Amici Curiae Supporting Echols, supra note 686, at 1 (stating that, since Misskelley did
not testify, Echols did not have an opportunity to confront him in court).
696
Brief of Amici Curiae Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions of Youth & Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers
as Amici Curiae Supporting Echols, supra note 686, at 6; Motion for New Trial at 1, Echols v. State, No.
CR-93-450a (Craighead Cty. Cir. Ct. Apr. 11, 2008) (on file with authors). The Misskelley trial, at which it
had been alleged that Echols and Baldwin “beat, cut, and sexually abused the boys,” had been televised and
widely reported in newspapers. Joe Stumpe, Affidavit and DNA Crucial in Appeal of '93 Conviction, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2010, at A16.
697
Echols v. State, 936 S.W.2d 509, 518–19 (Ark. 1996).
698
Motion for New Trial, supra note 696, at 4; LEVERITT, supra note 679, at 236–37.
699
Echols, 936 S.W.2d at 519.
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Following their convictions, Echols was sentenced to death, and Baldwin to life in
prison without parole. 700 All three convictions were affirmed on direct appeal by the
Arkansas Supreme Court, which held that Misskelley’s confession had been voluntary—
despite its indicia of falsity 701 —and thus sufficient to convict him, 702 that Echols’s
conviction had rested on “substantial evidence of [his] guilt,”703 and that all but one of the
issues that Baldwin raised were “without merit.”704
The West Memphis Three, meanwhile, attracted the interest of Mara Leveritt, an
award-winning investigative journalist, and became the subject of a 1996 HBO
documentary, Paradise Lost: The Child Murders at Robin Hood Hills.705 As time passed,
actor Johnny Depp, Pearl Jam lead vocalist-guitarist Eddie Vedder, and Dixie Chicks
singer-songwriter Natalie Maines would rally to the cause.706
A petition for post-conviction relief brought on Echols’s behalf was denied in
707
2001,
but in 2004 the Arkansas Supreme Court granted his motion—and similar
motions on behalf of Baldwin and Misskelley—for DNA testing of genetic evidence
recovered from the victims and the crime scene.708 The ensuing testing, conducted by
Bode Laboratories with technology that had not existed at the time of the trials,
eliminated all three youths as sources of the recovered material and linked some of it to
Steven Branch’s stepfather, Terry Hobbs, and a man named David Jacoby, who had been
with Hobbs when the boys disappeared.709
In 2010, the Arkansas Supreme Court ordered a state trial judge to determine
whether the DNA evidence invalidated the convictions of the West Memphis Three, but
before the hearing could be held the prosecution offered the men immediate release if
they agreed to plead guilty, while publicly maintaining their innocence, under the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Alford decision.710 They took the deal, enabling them to walk free on
August 19, 2001—eighteen years, two months, and sixteen days after their arrest.711
“I am innocent, as are Jason and Jessie,” said Echols, “but I made this decision
because I did not want to spend another day of my life behind those bars. I want to live
and to continue to fight for our innocence.”712 “It’s a total injustice,” said John Mark
Byers, father of victim Christopher Byers. “These three men are being made to plead
guilty to something they didn’t do.”713
700

Id. at 516.
Id. at 525. Under case law, the sole prerequisite for admission of a confession into evidence is
voluntariness; reliability is not an issue. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986).
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Misskelley v. State, 915 S.W.2d 702, 712 (Ark. 1996).
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Echols, 936 S.W.2d at 518–19.
704
Id. at 519, 548–49.
705
Dave Itzkoff, A Continuing Murder Mystery Keeps Its Grip on Filmmakers, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2014,
at C1.
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Stumpe, supra note 696.
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Echols v. State, 42 S.W.3d 467, 468–69 (Ark. 2001).
708
Motion for New Trial, supra note 696, at 3–4.
709
Id. at 3, 8–9, 46–52.
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Campbell Robertson, Deal Frees ‘West Memphis Three’ in Arkansas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2011, at A1;
see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).
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Robertson, supra note 710.
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Max Brantley, Damien Echols’ Statement on Plea Deal, ARK. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2011),
https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2011/08/19/damien-echols-statement-on-plea-deal.
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Blume & Helm, supra note 16, at 158.
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18.

Rodney Reed—Texas

The partially clothed body of nineteen-year-old Stacey Lee Stites was found in
thorny brush on the side of a desolate road in Bastrop County on April 23, 1996—
eighteen days before her planned marriage to her live-in fiancé, Jimmy Lewis Fennell,
Jr., a twenty-three-year-old rookie police officer in the nearby town of Giddings.714 Stites
had been strangled with her belt, and it was obvious from intact sperm heads recovered
from her body and the crotch of her underwear that she recently had engaged in sex.715
Fennell told investigators that he and Stites had showered together in their
apartment in Giddings on the evening of April 22, but they had not engaged in sex
because, although she was on birth control pills, there was an elevated risk of pregnancy
at that point in her prescription cycle.716 Stites was scheduled to report for at work at 3:30
A.M. on April 23 in the produce department of the H-E-B grocery store in the town of
Bastrop.717
Stites went to sleep at about 9:00 P.M, according to Fennell, but he stayed up
watching television and was awakened between 6:30 and 7:00 A.M. by Stites’s mother,
who lived in an apartment one floor below the apartment he and Stites shared. 718 The
mother had been notified that her daughter had not arrived at work.719 An hour or so
earlier, a Bastrop County sheriff’s officer on routine parole had noticed a truck in the
Bastrop High School parking lot and requested a stolen-vehicle check.720 It was Fennell’s
truck, which he said Stites had driven to work that day.721 Her body was found shortly
before 3:00 P.M. by a passerby.722
DNA tests eliminated Fennell as the source of the recovered sperm and of saliva on
Stites’s breasts, leading the authorities to surmise that she had been sexually assaulted.723
In ensuing months, DNA screening eliminated twenty-seven other suspects, including
Fennell’s friends and fellow officers, Stites’s former boyfriends, and her male H-E-B coworkers.724
At some point, the authorities focused on Rodney Reed, an African American, who
in the months after the murder frequently had been seen walking late at night near
Bastrop High School, where the truck from which Stites presumably had been abducted

714

Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 702, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (denying state habeas corpus). Stites
was born on January 19, 1977, and Fennell was born on December 25, 1972. Bastrop Police Dep’t
Supplementary Report, at 3 (1996) (on file with authors). Fennell is referred to in reported decisions and
most pleadings relating to the Stites murder as “Jimmy Fennell,” but his full name, as cited elsewhere, is
Jimmy Lewis Fennell Jr. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, Lear v. Fennell, No. 1:08-cv-00719-JRN
(W.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2008) (seeking damages from Fennell and the City of Giddings for rape of plaintiff)
(on file with authors).
715
Reed, 271 S.W.3d at 704–06.
716
Id. at 703; see also Supplemental Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, Ex parte Reed, No. 8701
(Bastrop Cty. Dist. Ct. June 8, 2016) (timeline provided to investigators by Fennell) (on file with authors).
717
Reed, 271 S.W.3d at 702.
718
Id. at 702–03.
719
Id. at 703.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 704.
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Id. at 705–06, 708, 712.
724
Id. at 707–09.
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had been found. 725 The authorities theorized that the location of the truck likely was
convenient for the killer; Reed lived six-tenths of a mile away.726 He was questioned after
it was discovered that his DNA profile included him among a tiny fraction of men who
could have been the source of the semen and saliva recovered from Stites.727 Unaware of
the DNA link, he falsely denied knowing Stites.728 In May 1997, Reed, twenty-nine, was
indicted for capital murder.729 He was tried before a Bastrop County jury, convicted, and
sentenced to death in May of the following year.730
An Austin American-Statesman article termed Reed’s defense—that he, a black
man, had been having an affair with the white fiancée of a white Giddings policeman—
“explosive.”731 Specifically, Reed claimed that he and Stites began an affair in November
1995 and that the last time they had engaged in sex was April 21, 1996, or “very early”
the next morning.732 Dr. Roberto J. Bayardo, the Travis County medical examiner who
performed the Stites autopsy,733 estimated that her time of death had been 3:00 A.M. on
April 23 and told the jury that the recovered sperm had been deposited shortly before she
died.734 Karen Blakely, a serologist with the Texas Department of Public Safety, testified
that sperm can remain intact for no more than twenty-four hours.735
In a closing statement that the American-Statesman called “devastating and
eloquent,” the prosecutor, Lisa Tanner, told the jury that the semen was “the smoking
gun”— “equivalent to the slipper in the Cinderella story.”736 The jury evidently agreed,
convicting Reed on May 18, 1998, of murder and nine days later finding him eligible for
a death sentence, which Judge H.R. Townslee imposed.737 The conviction and sentence
were affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on direct appeal in 2000 738 and on
a petition for a state writ of habeas corpus in December 2008.739
Meanwhile, on May 20, 2008, Jimmy Fennell pleaded guilty to aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, having sex with a person in custody, and official
725

Id. at 709.
Id.
727
Id. Reed’s DNA was in a state database because he previously had been charged with sexual assault,
although not convicted. Mike Ward & Bill Bishop, Murder in Black and White, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Apr. 22, 2001, at A1.
728
Reed, 271 S.W.3d at 709; Ward & Bishop, supra note 727.
729
Reed v. Stephens, 739 F.3d 753, 761 (5th Cir. 2014). Reed was born December 22, 1967. Death Row
Information: Rodney Reed, TEX. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST.,
https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/death_row/dr_info/reedrodney.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2019).
730
Mike Kelley, Reed Sentenced to Death in Bastrop Murder Case, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 29,
1998, at B1.
731
Ward & Bishop, supra note 727.
732
Rodney Reed Affidavit, Reed v. State, No. 8701 (Bastrop Cty. Dist. Ct. Nov. 21, 2014) (on file with
authors).
733
Medical Examiner’s Report, (Apr. 24, 1996) PA-96-0213 (on file with authors).
734
Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
735
Id. at 704; see also Appeal for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, Ex parte Reed, No. 8701 (Tex. Crim. App.
Feb. 4, 2015) (on file with authors).
736
Ward & Bishop, supra note 727.
737
Dave Harmon, Jury Convicts Rodney Reed of Murder in Bastrop Case, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May
19, 1998, at A1; Kelley, supra note 730.
738
Ex parte Reed, WR-50, 961-03, 2005 WL 2659440, at *1 (citing Reed v. State, No. AP-73,135 (Tex.
Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2000)).
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Reed, 271 S.W.3d at 713.
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oppression, and was sentenced to ten years in prison.740 The victim was Connie Iris Lear,
twenty at the time of her attack, whose case prompted several other women to come
forward with similar allegations.741 Lear’s civil action against Fennell and the Giddings
Police Department was settled for $100,000 in 2009.742 The developments raised, in the
words of an Austin Chronicle report, “a healthy suspicion that Fennell had some
involvement” in his fiancée’s murder.743 Against that backdrop, Dr. Bayardo backed off
of his trial testimony about the time of Stites’s death, stating in a sworn declaration that
that his 3:00 A.M. estimate should not have been “used at trial as an accurate
statement.”744
In February 2015, with Reed’s execution scheduled in just two weeks, his appellate
lawyers, Bryce Benjet and Andrew F. Macrae, filed a successor petition for a state habeas
corpus contending that new evidence proved that the prosecution theory of the crime was
“medically and scientifically impossible,” and that Reed was innocent. 745 The petition
cited opinions of three of the nation’s leading forensic pathologists—Drs. LeRoy
Riddick, Werner U. Spitz, and Michael M. Baden—who concluded from photographs
and video of Stites’s body that she had been slain hours earlier than 3:00 A.M.—the time
estimate on which the prosecution had relied at Reed’s trial.746 The petition also relied on
a sworn statement by a Stites coworker at H-E-B who said that Stites had confided that
“she was sleeping with a black guy named Rodney and that she didn’t know what her
fiancé would do if he found out.”747
In response to the petition, the Court of Criminal Appeals stayed Reed’s
execution. 748 While the petition remained pending, Curtis Davis, a close friend of
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, supra note 714, at 6–8; see also State Motion to Dismiss Subsequent
Appeal for Writ as Abusive at 6, Ex parte Reed, WR-50, 961-08 & WR-50, 961-09 (Tex. Crim. App. July
30, 2018) (on file with authors).
741
Jordan Smith, Is Texas Getting Ready to Kill an Innocent Man?, INTERCEPT (Nov. 17, 2014),
https://theintercept.com/2014/11/17/is-texas-getting-ready-kill-innocent-man/.
742
Id.; see also Final Judgment at 1, Lear v. Fennell, 1:08-cv-00719 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2009) (on file with
authors).
743
Jordan Smith, Reed Appeal Unearths Grisly Details on Fennell, AUSTIN CHRONICLE (May 1, 2009),
https://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2009-05-01/774702/.
744
Declaration of Roberto J. Bayardo at 2, Reed v. Dretka, A-82-CA-142 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2012) (on
file with authors).
745
Appeal for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 735, at 1, 73.
746
Id. at 3; see also Affidavit of LeRoy Riddick, retired Alabama state medical examiner, at 5 (Jan. 10,
2015) (stating that the time interval between death and discovery of the body was “significantly longer”
than the time lapse estimated at trial) (on file with authors); Affidavit of Werner U. Spitz, board-certified
anatomic and forensic pathologist, at 2 (Feb. 4, 2015) (stating that is was impossible that Stites was
murdered and left at the scene in the time frame presented at trial) (on file with authors); Affidavit of
Michael Baden, former New York City chief medical examiner, at 3 (Feb. 10, 2015) (stating that lividity
depicted in the photographic evidence leaves no doubt that Stites died before midnight on April 22, 1996,
when she was alone with Fennell) (on file with authors) For a succinct summary of the evidence of Reed’s
innocence, see Chuck Lindell, Lawyers for Rodney Reed Assert Innocence in Appeal, AUSTIN AM.STATESMAN, Feb. 13, 2015, at A1. Fennell was released from prison in March 2018. Brittany Glas, Stacey
Stites’ Fiancé Released from Prison After Serving 10-Year Sentence, KXAN.COM,
https://www.kxan.com/news/crime/stacey-stites-fianc-released-from-prison-after-serving-10-yearsentence/1026871725 (last updated Mar. 9, 2018, 11:58 PM CST).
747
Affidavit of Alicia Slater at 2 (Dec. 14, 2014) (on file with authors).
748
State Motion to Dismiss Subsequent Appeal for Writ as Abusive, supra note 740, at 6 (citing Order, Ex
parte Reed, WR-50, 961-07 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2015)).
740
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Fennell’s, gave an interview for an upcoming episode of CNN’s Death Row Stories
attributing incriminating statements to Fennell. 749 At a hearing before Senior District
Court Judge Doug Shaver in October 2017, Davis reiterated under oath the substance of
what he had told CNN and Fennell asserted his Fifth Amendment right to silence. 750
Shaver denied relief, sending the case back to the Court of Criminal Appeals, where it
remained pending in early 2019.751
19.

Darlie Lynn Routier—Texas

Brothers Damon and Devon Routier, ages five and six, respectively, were stabbed
to death in their Dallas County home on June 6, 1996. 752 Their twenty-six-year-old
mother, Darlie Lynn Routier, was convicted and sentenced to death in 1997 for her
younger son’s murder; she was not charged with the older child’s death.753
Routier testified that, while her husband and an infant son slept upstairs, she was
sleeping on a downstairs couch, with her older sons on the floor nearby, when a stranger
attacked them with a knife and fled. 754 Although Routier was seriously wounded—
“including a slash across her neck that came perilously close to severing her carotid
artery”—the prosecution contended that there had been no intruder, that Routier had
staged the crime scene, that her wounds had been self-inflicted, and that she had “some
pecuniary motive to murder her children.”755
A significant element of the prosecution case was a video made by a Dallas
television station showing Routier spraying Silly String on her sons’ graves on the day
that Devon would have turned seven.756 The defense objected that the video was more
prejudicial than probative, but Judge Mark Tolle admitted it into evidence 757 and the
prosecution argued that the video “gives you a lot of insight into [Routier]. . . . [T]his is
not a picture of a grieving mother.”758 The jury—as Routier’s mother, Darlie Kee, put it
in a Dallas Morning News interview—“ended up deliberating on the Silly String.”759
The conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal—which largely
focused not on sufficiency of the evidence or fairness of the trial, but on problems with

E-mail from Bryce Benjet, Reed’s appellate attorney, to author (Feb. 20, 2019, 6:24 PM CST) (on file
with authors).
750
Id.
751
Id.; State Motion to Dismiss Subsequent Appeal for Writ as Abusive, supra note 740, at 7.
752
Tasha Tsiaperas, Did Darlie Routier Kill Her Kids? Doubts Remain Two Decades Later, DALLAS NEWS
(June 3, 2016), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2016/06/03/did-darlie-routier-kill-her-kidsdoubts-remain-20-years-later.
753
Id. Routier was born on January 4, 1970. Death Row Information: Offenders on Death Row, supra note
73.
754
Routier v. State, 273 S.W.3d 241, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
755
Id. at 244–45. The supposed “pecuniary motive” was a $5,000 life-insurance policy on each child. Id. at
258.
756
Tsiaperas, supra note 752.
757
Transcript of Record at 2515, State v. Routier, No. A96-253 (Kerr Cty. Dist. Ct. Jan. 17, 1997),
https://darliefacts.com/jury-trial-transcripts/.
758
Id. at 5238.
759
Tsiaperas, supra note 752.
749
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the trial record.760 During pendency of the appeal, however, Texas Monthly published an
article raising the possibility that Routier’s husband, Darin Routier, had something to do
with the crime.761 According to the article, he had twice admitted that shortly before the
crime he had looked for someone to break into the family home as part of an insurance
scam—although there was nothing to indicate that anything had been done in furtherance
of any such scam.762 After the conviction was affirmed, Darlie Routier filed a motion for
DNA testing of physical evidence that conceivably could prove that there had been an
intruder.763 The trial court denied the motion,764 but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
ordered some of the requested testing,765 touching off a process that would drag on for
years without definitive results.766
Appeals, meanwhile, were in abeyance,767 including a 2005 petition for a federal
writ of habeas corpus raising a plethora of issues bearing on Routier’s possible
innocence—competence of the crime scene investigation, admission of “inflammatory
character evidence” at trial, allegedly inaccurate trial testimony by expert witnesses for
the prosecution, and effectiveness of trial counsel.768 Expanding on the issue that Texas
Monthly had raised, the petition noted that lawyers appointed to represent Routier after
her arrest had retained forensic experts whose preliminary analysis indicated that the
crime scene had not been staged. 769 Before trial, however, Routier’s husband and her
mother retained new counsel for her—Douglas Mulder, who had defended them for
alleged violations of a gag order regarding the upcoming trial.770 Mulder had told them
that the appointed lawyers planned to implicate Darin Routier in the crime. 771 Mulder
promised not to do that 772 and proceeded to trial without any forensic testimony
challenging the staged-crime-scene theory.773
The petition also challenged the prosecution rendition of the alleged staging of the
scene.774 One piece of physical evidence had been a bloody sock that the prosecution
760

Routier v. State, 112 S.W.3d 554, 557–63, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Sandra Halsey, the certified
court reporter at Routier’s trial, was alleged to have made some 18,000 errors in the 6,000-page record.
Dallas County v. Halsey, 87 S.W.3d 552, 553 (Tex. 2002).
761
Skip Hollandsworth, Maybe Darlie Didn’t Do It, TEX. MONTHLY (July 2002),
https://www.texasmonthly.com/articles/maybe-darlie-didnt-do-it/ (last visited May 23, 2019).
762
Id.
763
Routier v. State, 273 S.W.3d 241, 248–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
764
Id. at 245.
765
Id. at 256–59.
766
CTR. FOR HUMAN IDENTIFICATION, UNIV. OF N. TEX., FORENSIC DNA REPORT # 3 (2015) (on file with
authors).
767
Status Report at 6, Routier v. Stephens, SA-05-CA-1156-FB (W.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2013) (on file with
authors). A bloody fingerprint from the coffee table in the room where the murders occurred “is strong
evidence that an intruder was present at the time of the attacks.” Id. at 10.
768
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1, 12–17, 18–19, 24–42, 46–48, Routier v. Dretke, No. F9639973-J (W.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2005) (on file with authors). Judicial action on the petition would be stayed
pending DNA testing. Id. at 23.
769
Id. at 15–16, 29–37.
770
Id. at 16.
771
Id.
772
Id. at 24–25.
773
Id. at 16. In summation, Dallas County Assistant District Attorney Greg Davis told the jury, “It speaks
volumes to you sometimes what you don’t see and hear.” Id. at 17.
774
Id. at 10–11.
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theorized Routier had planted in an alley seventy-five yards from the home.775 She would
have had to have planted it before stabbing herself, since it contained the blood of both
boys, but her blood was not on it or in the vicinity. 776 She made a call to 911 that lasted
five minutes and forty-four seconds—presumably after planting the sock.777 Paramedics
arrived a little more than a minute after the call ended, just as Damon Routier took his
last breath—which, a state pathologist testified, could have been no more than nine
minutes after he had been stabbed.778 Thus, after stabbing the boys, Routier would have
had to have planted the sock, staged the scene inside the house to make it appear that
there had been an intruder, and stabbed herself, all in, at most, only slightly more than
two minutes—which the petition deemed “physically impossible.”779
When the appellate process emerges from abeyance, there is a chance, based on the
issues raised in the 2005 petition, that the conviction will be reversed and the case
remanded for a new trial, leading to dropping of the charges or an acquittal—but as of
May 1, 2019, Routier, forty-nine, remained one of six women under death sentences in
Texas.780
20.

Corey Dewayne Williams—Louisiana

Twenty-three-year-old Jarvis Griffin was robbed and shot to death while delivering
a pizza in the Queensborough neighborhood of Shreveport on January 4, 1998.781 The
next morning, after an all-night interrogation, sixteen-year-old Corey Dewayne Williams,
who had an IQ of sixty-eight, confessed to the crime. 782 Based primarily on the
confession, he was convicted by a Caddo Parish jury and sentenced to death on October
28, 2000 783 —two years before the U.S. Supreme Court banned the death penalty for
defendants with intellectual disabilities784 and, three years after that, for defendants who
committed murders before the age of eighteen.785
On the night of the crime, Williams joined a group of teenagers and young adults
outside the home of Renee Iverson, who had ordered a pizza.786 Among the group were
775

Id.
Id.
777
Id.
778
Id.
779
Id. at 11.
780
The other women on death row were Kimberly Cargill, 52, convicted in 2012 of killing a witness against
her in a child-protective case; Linda Carty, 60, convicted in 2002 of abducting and murdering a woman;
Brittany Marlowe Holberg, 45, convicted in 1998 of murdering an eighty-year-old man during a robbery of
his home; Melissa Elizabeth Lucio, 50, convicted in 2008 of murdering her daughter; and Erica Yvonne
Sheppard, 45, convicted in 1995 of murdering a Houston woman. See Jolie Mccullough & Ben Hasson,
Faces of Death Row, TEXAS TRIB., https://apps.texastribune.org/death-row/ (last updated Apr. 8, 2019).
781
State v. Williams, 831 So. 2d 835, 840 (La. 2002), superseded by statute as recognized in Brumfield v.
Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015).
782
Williams gave two statements on January 5, 1998. In the second statement, at about 8:30 AM, he
confessed that he shot Griffin. In the first, shortly before 6:00 AM, he attributed the murder to Gabriel
Logan. Williams, 831 So. 2d at 839, 841 (listing Williams’s IQ at 68 and describing his confessions).
783
Id. at 83; State v. Williams, at 1, No. 193,258 (La. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct., Caddo Par. Nov. 4, 2015) (on file
with authors).
784
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
785
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
786
Williams, 831 So. 2d at 840.
776
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Iverson’s twenty-old-year-old boyfriend, Nathan Logan, his sixteen-year-old brother,
Gabriel Logan, and twenty-year-old Chris Moore.787 When Griffin arrived with the pizza,
Iverson paid him and he returned to his car, where he was shot—by, it would be alleged,
Williams.788 The car rolled down the street, veering into a porch, where, according to
witnesses, Gabriel Logan took a bank bag and a pizza from the car before fleeing with
Moore; they put the bag and pizza box into a dumpster, from which the items were
recovered. 789 Nathan Logan claimed that Williams had hidden the murder weapon—a
.25-caliber semi-automatic pistol—in a barbecue pit, where Nathan and his brother,
Gabriel, retrieved and cleaned it before hiding it in another location.790
After motions to suppress the confession as involuntary were denied, the trial
opened on October 23, 2000, before Caddo Parish District Judge Scott J. Crichton, a
former prosecutor who years later would ascend to the Louisiana Supreme Court.791 The
prosecutor was Hugo Holland, who dispatched ten men to death row, more than any other
prosecutor in the state, although half of those defendants’ sentences were overturned and
none of the defendants was executed.792 The primary evidence linking Williams to the
crime, other than his confessions, was the testimony of Chris Moore, who told the jury
that he had seen Williams shoot Griffin.793 No physical evidence linked Williams to the
crime, but Nathan Logan’s fingerprint had been found on an empty clip in the recovered
pistol and Griffin’s blood had been found on Gabriel Logan’s clothing. 794 Williams’s
lawyer argued that Moore and the Logans likely had killed Griffin and “got together” to
pin the crime on Williams.795 The jury, nonetheless, found Williams guilty and sentenced
him to death.796
On November 1, 2002, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed Williams’s
conviction, but remanded his case for resentencing in light of the U.S. Supreme Court
decision a few months earlier banning the death penalty for the mentally disabled.797 On

787

Id.
Id. at 841.
789
Id. at 840–41.
790
Id. at 840.
791
Id. at 839. For background on Judge Crichton, who was sworn in as a justice of the Louisiana Supreme
Court on December 15, 2014, see Louisiana Supreme Court Justices: Justice Scott J. Crichton, LA. SUP.
CT., https://www.lasc.org/justices/crichton.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2019).
792
Radley Balko, How a Fired Prosecutor Became the Most Powerful Law Enforcement Official in
Louisiana, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thewatch/wp/2017/11/02/how-a-fired-prosecutor-became-the-most-powerful-law-enforcement-official-inlouisiana/?utm_term=.5f5538e490e8; Jim Mustian, Meet ‘Controversial’ Louisiana Prosecutor: An
Outspoken Death Penalty Champion with Cat Named After Lee Harvey Oswald, ADVOC. (June 3 2017,
7:00 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/courts/article_3647e248-4551-11e7-8019635640ba6b05.html.
793
Williams, 831 So. 2d at 849.
794
Id. at 841; Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Louisiana at 7–8, Williams v. State,
No. 17-1241 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/171241/37353/20180302123056168_17-_Petition.pdf (last visited May 23, 2019)
795
Williams, 831 So. 2d at 841; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 794, at 9.
796
Williams, 831 So. 2d at 839.
797
Id. at 838, 857; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (banning the death penalty for the
mentally disabled).
788
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remand, Crichton sentenced Williams to life in prison on February 20, 2004. 798
Williams’s lawyers filed an application for post-conviction relief in Caddo Parish District
Court on April 5, 2005.799 Over the ensuing decade, supplemental pleadings were filed,
the final one on January 13, 2015, 800 leading to the belated disclosure of evidence
exposing what G. Ben Cohen, one of Williams’s appellate lawyers, termed “a toxic
combination of hubris, deceit, and indifference” by Hugo Holland.801
The belatedly surrendered evidence included an electronic recording of a police
interview hours after the crime with Nathan Logan, who proclaimed, based on what he
had seen, that the murder “had to” have been committed by his brother, Gabriel Logan,
and that “it don’t make any sense” to say that Williams had committed it.802 Not only had
the recording been withheld, but before the trial the defense had been given a summary of
the interview falsely stating, “Nathan thought that Corey shot the man.” 803 Another
suppressed recording from the night of the murder was a police interview with a witness
named Patrick Anthony, who reported that, before the murder, he had seen Nathan Logan
give the murder weapon to Chris Moore and, after the murder he, Anthony, helped Moore
and the Logans hide the same weapon where police recovered it.804
The prosecution conceded that the recorded statements and other exculpatory
evidence had been withheld from Williams’s trial lawyers, but asserted that the evidence
had been immaterial under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. Maryland
because Williams had confessed and, therefore, the suppressed evidence would not have
changed the outcome of the trial 805 —an argument that the post-conviction judge,
Katherine Clark Dorroh, credited in denying relief to Williams on November 4, 2015.806
On March 26, 2018, Blythe Taplin, of the New Orleans Promise of Justice
Initiative, and Amir H. Ali, of the Roderick & Solange Justice Center in Washington,
D.C., petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari on Williams’s behalf, arguing,
“The record in this case epitomizes the dangers of allowing prosecutors to . . . suppress
exculpatory evidence based upon their pretrial assessment of what would be ‘material’ to
the defense.”807 Forty-four former high-level U.S. Justice Department lawyers and U.S.
attorneys from around the country joined in an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to
“grant review and reverse the judgment in this case, as the favorable information not
disclosed by prosecutors, considered cumulatively, puts this case ‘in such a different light
as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’”808
798

Ruling on Issue of Mental Retardation at 1, State v. Williams, No. 193,258 (La. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct., Caddo
Par., Feb. 20, 2004) (on file with authors).
799
State v. Williams, at 1, No. 193,258 (La. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct., Caddo Par. Nov. 4, 2015) (on file with
authors).
800
The final Williams pleading at the post-conviction stage was filed on January 13, 2005. Id. at 2.
801
Jessica Pishko, How Prosecutors Ruined the Life of Corey Williams, NATION (June 4, 2018),
https://www.thenation.com/article/prosecutors-ruined-life-corey-williams/.
802
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 794, at 12.
803
Id. at 13.
804
Id. at 13–14.
805
Id. at 19; see generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
806
Williams v. State, at 5, No. 193,258 (La. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct., Caddo Par. Nov. 4, 2015) (on file with
authors).
807
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 794, at 34.
808
Brief of Amici Curiae Former Prosecutors and Dep’t of Justice Officials in Support of Petitioner at 6,
Williams v. Louisiana, No. 17-1241 (U.S. Apr. 5, 2018).
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On May 21, 2018, with the petition for certiorari pending, Caddo Parish District
Attorney James E. Stewart, Sr. and Williams’s lawyers filed a joint motion before Judge
Dorroh asking that Williams’s conviction and sentence be vacated, with the
understanding that he would plead guilty to manslaughter and obstruction of justice in
exchange for immediate release. 809 Dorroh granted the motion, accepted the plea, and
ordered Williams released.810
The next day, Williams, thirty-six, walked free—but, of course, not exonerated—
twenty years, four months, and eighteen days after his arrest for a crime for which it had
been doubtful from the beginning that he had committed. 811 In pleading guilty to the
lesser charges, Williams waived any right to pursue civil damages for his wrongful
conviction, but Amir Ali told a reporter, “This was an impossible deal for Corey to turn
down. I think, given the circumstances, it was the best possible outcome for Corey.”812
21.

Marcellus S. Williams—Missouri

Felicia Anne Gayle’s body was found by her husband, Dr. Daniel Picus, a St. Louis
radiologist, in their suburban University City home on August 11, 1998.813 Gayle, a fortytwo-year-old former St. Louis Post-Dispatch reporter, 814 had been stabbed forty-three
times with a butcher knife that the killer found in the home.815
The case had grown cold when, fifteen months later, St. Louis County Prosecuting
Attorney Robert P. McCulloch announced that Marcellus S. Williams, a thirty-year-old
burglar and armed robber, had been charged with the crime. 816 The recovery of a laptop
809

Joint Motion for Post-Conviction Relief at 1–2, Williams v. Vannoy, No. 193,258, (La. 1st Jud. Dist.
Ct., Caddo Par., May 21, 2018) (on file with authors). Amid accusations of racial bias in the district
attorney’s office, Stewart was elected Caddo Parish’s first African American district attorney in 2015 after
a hard-fought campaign during which he promised “to bring professionalism and ethics back to the district
attorney’s office.” Alexandria Burris, Stewart Wins Caddo DA Race, SHREVEPORT TIMES,
https://www.shreveporttimes.com/story/news/election/2015/11/21/caddo-da-election-runoffresults/75899240/ (last updated Nov. 22, 2015).
810
Andrew Cohen, Corey Williams About to Walk Free in Louisiana, MARSHALL PROJECT (May 21, 2018),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/05/21/corey-williams-about-to-walk-free-in-louisiana. The
Marshall Project earlier had published an account of the case, stating that it presented the Supreme Court
with a seemingly “irresistible constellation of issues”—including police interrogation of an intellectually
disabled teenager and prosecutorial misconduct—“during the reign of Hugo Holland, a prosecutor known
for taking shortcuts in pursuing the death penalty.” Andrew Cohen, Is There Such a Thing As a Slam Dunk?
The Corey Williams Case Comes Close, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 16, 2018),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/04/16/is-there-such-a-thing-as-a-slam-dunk.
811
Pishko, supra note 801. Among exculpatory materials released during post-conviction proceedings were
electronically recorded statements of investigating officers indicating that, until they obtained Williams’s
confession, they suspected that the older men were falsely accusing him. “It sounds like to me y’all all
decided y’all going to blame it on Corey,” one officer told other suspects. “That’s exactly what I’m
getting.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 794, at 15–16.
812
Mark Berman, He Was 16 When Louisiana Charged Him with Murder. Two Decades Later, He’s Free,
WASH. POST (May 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/05/22/he-was16-when-louisiana-charged-him-with-murder-two-decades-later-hes-free/?utm_term=.8b710e8abfdf.
813
Deborah Peterson & Lance Williams, Police Check Out Leads in Slaying of Former Post-Dispatch
Reporter, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 13, 1998, at B3.
814
Id.
815
Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d 825, 832 (8th Cir. 2012).
816
William C. Lhotka, Man Charged in Slaying of Former Reporter Has Long Criminal Record, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 30, 1999, at B1. Williams was born on December, 30, 1968. See Current Inmates,
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computer and other items taken in the burglary led to the charges, McCulloch said, and
the Post-Dispatch quoted sources as saying that two informants had provided information
to authorities.817
The trial of the racially charged case—black defendant, white victim—opened on
June 4, 2001, before a St. Louis County jury of eleven white jurors and one black juror
after the prosecution exercised peremptory challenges to eliminate six of seven qualified
black potential jurors from the panel.818 Eleven days later, the jury convicted Williams of
first-degree murder, burglary, robbery, and armed criminal action.819 On June 19, the jury
recommended a death sentence,820 which Judge Emmett M. O’Brien imposed on August
27.821
The conviction rested mainly on the testimony of Williams’s former girlfriend,
Laura Asaro, and a jailhouse informant, Henry Cole, both of whom claimed that Williams
had admitted the crime.822 Asaro claimed to have seen a purse containing Gayle’s state
identification card in the trunk of the car Williams was said to have used in the crime, 823
and police claimed to have found a ruler and a calculator that belonged to Gayle in the
car.824
Asaro, a crack addict and prostitute, agreed to testify in exchange for the dismissal
of outstanding warrants against her.825 She and Cole, a career criminal with a history of
mental illness, also stood to share in a $10,000 reward offered by Gayle’s family.826 A
third witness, Glenn Roberts, testified that Williams had sold him a laptop computer
taken in the burglary.827 Roberts would have added that Williams said he was selling the
computer for Asaro, but Judge O’Brien barred that proffered assertion as hearsay. 828
Hairs recovered from Gayle’s shirt and from a recently cleaned rug on which her body
was found had not come from Williams, Gayle, or her husband.829 Nor had blood and
skin recovered from Gayle’s fingernails come from Williams.830 Bloody footprints at the
scene matched the shoe size of neither Williams nor first-responders.831
The jury, with its lone African American member, deliberated less than two hours
before finding Williams guilty and, four days later, deliberated for less than ninety
minutes before recommending the death sentence, which Judge O’Brien imposed.832 The
MO. DEATH ROW, https://test-missourideathrowcom.pantheonsite.io/current-inmates/ (last updated Mar. 26,
2014).
817
Lhotka, supra note 816.
818
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 9, Williams v. Roper, No. 4:05CV01474RWS (E.D. Mo.2006)
(citing trial transcript) (on file with authors).
819
William C. Lhotka, Jury Votes Death Penalty for Woman’s Murderer, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June
20, 2001, at B1.
820
Id.
821
Id.
822
State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462, 466–67 (Mo. 2003).
823
Id. at 467.
824
Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 2012).
825
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 818, at 2–3, 9–10, 17–18.
826
Id. at 97–99; see also Williams v. State, 168 S.W.3d 433, 441 (Mo. 2005).
827
Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462 at 467.
828
Id.
829
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 818, at 10.
830
Id.
831
Id.
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Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 2012).
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Missouri Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the conviction both on direct appeal and
on a motion for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and
prosecutorial misconduct.833 The prosecutorial misconduct allegations included offering
to help two prospective witnesses with pending prosecutions, although the witnesses
wound up not testifying.834 The alleged ineffective assistance of counsel included failing
to investigate proffered testimony from Asaro’s mother that the car Williams supposedly
used in the crime had been inoperable at the time.835 Regarding the ruler and calculator
that police claimed to have found in the car, Williams’s post-conviction counsel noted
that Asaro or the police could have planted the items.836
Williams next sought a federal writ of habeas corpus, citing various grounds for
overturning his conviction or, at least, his death sentence. 837 In 2010, a federal judge
rejected the claims pertaining to the conviction, including a claim of innocence, 838 but
vacated Williams’s death sentence on the ground that trial counsel had failed to
investigate and present social and medical-history evidence during the penalty phase of
the trial.839 Among facts that would have been uncovered via diligent investigation, the
judge found, were that as a child Williams had been physically and sexually abused, that
his family had condoned criminal behavior, and that he had been exposed to guns, drugs,
and alcohol at a young age840—facts that the judge found, if known to Williams’s jury,
would have established “a reasonable probability that the outcome of the penalty phase
would have been different.”841
The U.S. Court of Appeals reinstated Williams’s death sentence, saying that
presenting evidence of childhood abuse in mitigation would have undermined trial
counsel’s portrayal of Williams as a “family man, who is innocent of such a violent
murder.”842 Williams, said the appellate court, “cannot now plead ineffective assistance
alleging that a different strategy would have worked better.”843 Williams’s execution was
set for January 28, 2015, 844 but it was stayed by the Missouri Supreme Court, which
ordered DNA testing845 that conclusively excluded Williams as the source of DNA on the
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Williams, 97 S.W.3d at 466; see also Williams v. State, 168 S.W.3d 433, 439–45 (Mo. 2005).
Williams, 168 S.W.3d at 440.
835
Id. at 442.
836
Explanations consistent with Williams’s innocence include that the police could have planted the items,
or that the police could have provided the items to Asaro, or that the actual killer could have provided the
items to her without the knowledge of the police. E-mail from Tricia Bushnell, one of Williams’s appellate
attorneys, to author (Jan. 30, 2019, 17:05 EST) (on file with authors). Asaro had access to the car. In the
Matter of Marcellus Williams, Request to Appoint an Independent Board of Inquiry at 1 (Aug. 8, 2017) (on
file with authors).
837
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 818, at 15–114.
838
Williams v. Roper, No. 4:05CV1474 RWS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144919, at *13–39, *49–69 (E.D.
Mo. Mar. 26, 2010).
839
Id. at *38–49.
840
Id. at *40.
841
Id. at *47.
842
Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d 825, 829 (8th Cir. 2012).
843
Id. at 834.
844
Williams v. McCulloch, 4:15CV00070 RWS, 2015 WL 222170, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 14, 2015).
845
Mo. Sup. Ct. Order SC94720, State ex rel. Williams v. Steele (Jan. 28, 2015).
834
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murder weapon.846 Nonetheless, the Missouri Supreme Court denied relief847 and the U.S.
Supreme Court declined to review the case.848
The execution was rescheduled for August 22, 2017,849 but, hours before it was to
be carried out, it was stayed by Governor Eric Greitens to permit further investigation of
the DNA evidence by a board he appointed for that purpose. 850 If the results of the
investigation were favorable to Williams, Greitens indicated he would grant
clemency851—but, before the board began delving into the case, Greitens, a Republican
who had campaigned on a promise to fight corruption, abruptly resigned on May 29,
2018, in the wake of a scandal involving campaign finances and an extra-marital affair.852
In February 2019, Williams, at age fifty, more than nineteen years after his arrest for the
Gayle murder, remained on Missouri death row.853
22.

Larry Ray Swearingen—Texas

On January 2, 1999, twenty-five days after nineteen-year-old Melissa Aline Trotter
was last seen alive in the Lone Star College library in Conroe, she was found dead, a
ligature around her neck, in Sam Houston National Forest. 854 Twenty-seven-year-old
Larry Ray Swearingen was a suspect because he had met Trotter on the afternoon of
December 8 at the college library and they had left together, after which her car had been
found in the library parking lot. 855 Swearingen was arrested on several outstanding
warrants on December 11, 1998, and was in the Montgomery County Jail when hunters
found Trotter’s body.856
Swearingen denied the crime, but was indicted within days. 857 His trial opened
before Judge Fred Edwards and a jury in Montgomery County District Court on June 14,

846

Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, Williams v. Larkin, No. SC96625, (Mo. Aug. 14, 2017) (on
file with authors).
847
State ex rel. Williams v. Steele, 2017 Mo. Unpub LEXIS 47, at *1 (Nov. 28, 2017).
848
Williams v. Steele, 137 S. Ct. 2307 (2017).
849
Tony Rizzo, Execution Set for Man Convicted of Killing Former St. Louis Newspaper Reporter, K.C.
STAR, http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/crime/article146876134.html (last updated Apr. 26, 2017).
850
Mark Berman & Wesley Lowery, Missouri Governor Stays Execution of Marcellus Williams, Says
Officials Will Probe DNA Evidence in the Case, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/08/22/missouri-plans-to-execute-marcelluswilliams-as-his-attorneys-say-dna-evidence-exonerates-him/?utm_term=.7ee10fc48de4 (last visited May
26, 2019)
851
Id.
852
Jack Suntrup & Kurt Erickson, Embattled Missouri Gov. Eric Greitens Resigns; Prosecutor Drops
Computer Tampering Charge, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 30, 2018, at A1.
853
Current Inmates, supra note 816.
854
Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (en banc); Alex Hannaford, Is Larry
Swearingen Innocent?, TEX. OBSERVER (Nov. 27, 2012), https://www.texasobserver.org/is-larryswearingen-innocent/. Trotter was born on November 26, 1979. Melissa Aline Trotter, FIND A GRAVE,
https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/6166138/melissa-aline-trotter (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
855
Swearingen, 101 S.W.3d at 93. Swearingen was born on May 21, 1971.Offender Information: Larry Ray
Swearingen, TEX. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST.,
https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/death_row/dr_info/swearingenlarry.html (last visited May 23, 2019).
856
Swearingen, 101 S.W.3d 89 at 93; Jerry Urban, Body Found in Forest ID’d as Student, 19, HOUS.
CHRON., Jan. 4, 1999, at A1; Hannaford, supra note 854.
857
Harvey Rice, Jury to Be Selected in Swearingen Trial, HOUS. CHRON., May 15, 2000, at A14.
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2000.858 The prosecution, led by Assistant District Attorney Michael R. Tiffin,859 alleged
that Swearingen strangled Trotter to death with a ligature torn or cut from her pantyhose
after she rejected his sexual advances—and that he disposed of her body in the forest the
same afternoon. 860 Dr. Joye M. Carter, who performed the autopsy, testified that the
decomposition of the body was consistent with it having been in the forest for twenty-five
days.861 Cell phone records indicated that Swearingen had placed a call from the vicinity
of the forest at 4:25 P.M. on December 8.862
Physical evidence purporting to link Swearingen to the crime included a piece of
pantyhose said to have been found outside his trailer home by his landlord four days after
Trotter’s body was discovered—the partial garment matched the ligature with which
Trotter had been slain—but police had twice previously searched the trailer without
finding it.863 Hairs said to be similar to Trotter’s hair were found in Swearingen’s truck,
and fibers that might have come from Swearingen’s jacket, truck, and trailer were found
on Trotter’s body,864 but DNA testing positively excluded Swearingen as the source of
male blood flakes found in scrapings of Trotter’s fingernails. 865 A cellmate of
Swearingen’s testified that, when asked if he had committed the crime, Swearingen
responded, “F---, yeah, I did it.”866 Swearingen took the stand to proclaim his innocence,
testifying that on December 8 he had left Trotter in the company of another man and gone
to visit his grandmother, who testified that he had picked her up at 2:30 P.M. and taken
her to the post office.867
On June 28, 2000, the jury found Swearingen guilty of murder, and eight days later
returned findings qualifying him for a death sentence, which Judge Edwards imposed on
July 11. 868 In March 2003, on direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed the verdict and death sentence.869 Two months later, the court denied a state writ
of habeas corpus, which Swearingen had sought while the direct appeal was pending.870
In May 2004, Swearingen sought a federal writ of habeas corpus, but his petition was
dismissed in September 2005 by U.S. District Court Judge Melinda Harmon,871 whose
decision was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Firth Circuit in July 2006.872

858

State v. Swearingen, No. 99-11-06435-CR, 2000 WL 35627000 (Montgomery Cty. Dist. Ct. July 11,
2000) (trial judge’s imposition of death sentence and description of the case chronology up to that point).
859
Id. at *1.
860
Swearingen, 101 S.W.3d 89 at 95.
861
Id. at 93; Second Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Apx. 1, at 1, Swearingen v. Quarterman, TXSD
No. 4:09-cv-00300 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2009) (affidavit of Joye M. Carter, former Harris County medical
examiner) (on file with authors).
862
Id. at 10.
863
Id.
864
Swearingen, 101 S.W.3d at 94.
865
Second Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 861, at 19.
866
Id. at 5 n.1.
867
Id. at 98.
868
State v. Swearingen, No. 99-11-06435-CR, 2000 WL 35627000, at *2–4 (Montgomery Cty. Dist. Ct.
July 11, 2000).
869
Swearingen, 101 S.W.3d at 101.
870
Ex parte Swearingen, No. WR-53, 613-04 (Tex. Crim. App. May 21, 2003).
871
Swearingen v. Dretke, No. 04-cv-2058, at 1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2005) (cited in Swearingen v. Dretke,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32933, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 2006)).
872
Swearingen v. Quarterman, 192 F. App’x 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
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Swearingen sought DNA testing to no avail 873 and twice came within one day of
execution—in January 2007 and January 2009—before being granted stays.874
On January 30, 2009, Swearingen’s appellate lawyers, Philip H. Hilder and James
G. Rytting, filed a second petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus citing seemingly
incontrovertible evidence of Swearingen’s innocence 875 —that, in the opinion of five
independent forensic experts, Trotter’s body could not have been left in the forest until
about December 18, 1998, more than a week after Swearingen’s arrest, and probably had
not been left there until two or three days before the hunters found it on January 2,
1999.876 In light of the forensic opinions, Dr. Carter, recanted her claim at Swearingen’s
trial that the decomposition of Trotter’s body had been consistent with the prosecution
theory that Trotter had been slain on December 8.877
Hilder and Rytting also developed evidence that days before Trotter disappeared,
she had received life-threatening telephone calls that caused her to break down in tears.878
Her co-workers—she had a telemarketing job—reported the threats to police, who
determined that the threats could not have come from Swearingen, but that information
was not disclosed to Swearingen’s trial counsel, Jerald Crow, in apparent violation of
Brady v. Maryland.879 In addition, the second habeas petition alleged that Swearingen
had been deprived of effective assistance of counsel by Crow’s failure to investigate
evidence suggesting that Swearingen had been in jail when the murder occurred.880
Based on the Anti-Terrorism and Effect Death Penalty Act, which severely limits
state prisoners’ ability to bring successive habeas actions,881 Judge Harmon dismissed the
petition in November 2009.882 The New York-based Innocence Project and the Innocence
Network, an umbrella organization of fifty-eight law school innocence projects, filed an
amicus brief urging the Fifth Circuit to reverse Harmon on the ground that Swearingen
had been incarcerated when Trotter died and therefore could not have murdered her. 883 In
April 2011, however, the Fifth Circuit again affirmed Harmon.884 Five months later, the
Texas Legislature, at the behest of the Innocence Project, amended the state law
873

Motion for Appointment of Counsel at 1, Swearingen v. Dretke, No. 4:06-mc-00059 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 13,
2006) (on file with authors).
874
Renée C. Lee, Inmate Avoids Death Again, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 27, 2009, at A1.
875
Second Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 861, at 3.
876
Id. at 11–12. The experts were forensic entomologists Dr. Dael Morris and Dr. James Arends, forensic
pathologists Dr. Lloyd White and Dr. Glenn Larkin, and Harris County Medical Examiner Dr. Luis
Sanchez. Id. at 5.
877
Second Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 861, Apx. 1, at 2 (affidavit of Joye M. Carter,
former Harris County medical examiner) (“[F]indings pursuant to the internal examination [of the body]
are consistent with a late exposure in the Sam Houston National Forest within fourteen days of
discovery.”).
878
Second Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 861, at 19–20.
879
Id. at 20; State v. Swearingen, No. 99-11-06435-CR, 2000 WL 35627000, at *1 (Montgomery Cty. Dist.
Ct. July 11, 2000) (identifying Crow as trial counsel); see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
880
Second Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 861, at 2. The decomposition of the body had
been so minimal that the hunters who found it thought it was a mannequin. Id. at 7 (citing police report).
881
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2012).
882
Swearingen v. Thaler, No. H-09-300, 2009 WL 4433221, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2009) (“Swearingen
has not met the AEDPA's requirements for filing a successive petition.”).
883
Brief of Innocence Project & Innocence Network as Amici Curiae at 13, 15, Swearingen v. Thaler, No.
09-70036 (5th Cir. Apr. 26, 2010) (on file with authors).
884
Swearingen v. Thaler, 421 F. App’x 413, 414 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
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governing DNA testing to address some of the reasons Swearingen’s efforts to obtain
further DNA testing had been denied,885 but as of May 1, 2019, Swearingen, forty-seven,
remained on death row.886
23.

Kimber Edwards—Missouri

Thirty-five-year-old Kimberly Cantrell was found shot to death in her apartment in
the St. Louis suburb of University City on August 23, 2000. 887 Canvassing the
neighborhood, police interviewed two neighbor boys: brothers Christopher Harrington, a
ninth grader, who said he had seen a black man carrying a black backpack knocking on
Cantrell’s door late the afternoon of August 22 and Brandon Harrington, twelve, who
said he had heard shots and a woman scream at around 5:15 or 5:30 that afternoon.888
Cantrell’s ex-husband, thirty-six-year-old Kimber Edwards, was an immediate
suspect.889 The couple had divorced a decade earlier, but in March 2000, Edwards had
been charged with failing to make a dozen monthly child-support payments.890 Edwards,
who had a fourteen-year-old daughter with Cantrell, had remarried and was living with
his wife and their two daughters in St. Louis, where he was a correctional officer at the
city jail.891 The day after Cantrell’s body was found, Edwards told police that he had
returned from out of town on August 22, when he had taken his daughters to medical
appointments, and then had done some repairs at a rental property he owned in St.
Louis.892 He said he had not seen Cantrell since August 10.893 Edwards’s second wife,
Jada Edwards, was interrogated for more than an hour, during which police took her
fingerprints, shoeprints, and hair samples as Edwards watched.894
On August 25, when police went to the Edwards’s rental property to check his
alibi, they met a tenant—thirty-nine-year-old Orthell M. Wilson—who fit the description
of the man Christopher Harrington had reported seeing three days earlier.895 Police found
a black backpack in Wilson’s apartment, and Harrington identified him from a
photograph. 896 In a series of shifting statements, Wilson implicated Edwards in the
885

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01(a)(1), 64.01(b) (West 2017). The amendments were specifically
designed to permit DNA testing of the sort sought by Swearingen. Testimony of Stephen Saloom, Innocence
Project Policy Director, Before the Tex. Sen. Criminal Justice Comm., at 5 (Mar. 22, 2011), and Before the
Tex. H. Criminal Jurisprudence Comm., at 5 (May 10, 2011) (on file with authors).
886
Death Row Information: Larry Ray Swearingen, supra note 855.
887
State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 520–21 (Mo. 2003); Woman Is Found Shot to Death in Her
Apartment, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 25, 2000, at B2.
888
Edwards v. State, 200 S.W.3d 500, 505 (Mo. 2006); Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 522.
889
Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 521. According to state inmate records, Edwards was born on March 29, 1964.
Offender Search: Kimber Edwards, MO. DEP’T OF CORR.,
https://web.mo.gov/doc/offSearchWeb/offenderInfoAction.do (search results for “Kimber Edwards”).
890
Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 521.
891
Id. at 520–21.
892
Id.
893
Id.
894
Appellant’s Brief & Addendum at 6, Edwards v. Roper, 688 F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1092) (on
file with authors).
895
Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 522. According to state inmate records, Wilson (whose first name is misspelled
“Ortell” in some records) was born on December 18, 1960. Offender Search: Orthell Wilson, MO. DEP’T OF
CORR., https://web.mo.gov/doc/offSearchWeb/offenderInfoAction.do (search results for “Orthell Wilson”).
896
Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 522.
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crime—in the first version, Edwards paid Wilson $500 “to just go knock on [Cantrell’s]
door and see if she was there or not, and then to leave,” in another version, Edwards
asked Wilson to “intimidate” Cantrell for $3,500, and, in the final version, Edwards
provided the handgun for Wilson to “take her out.”897 On August 26, Wilson led police to
a vacant building where they recovered the murder weapon.898
The next day, University City Police arrested Edwards, told him that Wilson was in
custody, and showed him photographs of the crime scene and murder weapon. 899
Edwards professed innocence, as he had four days earlier, but when told that the
investigation would continue, and that it would involve his wife and children, he agreed
to make a statement, provided that the police would leave his family alone.900 He then
claimed that a man named Michael had overheard him talking about his child-support
problems and offered to take care of the problems for $1,600—a price on which they
agreed.901 When police asked if Michael actually was Wilson, Edwards said that he was
not, but that Wilson had demanded a share of the money for helping Michael with “the
job.”902
On the assumption that the Edwards and Wilson statements were sufficient to prove
that the former had hired the latter to commit the crime, both were charged with
Cantrell’s murder.903 After Wilson pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life in prison,
Edwards’s trial opened on April 22, 2002, before St. Louis County Circuit Court Judge
Mark D. Siegel and an all-white jury—from which the prosecution peremptorily struck
three qualified African American potential jurors; Edwards was an African American.904
Before trial, Edwards moved to suppress his incriminating statement, contending that it
was the product of physical and psychological coercion, but Judge Siegel denied the
motion.905
Wilson was not called to testify at the trial, but his brother, Hughie Wilson, also
Edwards’s tenant, told the jury that that in the spring or early summer of 2000 Edwards
inquired about getting a “throwaway” gun.906 A few days before the murder, according to
Hughie Wilson, he had been with his brother and Edwards in his brother’s apartment,
where he saw a gun that looked like the murder weapon on a bedroom table.907 Edwards
Appellant’s Brief at 11–12, Edwards v. State, No. SC 86895 (Mo. Feb. 6, 2006) (on file with authors).
Id.
899
Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 522.
900
Id. at 523.
901
Id.
902
Appellant’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 894, at 9.
903
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 897, at 49–50.
904
Appellant’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 894, at 1, 9; Appellant’s Brief, supra note 897, at 13. The
prosecution claimed that removal of a potential black juror was justified because he had stated that his
niece had been treated unfairly by law enforcement, although a white juror who complained about the
harshness of his nephew’s prison sentence for burglary had been accepted. See Editorial Bd., Too Many
Black Men Sent to Death by White Juries, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 10, 2015, at A14 (quoting a
letter to Missouri Governor Jay Nixon signed by “dozens of elected officials, attorneys and death penalty
opponents”). Prosecutorial challenges of potential jurors of the same race as the defendant based solely on
race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
89 (1986).
905
Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 523–24.
906
Id. at 523.
907
Id.
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took the stand in his own defense, telling the jury that he had made the incriminating
statement out of fear that police would accuse his wife of being involved in the crime.908
The jury convicted Edwards on April 25, 2002, and, after a brief hearing the next
day, found him eligible for a death sentence, which Judge Siegel imposed a day after
that. 909 In August 2003, the conviction and sentenced were affirmed by the Missouri
Supreme Court,910 which denied Edwards’s petition for post-conviction relief three years
later.911 Edwards next sought a federal writ of habeas corpus,912 which was denied by the
U.S. District Court in October 2009913 and by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in January 2012.914
In June 2015, Edwards’s appellate counsel—Kent E. Gibson and Jeremy S. Weis—
filed a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting Edwards’s innocence based
primarily on a recantation by Orthell Wilson, who alleged that he had been coerced by
police to falsely implicate Edwards.915 The affidavit said that Wilson and Cantrell had
been engaged in a secret romantic relationship that began shortly after she and Edwards
were divorced, that during the entire relationship Wilson had “a serious drug problem”
for which he was “constantly in need of money,” that he shot her after a “heated
argument” over his drug addiction, and that he had recanted shortly after Edwards was
convicted, but no one “followed up on this with me.”916
Wilson’s assertion that he had been romantically involved with Cantrell was
corroborated by affidavits from two of Wilson’s neighbors and the daughter of a third
neighbor attesting that they had seen him hugging and kissing her on various
occasions. 917 The petition also cited a psychiatric evaluation conducted during earlier
proceedings indicating that Edwards suffered from Asperger’s Syndrome, a condition
that rendered him vulnerable to pressure to confess to a crime he did not commit.918
The Missouri Supreme Court rejected the petition without explanation919—which
was unsurprising in light of the propensity of courts to summarily dismiss recantations as
unreliable, even though experience in the DNA forensic age has established otherwise,920

Appellant’s Brief, supra note 897, at 5–6.
Appellant’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 894, at 15–16.
910
Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 550.
911
Edwards v. State, 200 S.W.3d 500, 521 (Mo. 2006) (en banc)
912
Appellant’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 894, at 22.
913
Edwards v. Roper, No. 4:06-CV-1419, 2009 WL 3164112, at *25 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2009), aff’d, 688
F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 2012).
914
Edwards, 688 F.3d at 463.
915
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, 8, 15–17, 22–24, 37, Edwards v. Griffith (Mo. June 1, 2015)
(on file with authors); id., Ex. 1, at 1–2 (affidavit of Orthell Wilson).
916
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 915, Ex. 1, at ¶¶ 4–5, 7 (affidavit of Orthell Wilson).
917
Id., Ex. 4, at ¶ 9 (affidavit of Mara Esthelle Robins-Couch); id., Ex. 5, at ¶¶ 6–7 (affidavit of Joyce
Harris); id., Ex. 6, at ¶¶ 5–7 (affidavit of Ronyne Jean McKnight).
918
Id. at 4, 6–7; see also Psychiatric Evaluation (report by William S. Logan, forensic psychiatrist) at 2–4,
Edwards v. State, 4:06-cv-01419-CJE (Mo. Aug. 17, 2007) (on file with authors).
919
State ex rel. Edwards v. Griffith, No. SC 95033, 2015 Mo. Unpub LEXIS 340, at *1 (June 30, 2015).
920
THE SNITCH SYSTEM, supra note 32 at 14. A 2013 study found that, of 250 documented exonerations in
U.S. murder cases, 139, or 55.6%, involved at least one recantation. ALEXANDRA E. GROSS & SAMUEL R.
GROSS, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, WITNESS RECANTATION STUDY: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 4
(2013), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/RecantationUpdate_5_2013.pdf.
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and similarly to look askance at the notion that confessions, absent physical torture, are
“damning and compelling evidence of guilt.”921
Edwards’s hope of avoiding execution at that point was slim, but on October 2015,
Missouri Governor Jeremiah W. “Jay” Nixon, a staunch proponent of the death penalty
who, as attorney general, had fought to preserve Edwards’s death sentence, 922
unexpectedly commuted his sentence to life—although purporting to believe that
Edwards was guilty.923 In early 2019, nearing his fifty-fifth birthday and the seventeenth
anniversary of his death sentence, Edwards languished in Missouri’s South Central
Correctional Center.924
24.

Robert Leslie Roberson III—Texas

On the morning of January 31, 2002, thirty-five-year-old Robert Leslie
Roberson III rolled a wheelchair into the Palestine Regional Medical Center
emergency room.925 His girlfriend, Teddie Cox, sat in the wheelchair, holding what
nurse Kelly Gurganus thought looked like a rag doll—but was Roberson’s limp twoyear-old daughter, Nikki Curtis. 926 “She’s not breathing,” Gurganus quoted Cox as
saying. 927
Noticing bruises on Nikki’s body and head, Gurganus asked Roberson what caused
them.928 He said Nikki had fallen out of bed.929 Finding that explanation implausible in
view of the severity of Nikki’s injuries, Gurganus asked the nursing supervisor to call
police—to whom Roberson reiterated that Nikki had fallen out of bed. 930 Meanwhile,
Andrea Sims, a nurse who specialized in sexual assault cases, examined Nikki, finding
rectal injuries consistent with sexual assault. 931 Due to swelling in Nikki’s brain, Dr.
Thomas Konjoyan transferred her to Children’s Medical Center in Dallas, where she died
of “blunt force head injuries” that, according to Dr. Jill Urban, who performed the
autopsy, could have resulted from shaking.932 Based largely on the fact that Roberson had
been alone with Nikki when she presumably suffered her fatal injuries—Teddie Cox had
been hospitalized for a hysterectomy933—a grand jury indictment was returned on April

921

Leo & Ofshe, supra note 325. Of 364 U.S. DNA exonerations documented as of late February 2019,
28% involved false confessions. DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).
922
Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 19, Edwards v. State, No. 06-8534 (Mo. Jan. 29, 2007)
(on file with authors).
923
John Eligon, Missouri Inmate Is Spared Death Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2015, at A13.
924
Offender Search: Kimber Edwards, supra note 889.
925
Roberson v. Dir., Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice-Corr. Insts. Div., No. 2:09cv327, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
139510, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2014). Roberson was born on November 10, 1966. Death Row
Information: Robert Leslie Roberson III, TEX. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST.,
https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/death_row/dr_info/robersonrobert.html (last visited May 23, 2019).
926
Roberson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139510, at *3.
927
Id.
928
Id. at *3–4.
929
Id. at *3.
930
Id. at *4; see also Roberson v. Stephens, 614 F. App’x 124, 126 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
931
Roberson, 614 F. App’x at 126.
932
Id. at 127–28; Roberson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139510, at *5–6.
933
Roberson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139510, at *8.
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25 charging Roberson with murder during the commission, or attempted commission, of
sexual assault of a child under age six.934
At Roberson’s jury trial, which opened on February 3, 2003, before Anderson
County District Court Judge Bascom W. Bentley III, the prosecution relied principally on
medical testimony. 935 Dr. Konjoyan testified that it was “basically impossible” that
Nikki’s injuries resulted from falling out of bed.936 Dr. John Ross, who examined Nikki
on the day she died, testified that her brain had shifted from the right side to the left and
that her injuries had not been accidental. 937 Sims, the nurse who specialized in sexual
assault, told the jury that she believed that Nikki had been sexually assaulted,938 even
though Dr. Urban, who performed the autopsy, noted no rectal injuries and detected no
semen.939 Dr. Janet Squires, a pediatrician who treated Nikki at the Dallas center, testified
that her death resulted from a “very forceful act,” but could not determine whether she
had been sexually abused.940
In addition to the medical witnesses, the prosecution called Teddie Cox, who
testified that while Roberson was in the Anderson County Jail she had asked him if he
killed Nikki and he said that he might have “snapped,” but had no memory of it. 941 Cox,
her ten-year-old daughter, Rachel Cox, and eleven-year-old niece, Courtney Berryhill, all
testified that they had seen Roberson shake and spank Nikki. 942 The defense called Cox’s
sister, Patricia Conklin, who testified the Roberson had a loving relationship with Nikki
and that Cox had a poor reputation for truthfulness.943
At the close of the evidence, the prosecution dismissed the sexual assault charges
for lack of evidence and the defense moved to dismiss the indictment, but Judge Bentley
denied the motion. 944 On February 11, the jury found Roberson guilty of what had
become a shaken-baby case and, after a hearing on mitigation and aggravation three days
later, found him eligible for a death sentence, which Judge Bentley imposed on February
14.945 The conviction and death sentence were affirmed in June 2007 by the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals,946 which denied a petition for post-conviction relief in September
2009.947 In September 2010, Roberson’s lawyers petitioned for a federal writ of habeas
corpus,948 which was denied by the U.S. District Court in September 2014949 and by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in May 2015.950
Roberson, 614 F. App’x at 125–26.
Id. at 126–27, 129; Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 3, 4, 33, Roberson v. Thaler, 2:09-cv-00327JRG-RSP, (E.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2010) (on file with authors).
936
Roberson, 614 F. App’x at 127.
937
Id. at 126–27.
938
Id. at 126.
939
Id. at 127.
940
Roberson v. Dir., Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice-Corr. Insts. Div., No. 2:09cv327, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
139510, at *17 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2104).
941
Id. at *10.
942
Id. at *6–7.
943
Id. at *10.
944
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 935, at 45.
945
Id. at 34.
946
Roberson v. State, No. AP-74,671, 2002 WL 34217382, at *12 (Tex. Crim. App. June 20, 2007).
947
Ex parte Roberson, WR-63, 081-01 & WR-63, 081-02, 2009 WL 2959738, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept.
16, 2009) (per curiam).
948
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 935.
934
935
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On June 8, 2016, thirteen days before Roberson’s scheduled execution, appellate
counsel he recently had obtained—Benjamin B. Wolff and Gretchen S. Sween, of the
Texas Office of Capital and Forensic Writs 951 —moved before the Court of Criminal
Appeals for a stay based on new evidence incontrovertibly establishing that “[i]t is
impossible to shake a toddler to death without causing serious neck injuries—and Nikki
had none.”952 Roberson’s conviction, to quote the motion, had rested “on junk science
and highly inflammatory sexual-abuse allegations that were false” and in the intervening
years there had been “a sea change in the medical consensus” on shaken baby cases. 953
The motion cited statements by three forensic pathologists—Drs. Harry J. Bonnell,
Janice J. Ophoven, and John Plunkett—and a biomechanical engineer—Ken L. Morrison,
Ph.D.—who agreed that the theory the prosecution advanced at Roberson’s trial about
how Nikki died was “unsupported by contemporary medicine or biomechanics.”954 The
four experts advanced various possible causes of death consistent with Roberson’s
innocence: Nikki could have died of undiagnosed meningitis from a middle ear infection,
evidenced by the fact that two days before her death she had a 104.5-degree temperature
when seen by a doctor; of a congenital condition, evidenced by the facts that her birth had
been difficult and she suffered long-standing health issues; of a head injury she sustained
before spending the night with her father; or of injuries sustained from a fall of as little as
two feet.955
On June 16, when Roberson had five days to live, the Court of Criminal Appeals
granted the stay and remanded the case to the trial court to resolve his claims that he had
been convicted on scientifically invalid testimony, that his right to a fair trial had been
violated by false forensic testimony, and that he was innocent of capital murder.956 More
than two and a half years later, in early 2019, the case remained under review in
Anderson County, and Roberson, at age fifty-two, passed his sixteenth year on death
row.957

Roberson v. Dir., Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice-Corr. Insts. Div., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137986, at *1
(E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2014) (adopting recommendation of U.S. Magistrate, Roberson v. Dir., Tex. Dep’t of
Crim. Justice-Corr. Inst. Div., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139510, at *169).
950
Roberson v. Stephens, 614 F. App’x 124, 125, 136 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
951
Motion for Stay of Execution at *9, Ex parte Roberson, WR-63, 081-03 (Tex. Crim. App. June 8, 2016)
(on file with authors) (filing occurred “as soon as practicable” by “recently obtained conflict-free federal
habeas counsel”); see also OFF. OF CAP. & FORENSIC WRITS, http://www.ocfw.texas.gov/ (last visited Mar.
21, 2019).
952
Motion for Stay of Execution, supra note 951, at *5.
953
Id. at *3.
954
Id. at *2.
955
Id. at *6–7.
956
Ex parte Roberson, No. WR-63, 081-03, 2016 WL 3543332, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. June 16, 2016).
957
Death Row Information: Robert Leslie Roberson III, supra note 925. For a discussion of the case and
shaken-baby syndrome, see Jolie McCullough, Will a Texas Law that Overturns Convictions Based on Bad
Science Save This Death Row Inmate?, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 16, 2018),
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/08/16/robert-roberson-death-penalty-junk-science-review/.
949
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CONCLUSION

The standard of proof necessary to establish convicted defendants’ innocence to the
legal system’s satisfaction is higher than the standard required to convict them in the first
place—an issue of serious concern in capital cases, as the foregoing profiles show.
Consider, for example, the case of Anibal Garcia Rousseau,958 who was convicted
and sentenced to death in Texas for the murder and armed robbery of a federal agent—
even though three eyewitnesses testified that Rousseau was not the killer. 959 Shortly after
the conviction, which rested solely on the demonstrably inaccurate testimony of a
surviving victim of the crime, 960 evidence emerged establishing that the weapon with
which the agent had been slain was used in a subsequent murder—a fact that, together
with other evidence, left virtually no doubt that both murders had been committed by
someone else. 961 Rousseau nonetheless languished on death row for more than fifteen
years, until he died while his innocence claim was still being litigated.962
Criminal convictions require proof of guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt,” 963
whatever that may mean in the eyes of beholders in jury boxes or judges at bench
trials.964 It is higher than a “preponderance of the evidence,” the standard of proof in civil
cases—a probability greater than fifty percent. How much higher is anyone’s guess, but
in practice it has not been high enough to prevent the convictions of:
• Sonia Jacobs,965 who was sentenced to death in Florida for the murder of two
police officers based primarily on the testimony of the probable actual killer, who was
unquestionably a liar.966
• Tyrone Lee Noling,967 who was sentenced to die for an Ohio double murder in
which he became a suspect because he had stolen a pistol that was suspected of being the
murder weapon—but in fact was not—and who was excluded as the source of myriad
fingerprints and other evidence related to the crime.968
• Darlie Lynn Routier,969 who was convicted and sentenced to death in Texas for
the murder of her five-year-old son based in part on her seemingly odd behavior in the
aftermath of the murder—even though during the crime, which she testified had been
committed by a knife-wielding home-invader, her carotid artery had been nearly fatally
severed.970
958

Supra profile No. 12.
Supra note 521 and accompanying text.
960
Supra notes 519–20 and accompanying text.
961
Supra notes 525–28 and accompanying text.
962
Supra note 533 and accompanying text.
963
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970) (“[A] society that values the good name and freedom of
every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt
about his guilt.”).
964
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (“Although this standard is an ancient and honored aspect of
our criminal justice system, it defies easy explication.”).
965
Supra profile No. 1.
966
Supra notes 28–29, 39–40 and accompanying text.
967
Supra profile No. 14.
968
Supra notes 587, 594–95 and accompanying text.
969
Supra profile No. 19.
970
Supra notes 754–57 and accompanying text.
959
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And what is the standard for establishing innocence after conviction? As a matter
of law, appellate courts view the evidence in criminal cases in the light most favorable to
the prosecution971—a sacrosanct principle in the extreme, as exemplified by the cases of:
• Dennis Harold Lawley,972 for whom a corroborated confession by the likely actual
killer was insufficient and who died on California death row, his home for more than
twenty-two years, while his case languished in litigation.973
• Eddie Lee Howard, Jr.,974 for whom a DNA exclusion and disavowal of highly
incriminating bite-mark testimony by a prosecution forensic witness was insufficient in
Mississippi.975
• Larry Ray Swearingen,976 for whom evidence that he had been in jail when the
murder for which he was sentenced to death in Texas occurred was insufficient, or at
least had been as of June 2019.977
It has been suggested that the risk of erroneous convictions in capital cases might
be alleviated by raising the standard of proof at trial to something higher than beyond a
reasonable doubt. 978 Whatever the merits of changing the nomenclature—whether it
curtailed erroneous convictions in capital cases,979 merely reinforced the illusion of jury
accuracy already provided by the reasonable-doubt standard, 980 or did something in
between—rejections of proposals to raise the standard to “beyond any doubt” in New
York,” 981 “no doubt” in Massachusetts, 982 and “beyond all doubt” in Illinois 983 have
“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government means ‘crediting every inference
that the jury might have drawn in favor of the government.’ ” United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 104
(2d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 136–37 (2d Cir. 1999)).
972
Supra profile No. 13.
973
Supra notes 554, 559, 570, 575, 578, 585 and accompanying text.
974
Supra profile No. 16.
975
Supra notes 669–71, 674–76 and accompanying text.
976
Supra profile No. 22.
977
Supra notes 875–77 and accompanying text.
978
Leonard B. Sand & Danielle L. Rose, Proof Beyond All Possible Doubt: Is There a Need for a Higher
Burden of Proof When the Sentence May Be Death, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1359, 1361 (2003) (“We propose
that before the government may deprive a defendant of life, it must prove the defendant's guilt by a
standard more rigorous than beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
979
Erik Lillquist, Absolute Certainty and the Death Penalty, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 45, 74 (2005) (Since
“certainty is impossible,” proponents of no-doubt standards “seem to be asking that no defendant ever be
sentenced to death.”).
980
Id. at 66 (“[R]easonable doubt, by appearing to require a great deal of certainty, may ensure that society
as a whole accepts guilty verdicts, regardless of whether jurors require such certainty in actuality.”).
981
William Glaberson, Killer’s Lawyers Seek to Raise Standard of Proof for Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2014, at 27 (“[T]he state’s Capital Defender Office argues for the first time that . . . [the Court of
Criminal Appeals] should require prosecutors to prove a defendant’s guilt ‘beyond any doubt’ to justify an
execution.”). The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the argument in People v. Mateo, 811 N.E.2d 1053,
1068 n.15 (2004) (“Contrary to defendant’s assertions, the reasonable doubt charge here conveyed the
proper standard.”). Following Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam), New York
did not reinstate the death penalty until 1995. Malcolm Gladwell, After 18 Years, N.Y. Death Penalty
Revived, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1995, at A15. In 2004, without any executions having occurred under the
law, the Court of Appeals voided the law by vacating a death sentence on the ground that a defective jurydeadlock instruction had been given in the case—a defect that could be cured only by “a new deadlock
instruction from the Legislature.” People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 344 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). Ensuing
attempts to reinstate the death penalty failed. Rebecca Baker Erwin, Lawmakers Reject Death Penalty Bill,
971
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rendered the prospect of such change sufficiently remote that, at least for the time being,
it scarcely seems worth considering.
There is, however, a change that is more realistically possible and likely to have
greater impact—ending the “death-qualification” of juries for the guilt-innocence phase
of capital trials. Until the U.S. Supreme Court decided Witherspoon v. Illinois984 in 1968,
prospective jurors who expressed conscientious or religious scruples against the death
penalty could be categorically excluded by judges for cause from capital cases. 985
Witherspoon held that such a sweeping exclusion resulted in “a tribunal organized to
return a death verdict,”986 but condoned the time-honored exclusion of prospective jurors
who said that they would not impose a death sentence, regardless of the evidence.987
Death-qualification, thus, has remained part of the jury-selection process in capital
cases. 988 The problem is that, while prospective jurors’ unwillingness to impose death
JOURNAL-NEWS (Westchester County, N.Y.), Apr. 13, 2005, at 18. In 2007, the Court of Appeals voided
another death sentence on constitutional grounds. People v. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969, 971, 984 (2007). In
2008, Governor David Peterson ordered the state’s death cell dismantled. Brendan Scott, Gov. Pulls Switch
on Death Cell, N.Y. POST (July 24, 2008), https://nypost.com/2008/07/24/gov-pulls-switch-on-death-cell/.
982
JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN ET AL., REPORT OF GOVERNOR’S COUNCIL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 22 (2004),
https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/08/mr/5-3-04governorsreportcapitalpunishment.pdf
[hereinafter Mass. Rpt.] (“[T]he jury should be required [as a prerequisite to a death sentence] to find that
there is ‘no doubt’ about the defendant’s guilt of capital murder.”). The report was central to an effort by
Governor Mitt Romney to reinstate the death penalty. Laura Mansnerus, States Seek Ways to Make
Executions Error Free, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2003, at WK5. Romney’s effort was rejected by legislators.
AP, Bill to Restore Death Penalty Fails in Boston, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005, at A16.
983
Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner, in an amendatory veto of a gun-control measure, called for
reinstatement of the death penalty for mass murderers and killers of law-enforcement officers. Letter from
Gov. Bruce Rauner to members of the Illinois legislature ¶ 8 (May 14, 2018) (stating that “the only morally
justifiable standard of proof in a death penalty case is ‘beyond all doubt’ ”),
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/fulltext.asp?DocName=10000HB1468gms&GA=100&LegID=101958&Se
ssionId=91&SpecSess=0&DocTypeId=HB&DocNum=1468&GAID=14&Session. The Illinois death
penalty was abolished in 2011. See Rob Warden, How and Why Illinois Abolished the Death Penalty, 30
LAW & INEQ. 245 (2012).
984
391 U.S. 510 (1968).
985
The Illinois statute challenged in Witherspoon provided as follows: “In trials for murder it shall be a
cause for challenge of any juror who shall, on being examined, state that he has conscientious scruples
against capital punishment, or that he is opposed to the same.” Id. at 512 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, §
743 (1959)). “Cause challenges” are unlimited in quantity and must be based on specified legal grounds, as
opposed to “peremptory challenges,” which are limited in number, but which attorneys, at the time of
Witherspoon, could exercise for any reason. See Craig Haney, Juries and the Death Penalty: Readdressing
the Witherspoon Question, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 512, 516 (1980). Eighteen years after Witherspoon, the
Supreme Court forbade the use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors to exclude jurors of the same race
as the defendant based solely on race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
986
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 540–41.
987
Id. at 522 n.21 (holding that exclusion of jurors is proper only if “their attitude toward the death penalty
would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant’s guilt”).
988
Haney, supra note 985, at 515. In 1985, the Supreme Court took the “opportunity to clarify”
Witherspoon, holding that a prospective juror may be excluded for cause when the juror’s views would
“prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions
and his oath.” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45
(1980)). In reality, the decision clarified nothing—leaving in place what one student of the law aptly
branded “a process riddled with ambiguity.” James M. Carr, At Witt’s End: The Continuing Quandary of
Jury Selection in Capital Cases, 39 STAN. L. REV. 427, 429 (1987).
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sentences is irrelevant to their ability to fairly decide whether to convict or acquit, there is
a strong correlation between attitudes about the death penalty and perceptions about
defendants’ guilt or innocence. 989 Studies repeatedly have shown that death-qualified
jurors are substantially more likely to convict than are jurors excludable under
Witherspoon. 990 In addition to the inclination to convict stemming from attitudes held
going into the jury-qualification process, the process itself is prejudicial, inevitably
creating an impression that the major players in the courtroom, including the judge and
defense counsel, believe the defendant is guilty.991
Since juries prescribe the punishment in capital cases, jurors who would not under
any circumstances impose a death sentence of course must be excluded from the penalty
phase of the trial, but they do not have to be excluded from the guilt-determination phase.
The solution is to have two juries—one for the guilt-innocence phase that is not deathqualified, and one for the penalty phase that is death-qualified. Proponents of the death
penalty can be counted upon to object to the costs associated with impaneling two juries.
In the scheme of things, however, the cost would be inconsequential.
In 2018, death sentences were imposed in forty-two state and federal cases.992 The
data are sketchy on the numbers of trials in which juries impose death sentences
following capital sentencing hearings,993 but even if only one in three capital trials ends
in a death sentence, there would have been fewer than 150 capital sentencing hearings in
2018. Nationally, there are more than 150,000 jury trials annually. 994 If a second jury
were impaneled in each of 150 capital cases, the increase in the number of juries would
be less than one-tenth of one percent—which would not break the criminal-adjudication
bank.
989

Claudia L. Cowan, William C. Thompson, Phoebe C. Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qualification on
Jurors' Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 53, 55–59
(1984) (summarizing studies concluding that death qualification results in juries more likely to convict than
juries that are not death-qualified); Haney, supra note 985, at 520, 525–26.
990
HANS ZEISEL, SOME DATA ON JUROR ATTITUDES TOWARDS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1968); Edward
Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-Qualified Jury: A Study of
Colorado Veniremen, 42 COLO. L. REV. 1 (1970); Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process
vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984); George L.
Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a “Death Qualified” Jury on the Guilt Determination Process, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 567 (1971); Welsh S. White, Constitutional Invalidity of Convictions Imposed by Death-Qualified
Juries, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1176 (1973).
991
Haney, supra note 985, at 523.
992
Death Sentences in 2018, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/2018-sentencing
(last visited May 22, 2018).
993
DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 233 (1990) (reporting that, in postFurman cases, juries imposed death sentences in 25% of Delaware cases, 36% of Colorado and New Jersey
cases, 42% of Maryland cases, 49% of Louisiana cases, 48% of California cases, 50% of North Carolina
cases, and 60% of Mississippi cases); Brandon L. Garrett, The Decline of the Virginia (and American)
Death Penalty, 105 GEO L.J. 661, 664 (2017) (reporting the author’s finding that a life sentence was
imposed in eleven of twenty-one Virginia cases—52%—in which there were capital-sentencing hearings
from 2005 through 2015).
994
HON. GREGORY E. MIZE ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF
JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS 7 (2007), http://www.ncscjurystudies.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CJS/SOS/SOSCompendiumFinal.ashx (reporting that, from 2002
through 2006, on average there were an estimated 148,558 state and 5,940 federal jury trials).
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A related situation that veritably demands action is racial discrimination in jury
selection—an historic wrong that could be remedied most easily by eliminating
peremptory challenges.995 Abuse of the jury-selection system in a racially discriminatory
manner is legion. 996 One example of how peremptory challenges are implicated in
dubious convictions is the Missouri case of Marcellus S. Williams, 997 an African
American at whose capital trial for the murder of a white woman the prosecution
exercised peremptory challenges to eliminate six qualified African Americans from the
jury.998 There is a strong and growing consensus among judges and legal scholars that the
jury-selection process should be overhauled.999 Reform, in our view, is long overdue.
995

Justice Thurgood Marshall believed that eliminating peremptory challenges was the only way to end
“the repugnancy” of racial discrimination in jury selection. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03
(1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
996
See Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory
Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 456–47 (1996) (surveying reported decisions 1,101 Batson
claims by criminal defendants between April 30, 1986 and April 30, 1993).
997
Supra profile No. 21.
998
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 818, at 4. A more egregious example is the case of
Curtis Giovanni Flowers, an African American gospel singer with no criminal record who is on death row
in Mississippi for a quadruple murder for which he has been tried six times. David Leonhardt, The
Mississippi Man Tried Six Times for the Same Crime, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2018, at A22; Nathalie
Baptiste, Prosecutors Are Using Jailhouse Snitches to Send Innocent People to Death Row, MOTHER
JONES, (July 9, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2018/07/prosecutors-are-usingjailhouse-snitches-to-send-innocent-people-to-death-row/ (last visited May 23, 2019) Curtis appears to
have been the repeated victim of racial discrimination in jury selection, having been sentenced to death
following four of his six trials at which the prosecutor, Montgomery County District Attorney Doug Evans,
exercised peremptory challenges to eliminate most qualified black jurors. Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief at 95, 110, Flowers v. State, No. 200300071-CR (Montgomery Cty. Cir. Ct. Mar. 17, 2016) (on file
with authors). The first three convictions were reversed based on prosecutorial misconduct. Flowers v.
State, 947 So. 2d 910 (Miss. 2007); Flowers v. State, 842 So. 2d 531, 535 (Miss. 2003); Flowers v. State,
773 So. 2d 309, 312–13 (Miss. 2000). Curtis’s other two trials ended in hung juries—the second in 2007
when seven white jurors voted to convict and five black jurors voted to acquit. Brief of Amici Curiae, The
Magnolia Bar Association, The Mississippi Center For Justice, and Innocence Project New Orleans at 21.
Flowers v. State, No l 7-9572 (U.S. July 26, 2018) (on file with authors). Flowers’s fourth conviction, after
his sixth trial, was affirmed by the Mississippi Supreme Court, Flowers v. State, 158 So. 3d 1009, 1075–76
(Miss. 2014), but remanded by U.S. Supreme Court for consideration of possible racial discrimination in
jury selection, Flowers v. Mississippi, 136 S. Ct. 2157 (2016), and reaffirmed by the Mississippi Supreme
Court, Flowers v. State, 240 So. 3d 1082, 1106 (Miss. 2017). On November 2, 2018, the U.S. Supreme
Court agreed to review the case. Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 451 (2018). The case was argued on
March 20, 2019. Richard Wolf, Justices Ponder Racism in Miss. Case, CLARION LEDGER (Jackson), Mar.
21, 2019, at A4. A decision is awaited.
999
See José Felipé Anderson, Catch Me If You Can! Resolving the Ethical Tragedies in the Brave New
World of Jury Selection, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 343, 349 (1998) (“There is a cruel irony in the jury system
that the very element of public consensus that gives it its democratic character may, in the same breath,
lead to controversial and unjust verdicts that many of us abhor.”); Mark W. Bennett,
Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2010)
(“[P]resent methods of addressing bias in the legal system—particularly in jury selection—which are
directed primarily at explicit bias, may only worsen implicit bias.”); Carol A. Chase & Colleen P. Graffy,
A Challenge for Cause Against Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Proceedings, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L.J. 507, 508 (1997) (“[I]t is now evident that trial attorneys primarily use peremptory challenges to
‘stack the deck’ and seat a favorable, rather than impartial, jury.”); Morris B. Hoffman,
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It also seems reasonable that, since appellate courts view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, trial juries ought to be instructed to view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the accused. Presently juries in criminal cases are instructed
that defendants are entitled to a presumption of innocence and that guilt must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.1000 We are not suggesting changing the standard of proof, but
rather merely that the standard be expressed differently. What does the presumption of
innocence mean—if not that the evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to
the defendant? We are confident that the language we propose would result in fewer
erroneous convictions if the instruction were given at least three times—during the juryqualification process, before opening statements, and before the jury retires at the close of
evidence.
Regarding evidentiary issues, in our view, no conviction should stand when it
probably would not have occurred absent the testimony of a witness who is a proven
liar—as a recanting witness is by definition, except under the rarest of circumstances.1001
A case in point is that of Sonia Jacobs, whose conviction and death sentence rested
heavily on the testimony of Walter Norman Rhodes, Jr., who recanted his trial testimony
and then recanted his recantation.1002 All fifty states and the federal government permit
perjury convictions solely on proof that materially conflicting statements were made
under oath—without regard to which may be true or false.1003 The same standard should
entitle a convicted person to relief upon showing that the sole witness on whose
testimony the conviction rested is a liar—which a recantation definitively establishes. Yet
judges reviewing cases in which prosecution witnesses have recanted often presume that
recantations are inherently unreliable1004—as evidenced by the fact that recantations in
eleven of the twenty-four cases profiled above have proved insufficient to secure
relief.1005
An even better idea than endeavoring to persuade judges to take recantations
seriously would be to keep the sort of testimony that winds up being recanted out of trials
Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 810
(1997) (“After experiencing peremptory challenges firsthand for six years as a trial judge in a state court of
general jurisdiction, I now add my small voice to the chorus calling for abolition.”); Tania Tetlow, Solving
Batson, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1859, 1992 (2015) (“Peremptory challenges function not as an
individualized attempt to determine impartiality but rather as an adversarial process that makes use of each
side’s self-interest.”).
1000
California Pattern Jury Instruction No. 103 says, for example, “A defendant in a criminal case is
presumed to be innocent.” CAL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 103 (JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL. 2019). This
presumption requires the state to prove a defendant guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
1001
A recantation can be a retraction of a mistake. For example, Jacques Rivera was exonerated in 2011 of
a murder for which he had been in prison in Illinois for twenty-two years, after the only witness who linked
him to the crime—a twelve-year-old boy—recanted, saying that, after identifying Rivera, he had seen the
killer on the street and realized that he had made a mistake. Ruling of Hon. Neera Walsh at 7, People v.
Rivera, 88 CR 15436 (Cir. Ct. of Cook Cty. Sept. 12, 2011) (on file with authors).
1002
Supra profile No. 1.
1003
Survey of Perjury Statutes by Rob Warden (2015) (on file with authors).
1004
Warden, supra note 46 and accompanying text.
1005
The cases, in addition to that of Sonia Jacobs, are those of Edward Lee Elmore (supra profile No. 4),
John George Spirko Jr. (No. 5), Kevin Cooper (No. 6), Jarvis Jay Masters (No. 8), Ha’im Al Matin Sharif
(No. 10), Dennis Harold Lawley (No. 13), Tyrone Lee Noling (No. 14), David Ronald Chandler (No. 15),
Larry Ray Swearingen (No. 22), and Kimber Edwards (No. 23).
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in the first place. Jailhouse informant testimony has proved so notoriously false in cases
in which defendants have been exonerated1006 that a categorical ban on such testimony—
which contributed to convictions in ten of our profiled cases1007—seems justified.
Another useful reform would be to allow defendants, at their discretion, to
introduce polygraph results at their trials.1008 The fact that the defendant agrees to take
the test is in itself probative of innocence. Reliability of the test is beside the point. 1009
Jurors who convicted Tyrone Lee Noling1010 might have acquitted him had they known
that he had agreed to take and passed a polygraph test. 1011 The convictions of
Damien Wayne Echols1012 and his co-defendants might have been avoided if their juries
had known that Jessie Lloyd Misskelley, Jr. had taken and passed a polygraph. 1013 Sonia
Jacobs1014 might not have been convicted if the judge in her case had not suppressed a
polygraph examiner’s exculpatory memo.1015
To gain prompt release and avoid retrials, Jacobs and defendants in three of the
other profiled cases—Edward Lee Elmore, 1016 Ha’im Al Matin Sharif, 1017 and Damien
Wayne Echols 1018 —entered what amounted to coerced pleas under North Carolina v.
Alford.1019 In addition, Corey Dewayne Williams agreed to plead guilty in exchange for

1006

Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent Redux, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA
REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 40, 51 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017)
(reporting that 74 convictions, or 22% of 330 convictions in cases in which defendants were exonerated by
DNA evidence, rested in part on jailhouse-informant testimony).
1007
See supra profiles Sonia Jacobs (No. 1), Jonathan Bruce Reed (No. 2), Edward Lee Elmore (No. 4),
John George Spirko Jr. (No. 5), Kevin Cooper (No. 6), Jarvis Jay Masters (No. 8), Ha’im Al Matin Sharif
(No. 10), Walter Ogrod (No. 11), Tyrone Lee Noling (No. 14), and Larry Ray Swearingen (No. 22).
1008
A forerunner of the modern polygraph was deemed inadmissible nearly a century ago. Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that a systolic blood pressure deception test had not
gained “standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities”),
superseded by FED. R. EVID. 702, as stated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
In the years since, polygraphs have been banned under the Frye standard. See James R. McCall,
Misconceptions and Reevaluation—Polygraph Admissibility After Rock and Daubert, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV.
363, 364 (1996) (“American courts have invariably followed Frye . . . on the question of
admitting polygraph results in[to] evidence.”).
1009
The National Academy of Sciences has noted that, “One role of the polygraph test is to help elicit
admissions from people who believe, or are influenced to believe, that it will accurately detect any
deception they may attempt. . . . The polygraph test has a useful role independently of whether it can
accurately detect deception.” NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’S ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE
POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 22 (2003).
1010
Supra profile No. 14.
1011
See supra note 593 and accompanying text.
1012
Supra profile No. 17.
1013
Supra note 691 and accompanying text.
1014
Supra profile No. 1.
1015
Supra note 58 and accompanying text.
1016
Supra profile No. 4.
1017
Supra profile No. 10.
1018
Supra profile No. 17.
1019
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 28 n.2 (1970). For a discussion of the coercive effect of plea
negotiations for defendants in custody, see David M. Reutter, Alford Pleas: Prosecutors’ Choice for the
Wrongfully Convicted, CRIM. LEGAL NEWS (Nov. 16, 2017),
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immediate release while a petition for certiorari in his case was pending before the U.S.
Supreme Court. 1020 Prosecutors’ willingness to offer and accept such pleas is a tacit
acknowledgement that the defendants pose no danger to society. The defendants, thus,
ought to be released on personal recognizance while considering the offer—a situation
that would remain coercive, but not to the extent that it is for persons in custody. Another
way to alleviate the problem would be to establish civil procedures under which persons
who enter pleas to gain prompt release could pursue certificates of innocence, restoring
their legal innocence and entitling them to pursue compensation for wrongful
imprisonment.1021
Dubious confessions were involved in five of the profiled cases—those of codefendants Thomas Jesse Ward and Karl Allen Fontenot,1022 Walter Ogrod,1023 Damien
Wayne Echols,1024 Corey Dewayne Williams,1025 and Kimber Edwards.1026 In the case of
Eddie Lee Howard, Jr., a police officer testified that during interrogation Howard had
stated, “I had a temper and that’s why this happened.” 1027 In recent years, electronic
recording of custodial interrogations, a safeguard against police misconduct during
interrogations, has been implemented in about half of the states, 1028 but the common,
counterintuitive phenomenon of false confessions persists.1029

https://www.criminallegalnews.org/news/2017/nov/16/alford-pleas-prosecutors-choice-wrongfullyconvicted/.
1020
Supra profile No. 20.
1021
Illinois, Kansas, and the District of Columbia have civil procedures under which exonerated persons
may obtain certificates of innocence but, to qualify, an applicant’s conviction must have been vacated and
charges must have been dismissed. D.C. CODE § 2-421 (2017); 735 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/2-702 (2014); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-5004 (2018). The laws would have to be amended in order for persons who enter Alford
pleas to avail themselves to the procedures.
1022
Supra profile No. 7.
1023
Supra profile No. 11.
1024
Supra profile No. 17.
1025
Supra profile No. 20.
1026
Supra profile No. 23.
1027
Supra profile No. 16.
1028
In 2000, when the Kimber Edwards case (the last of the profiled cases involving a confession) arose,
electronic recording was required only in Alaska and Minnesota—by court order. THOMAS P. SULLIVAN,
ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS 7–8 (2019),
https://www.nacdl.org/electronicrecordingproject. Fourteen states (California, Colorado, Illinois, Kansas,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Texas, and
Vermont) and the District of Columbia now require electronic recording by law. Id. Court orders similar to
those that have required electronic recording in Alaska since 1985 and in Minnesota since 1994 now
require electronic recording in five additional states (Arkansas, Indiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Utah).
Id. Recording of custodial interrogations is not required in Pennsylvania, but Philadelphia police now
record them voluntarily in murder cases. Id. at 121.
1029
Electronic recording has not prevented false confessions in a number of cases, including those of
(jurisdiction and crime date in parenthesis) Robert Armstrong (Ariz., 2003), David Alexander Bostick (Fla.,
2008), Travis DuBois Sr. (N.D., 2011), Matthew Livers (Neb., 2006), Lorenzo Montoya (Colo., 2000),
Travis Rowley (N.M., 2007), James Cox, (Mo. 2007), and Michael Clemens (Ind., 2015). Email from
Richard A. Leo, professor of law and psychology, Univ. of S.F., to Rob Warden (Mar. 27, 2019 11:02
CDT) (on file with authors).
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The underlying problem is that the standard for admission of confessions into
evidence at trial is their voluntariness—not their reliability.1030 On the latter score, the
confessions in our chronicled cases leave much to be desired. In the Ward-Fontenot case,
the authorities construed descriptions of dreams as confessions, even though the
purported facts in the dreams were significantly at odds with the facts of the crime.1031
Intellectual limitations known to render suspects vulnerable to psychological
interrogation techniques1032 were manifested in three of the cases—those of Ogrod, who
suffered from learning disabilities, 1033 Jessie Lloyd Misskelley, Jr., who was only
seventeen and had an IQ of seventy-two when he made the confession that landed Echols
on death row,1034 and Williams, who was only sixteen and had an IQ of sixty-eight when
he was interrogated.1035 The officer who attributed an incriminating remark to Howard
had made no contemporaneous note of the alleged admission.1036
In medicine, before invasive procedures can be performed, except in emergencies,
“informed consent” is required. 1037 If that standard were required in advance of
interrogations, few suspects would waive their right to remain silent under Miranda v.
Arizona. 1038 The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry has

Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961) (holding that a trial judge’s attention should focus on
whether interrogators’ behavior “was such as to overbear petitioner’s will to resist and bring
about confessions not freely self-determined—a question to be answered with complete disregard of
whether or not petitioner in fact spoke the truth”).
1031
Supra notes 301–06 and accompanying text.
1032
GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS 261 (2003) (stating
that mentally handicapped persons “are considered to be ‘vulnerable’ suspects” and quoting the UK Police
& Criminal Justice Act 77-78 (1984): “[M]entally handicapped people [may be] . . . particularly prone in
certain circumstances to provide information which is . . . self-incriminating.”); Christine S. ScottHayward, Explaining Juvenile False Confessions: Adolescent Development and Policy Interrogation, 53
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. (2007), at 54, 57-58 (citing cases that, “along with research demonstrating the
vulnerability of young people to suggestive and deceptive interrogation techniques, suggest that juvenile
false confessions is a serious problem.”) Since 1974, more than 500,000 U.S. police officers have been
trained in psychological interrogation techniques. John E. Reid & Associates Training Programs,
http://www.reid.com/training_programs/r_training.html (last visited May 23, 2019).
1033
Supra notes 440–44 and accompanying text.
1034
Supra notes 690–91 and accompanying text. In the United States, interrogators are allowed to lie to
suspects. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495–96 (1977) (holding that interrogator’s lie that
petitioner’s fingerprints had been found at the crime scene was insufficient to render his confession
inadmissible); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737, 739 (1969) (holding petitioner’s confession voluntary
even though he had been falsely told during interrogation that a co-suspect had confessed). The practice has
been banned in the United Kingdom. CHRISTIAN A. MEISSNER ET AL., CAMPBELL SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS
INTERVIEW AND INTERROGATION METHODS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON TRUE AND FALSE CONFESSIONS 11–12
(2012)
https://campbellcollaboration.org/media/k2/attachments/Meissner_Interview_Interrogation_Review.pdf.
1035
Supra note 782 and accompanying text.
1036
Supra note 651 and accompanying text.
1037
Informed Consent: Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.1.1, AM. MED ASS’N, https://www.amaassn.org/delivering-care/ethics/informed-consent (last visited May 23, 2019).
1038
384 U.S. 436 (1996).
1030
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recommended that juvenile suspects have attorneys present during interrogation. 1039
Establishing that as a right for all suspects, regardless of age, would guarantee that
statements made during interrogation were genuinely voluntary.
Ten of our profiled cases involved allegations of prosecutorial misconduct1040—a
scandal of significant proportions that has gone largely unaddressed by the courts. 1041
Various remedies have been suggested, including encouraging judges to comply with
existing requirements to report prosecutorial misconduct to disciplinary authorities and
requiring prosecutors to implement open-file policies to make exculpatory materials
accessible to trial counsel. 1042 Perhaps a more effective remedy would be to avail
prosecutors to civil liability for civil rights deprivations under the Civil Rights Act of
1871, which provides that, with the exception of judicial officers acting in their official
capacities, “[e]very person” who acts under color of law to deprive another of a
constitutional right “shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.” 1043 Despite that inclusive language, the U.S.
Supreme Court has exempted prosecutors on the theory that the disciplinary process is
sufficient to address the problem. 1044 Experience strongly suggests otherwise, and it
seems long past time to hold prosecutors civilly accountable for their misdeeds.
This brings us to one of the criminal justice system’s dirtiest little open secrets,
which is that juries, as the late Jerome Frank, a renowned legal philosopher and judge of
1039

Interviewing and Interrogating Juvenile Suspects, AM. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY
(Mar. 7, 2013),
https://www.aacap.org/aacap/Policy_Statements/2013/Interviewing_and_Interrogating_Juvenile_Suspects.a
spx (last visited May 23, 2019).
1040
Those of Sonia Jacobs (profile No. 1) (suppressing polygraph examiner’s memo undermining trial
testimony of key witness, supra note 34 and accompanying text), Jonathan Bruce Reed (No. 2) (telling jury
that jailhouse informant’s testimony that Reed, in describing the crime, had stated that the victim had a
tampon in place, although in fact the tampon had been inserted at the hospital after the attack, and failing to
disclose the informant’s plea agreement, supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text), John George Spirko
(No. 5.) (failing to disclose evidence that alleged co-perpetrator had been in Kentucky when the crime
occurred in Ohio, supra notes 198–202, 211–12 and accompanying text), Kevin Cooper (No. 6) (belated
disclosure during trial of exculpatory witness interviews, supra notes 257–62 and accompanying text),
Walter Ogrod (No. 11) (failing to disclose that two informants had been promised leniency in exchange for
their testimony, supra notes 495–96 and accompanying text), Dennis Harold Lawley (No. 13) (withholding
exculpatory evidence, supra note 569 and accompanying text), Tyrone Lee Noling (No. 14) (allegedly
coercing witnesses to testify falsely, supra note 608 and accompanying text), David Ronald Chandler (No.
15) (threatening witness with electric chair unless he falsely implicated defendant, supra note 630 and
accompanying text), Corey Dewayne Williams (No. 20) (suppressing exculpatory recordings of witness
interviews, supra notes 802–04 and accompanying text), and Larry Ray Swearingen (No. 22) (failing to
disclose statements of victim’s co-workers that she had received threatening telephone calls that the
defendant could not have made, supra note 879 and accompanying text).
1041
For an account of the extent of the problem and the failure to address it, see Thomas P. Sullivan &
Maurice Possley, The Chronic Failure to Discipline Prosecutors for Misconduct: Proposals For Reform,
105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 881 (2015).
1042
Id. at 904–39 (providing a thorough discussion of possible reforms).
1043
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
1044
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) (“[A] prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials
whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by an
association of his peers. These checks undermine the argument that the imposition of civil liability is the
only way to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional rights of persons accused of crime.”).
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the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, observed eighty-one years ago, are
“hopelessly incompetent as fact-finders” 1045 —an inconvenient truth borne out in the
DNA forensic age.1046 As long as we have juries, surely we ought not entrust them with
life-and-death decisions. Nor, of course, should we relegate such decisions to judges like
“Maximum Dan” Futch.1047 That leaves but one option—abolishing capital punishment.

1045

JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 179–80 (1930).
See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., CONVICTED BY JURIES,
EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER
TRIAL (1996) (documenting twenty-eight cases in which convicted persons were exonerated by DNA
testing).
1047
Supra note 19 and accompanying text.
1046
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